Impact of the International Criminal Court on United States National Security Policy

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy A. Kokinda
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
National Security Policy

The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Afghanistan: The Rupturing of Mutual Accommodation

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Chief Prosecutor ◽  
The U.S

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.

scholarly journals Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International Criminal Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-173
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Intelligence Agencies ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address fiercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bolton challenged the legitimacy of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identified retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies.”

The United States and the International Criminal Court: Avoiding Jurisdiction Through Bilateral Agreements in Reliance on Article 98

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Bilateral Agreements ◽  
General Obligation ◽  
History Of ◽  
Treaty Interpretation

AbstractState-parties to the International Criminal Court Statute have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate represents the functional cornerstone of the Court's existence. A narrow exception to this duty is contained in Article 98 of the Statute, which provides for limited circumstances in which the Court must refrain from seeking a surrender of an individual to the Court. Following rules of treaty interpretation, as well as an examination of the legislative history of the ICC Statute, the article explores the scope of Article 98, the provision the United States relied on in concluding a series of bilateral agreements that are primarily aimed at preventing the surrender of any U.S. nationals to the ICC. The article considers the issue of what impact, if any, the agreements have in the context of extradition, and the U.S.' legal ability to fulfill the commitments made in the "Article 98" agreements.

National Security Evidence: Enhancing Fairness in View of the Non-Disclosure Regime of the Rome Statute

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-359
Author(s):  
Ariel Zemach
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Present Article ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Prosecutorial Discretion ◽  
Selection Of

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court completely divests the Court of the power to compel a state to disclose evidence in its possession if the state opposes such disclosure on grounds of national security. If a state refuses to disclose information essential to the adjudication of a case on national security grounds, the ICC may settle fair trial concerns either by drawing factual inferences favourable to the defendant or by staying the proceedings. I argue, however, that in practice such judicial powers do not provide a sufficient guarantee of a fair trial. I propose to allay fair trial concerns arising from the refusal of states to allow the ICC access to evidence in their possession by introducing a reform in the exercise of the ICC's prosecutorial discretion. According to my proposal, the requirement of a fair trial, which entails the disclosure of material essential for the defence, would be incorporated into the criteria that guide the ICC Prosecutor in the selection of cases for prosecution. Although the present article focuses on the issue of national security evidence, the reach of the proposed reform extends to all cases of state refusal to allow the ICC access to evidence, regardless of the grounds for refusal.

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