Information Warfare...From the Sea. Integrating Information Operations and the Marine Corps Planning Process

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas I. Feiring
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1855-1864
Author(s):  
Olga Zoric ◽  
Katarina Jonev ◽  
Ivan Rancic

The author starts from the informational dimension of the operational environment in a strategic reality and deal with the problem of defining informational power from the theoretical and practical aspect of information warfare.The deliberations in the work are aimed to initiate a procedure for auditing of the security documents in order to create a legal basis for the operationalization of the content of information security, as one of the aspects of integral security of the Republic of Serbia. The paper deals with the conceptual determinations and importance of information, information warfare and information operations, as well as the content of information warfare, pointing out the strategic and doctrinal definitions of the information warfare of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia. It is necessary to accurately and objectively observe world achievements in the field of national security and the relation of the most powerful world powers to the problem of information warfare. Based on a comparative analysis of world trends and the state of the theoretical and practical aspects of information security of the Republic of Serbia, the focus is on work, where measures are proposed to improve the security function in the fourth unit of work.


Author(s):  
Kenneth James Boyte

This comparative international case study provides a context for considering the evolution of cyber technologies as elements of hybrid warfare, including information operations (IO), capable of killing people, as well as impacting political elections and physical infrastructure (such as power grids and satellite-based communications and weapons systems). Threatened by “autonomous battle networks,” the “Internet of Battle Things” has been considered a domain of modern warfare by the United States since 2011 and by NATO since 2016. Focusing on three historic cyberattacks against three modern democracies—Estonia in 2007, the United States in 2012, and Ukraine during the 2013-2015 conflict—the study shows how computer warfare, first reported in the 1990s, has become integral in warfare for both state and non-state actors—particularly for information warfare waged by proxies to create confusion and manipulate public opinion via satellites that can penetrate national boundaries and firewalls with armies of zombies and botnets.


2011 ◽  
pp. 291-297
Author(s):  
Aki-Mauri Huhtinen

Information warfare (IW) has recently become of increasing importance to the military, the intelligence community, and the business world. The purpose of many actors, like decision makers, military advisers, non-governmental actors, or business people, is to facilitate an understanding of information warfare with reference to both military and civilian life (e.g., Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002; Kaldor, 2001). According to James Der Derian (2003), information warfare has become the umbrella concept for understanding cyberwar, hackerwar, netwar, virtual war, and other technological network-centric conflicts. Many of these concepts associate technology and digital equipment and refer to a specific kind of computer technology. But these concepts are also connected to the definition of conventional conflicts and warfare. The question of conflict or warfare is not only physical, but also a psychological issue. For example, the terrorist group would hit the automated teller machine systems (ATM) and steal the money of private people. The damage would be very small technically but the influence of psychological behaviour could have a long effect. The ATM systems work perfectly and safely after the damage has been done but people no longer want to use it because of bad rumours. Military operation other than war (MOOTW) has a history that goes back at least as far as Sun Tzu, who considered defeating an enemy without violence to be the “acme of skill” in warfare. Asymmetric, non-linear model of war underline the capability of perception and fast influence. The idea of avoiding open linear contact with the enemy and trying to seize the initiative to strike is the revival of the art of war. (Der Derian 2003, p. 453) Information warfare is concept of information society conflicts and threats. Information warfare means the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Cyberwar is an assault on electronic communication networks. “The POST-COLD WAR paradigm for U.S. forces in combat and in military operations other than war (MOOTW) is increasingly a nonlinear battlespace where brigades and battalions conduct independent operations in assigned sectors. In postcombat and peace-support operations, nonkinetic/nonlethal means are often the main effort. The new paradigm is changing the way the Army plans, coordinates, executes, and conducts information-operations (IO) and IO-effects assessment at brigade and below.” (Tulak, Broome, & Bennett, 2005) The action of information warfare is defined as information operation (IO). Information operation can be divided into offensive IO (e.g., computer network attack, command and control warfare, special information operations), civil affairs, public affairs (media warfare), and defensive IO (e.g., physical security, computer network defense, and counter propaganda) (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002). Information superiority means the simultaneous joint operation with all aspects of information operation. For example, the lack of defensive IO aspect can put at risk offensive IO. Without civil affairs of public affairs capabilities there are risks at achieve success in offensive and defensive IO. Media is one of the most important parts of modern warfare.


