scholarly journals Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International Criminal Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-173

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address fiercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bolton challenged the legitimacy of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identified retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies.”

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-630

On April 4, 2019, the United States revoked the visa of Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This action occurred less than a month after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that, except to the extent otherwise required by the UN Headquarters Agreement, the United States would impose visa restrictions on “those individuals directly responsible for any ICC investigation of U.S. personnel.” In her preliminary investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, Bensouda had specifically listed war crimes by U.S. military and intelligence agencies as one of several categories of crimes that her office found reason to believe had occurred. Approximately one week after Bensouda's visa revocation, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denied her request to move forward with an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-140

On September 2, 2020, the Trump administration announced that the United States had added the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and the head of the Office of the Prosecutor's Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochoko, to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The action followed Executive Order 13,928, signed in June, which authorized economic sanctions and visa restrictions on ICC employees who are investigating whether U.S. forces committed war crimes in Afghanistan. Governments and human rights groups decried the sanctions as an attack on international justice.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Beth Van Schaack

On June 11, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13928 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court under the authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and other federal statutes. Although the Trump Administration had earlier threatened aggressive action against the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issuance of the E.O. followed a ruling by the ICC Appeals Chamber authorizing the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which might implicate U.S. persons. The E.O. declared the ICC's “illegitimate assertion of jurisdiction” over U.S. personnel and the personnel of “certain of its allies” to be “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” within the meaning of IEEPA. It is a sweeping measure, blocking all property within the United States owned by designated natural or legal person (section 1); barring any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for the benefit of, designated persons (section 3), including even the donation of food, clothing, or medicine (section 2). The E.O. also authorized the imposition of certain immigration restrictions, including suspension of entry into the United States of ICC officials and their immediate family members (Section 4).


1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric D. Smaw

In what follows, I present a combination of philosophical and political perspectives on human rights and the establishment of an international criminal court. I present the United States’ pragmatic objections to establishing an international criminal court. Contrary to the United States’ pragmatic objections, I argue in favor of an international criminal court. Ultimately, I attempt to illustrate that the international criminal court will have protective measures designed to prevent political abuses of justice. When working properly, these protective measures will satisfy the U.S.’s pragmatic concerns. Thus, I conclude, the U.S. ought not abandon its longer history of supporting the establishment of an international criminal court.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-183
Author(s):  
THOMAS WAYDE PITTMAN ◽  
MATTHEW HEAPHY

AbstractThis article addresses the prosecution of service members by the United States for the commission of war crimes, specifically whether or not the offences charged in such cases can truly be considered ‘war crimes’. The answer has implications in terms of application of the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute, as well as the stigmatic effect that is avoided when the United States prosecutes ordinary criminal offences rather than war crimes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Pellet

In their eagerness to justify the “United States perspective” on the Kampala definition of the crime of aggression and on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Koh and Buchwald tend to invent imaginary enemies and to ascribe to them views that they do not actually hold. In so doing, the authors weaken a thesis that, in some respects, is not devoid of interest. From at least two points of view, however, their article is paradoxical, if not pathetic—exactly like the U.S. position.


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