scholarly journals Winning the Other, Other War: Winning Military Hearts and Minds for MOOTW in the Global War on Terror

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmela A. Conroy
Author(s):  
Lauren Benton

While the other chapters in Part III focus on Europe and its ‘semi-periphery’, Lauren Benton turns to the justification of imperial violence within the periphery: in response to urgent calls to protect imperial subjects across the nineteenth-century world, European imperial agents were authorized to use force at their discretion and instructed to avoid the outbreak of new, full-scale wars. Imperial agents drew from well-established practices of protection and possession in framing justifications for small-scale, sporadic violence. Their efforts gave expression to a perpetual right of empires to use violence to promote order in pluri-political regions of overlapping and uncertain sovereignties. This chapter illustrates these patterns by examining interpolity conflicts in one Pacific region and the strategies of British navy captains. The case suggests that understanding nineteenth-century legalities of imperial violence can be useful to the analysis of justifications of episodic use of force in later periods, including periodic attacks by international hegemons in the global ‘war on terror’.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candice A. Alfano ◽  
Jessica Balderas ◽  
Simon Lau ◽  
Brian E. Bunnell ◽  
Deborah C. Beidel

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abigail B. Calkin

Author(s):  
Avinash Paliwal

The Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha in March 2001 outraged India (and the world). It killed any scope for conciliation with the Taliban. In this context, the US decision to take military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks was welcomed by many in India. However, Washington’s decision to undertake such action without UN approval (which came only in December 2001) sparked another round of debate between the partisans and the conciliators. As this chapter shows, the former were enthusiastic about supporting the US in its global war on terror, but the latter advocated caution given Washington’s willingness to partner with Islamabad. Despite the global trend to ‘fight terrorism’, the conciliators were successful in steering India away from getting involved in Afghanistan militarily.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Falkenrath

This chapter examines strategy and deterrence and traces the shift from deterrence by ‘punishment’ to deterrence by ‘denial’ in Washington’s conduct of the Global War on Terror. The former rested on an assumption that the consequences of an action would serve as deterrents. The latter may carry messages of possible consequences, but these are delivered by taking action that removes the capabilities available to opponents – in the given context, the Islamist terrorists challenging the US. Both approaches rest on credibility, but are more complex in the realm of counter-terrorism, where the US authorities have no obvious ‘return to sender’ address and threats to punish have questionable credibility. In this context, denial offers a more realistic way of preventing terrorist attacks. Yet, the advanced means available to the US are deeply ethically problematic in liberal democratic societies. However, there would likely be even bigger questions if governments failed to act.


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