Author(s):  
A. Huhtinen

Information warfare (IW) has recently become of increasing importance to the military, the intelligence community, and the business world. The purpose of many actors, like decision makers, military advisers, non-governmental actors, or business people, is to facilitate an understanding of information warfare with reference to both military and civilian life (e.g., Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002; Kaldor, 2001). According to James Der Derian (2003), information warfare has become the umbrella concept for understanding cyberwar, hackerwar, netwar, virtual war, and other technological network-centric conflicts. Many of these concepts associate technology and digital equipment and refer to a specific kind of computer technology. But these concepts are also connected to the definition of conventional conflicts and warfare. The question of conflict or warfare is not only physical, but also a psychological issue. For example, the terrorist group would hit the automated teller machine systems (ATM) and steal the money of private people. The damage would be very small technically but the influence of psychological behaviour could have a long effect. The ATM systems work perfectly and safely after the damage has been done but people no longer want to use it because of bad rumours. Military operation other than war (MOOTW) has a history that goes back at least as far as Sun Tzu, who considered defeating an enemy without violence to be the “acme of skill” in warfare. Asymmetric, non-linear model of war underline the capability of perception and fast influence. The idea of avoiding open linear contact with the enemy and trying to seize the initiative to strike is the revival of the art of war. (Der Derian 2003, p. 453) Information warfare is concept of information society conflicts and threats. Information warfare means the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Cyberwar is an assault on electronic communication networks. “The POST-COLD WAR paradigm for U.S. forces in combat and in military operations other than war (MOOTW) is increasingly a nonlinear battlespace where brigades and battalions conduct independent operations in assigned sectors. In postcombat and peace-support operations, nonkinetic/nonlethal means are often the main effort. The new paradigm is changing the way the Army plans, coordinates, executes, and conducts information-operations (IO) and IO-effects assessment at brigade and below.” (Tulak, Broome, & Bennett, 2005) The action of information warfare is defined as information operation (IO). Information operation can be divided into offensive IO (e.g., computer network attack, command and control warfare, special information operations), civil affairs, public affairs (media warfare), and defensive IO (e.g., physical security, computer network defense, and counter propaganda) (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002). Information superiority means the simultaneous joint operation with all aspects of information operation. For example, the lack of defensive IO aspect can put at risk offensive IO. Without civil affairs of public affairs capabilities there are risks at achieve success in offensive and defensive IO. Media is one of the most important parts of modern warfare.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett Van Niekerk

Background: Contemporary technology and its rapid rise to a ubiquitous nature are affecting the way in which technology is used. This holds implications for military information operations and information warfare concepts as the previously separate functional areas are increasingly overlapping due to the increased convergence of information technology.Objective: The aim of the article is to illustrate the convergence of the functional areas of information operations through the use of reported examples and descriptive models. Methods: A qualitative review and analysis of practitioner documents, academic publications, and other reports is conducted. The diverse views of this phenomenon are contrasted and discussed. The possible implications of the convergence and possible management techniques are proposed and discussed. Results: There is strong opinion that the domains are not converging, however practice shows that there is an increasing overlap of operational considerations and organisational structure. Conclusion: It is concluded that the domains are not converging, but the operations and management of the information operations functional areas may converge, and this has an impact across all functional areas that needs to be taken into consideration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-86
Author(s):  
Emilio Iasiello

Much attention has been focused on the potential consequences of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the use of cyber weapons as an asymmetric equalizer. However, as a capability considered to be under the larger umbrella of an information operations (IO)/information warfare (IW) campaign, how significant a weapon is cyber for the strategist in an information environment? As observed in recent IO/IW campaigns targeting U.S. elections in 2016 and 2020, lack of any discernable disruptive cyber attacks may have provided an answer to this, as a cyber power purposefully elected not to implement attacks. Instead, cyber espionage was used, and even at that, played a minor complementary role in the larger effort. This calls into question the efficacy of cyber as an instrument of IO/IW, and the true nature of its role in more strategic soft-power operations. This paper argues that cyber is at best a supportive enabler of campaigns where information is the catalyst to achieve strategic results, reducing cyber attacks as tools best used for signaling, punishment, or implemented in first strike scenarios.


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