Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public Affairs.

Author(s):  
W. C. Garrison
2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma L. Briant

This article presents qualitative research examining adaptation to global asymmetric threats and a modern media environment of US Government propaganda systems by planners following 9-11, which proceeded largely unhindered by public debate. It draws on interviews with US elite sources including foreign policy, defense and intelligence personnel and documentary sources to explore how dissent was contained. A ‘merging’ of Psychological Operations and Public Affairs has been identified as a point of concern elsewhere and is argued to have facilitated the extension of US hegemony. It will present an account of the struggles between 2005 and 2009 when planners sought to alter ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ audience targeting norms that emerged in an old-media system of sovereign states with more stable populations. It focuses on a key example of transformation: the pressing through of internet policy changes for military Psychological Operations and Public Affairs, against resistance. Policies were brought in to coordinate and overcome discordance in foreign-domestic messaging by Psychological Operations and Information Operations personnel. Viewed as operational necessity for Psychological Operations, these resulted in a ‘terf war’ with Public Affairs who constructed a defense using discourses of legitimacy and credibility with domestic audiences. This article will show how concerns raised by Public Affairs were met by the reduction of their planning role, until a culture change and new orthodoxy emerged. Challenges raised by evolving media demand a reappraisal of propaganda governance and governments must allow greater transparency for public debate, legal judgement and independent academic enquiry to occur.


2011 ◽  
pp. 291-297
Author(s):  
Aki-Mauri Huhtinen

Information warfare (IW) has recently become of increasing importance to the military, the intelligence community, and the business world. The purpose of many actors, like decision makers, military advisers, non-governmental actors, or business people, is to facilitate an understanding of information warfare with reference to both military and civilian life (e.g., Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002; Kaldor, 2001). According to James Der Derian (2003), information warfare has become the umbrella concept for understanding cyberwar, hackerwar, netwar, virtual war, and other technological network-centric conflicts. Many of these concepts associate technology and digital equipment and refer to a specific kind of computer technology. But these concepts are also connected to the definition of conventional conflicts and warfare. The question of conflict or warfare is not only physical, but also a psychological issue. For example, the terrorist group would hit the automated teller machine systems (ATM) and steal the money of private people. The damage would be very small technically but the influence of psychological behaviour could have a long effect. The ATM systems work perfectly and safely after the damage has been done but people no longer want to use it because of bad rumours. Military operation other than war (MOOTW) has a history that goes back at least as far as Sun Tzu, who considered defeating an enemy without violence to be the “acme of skill” in warfare. Asymmetric, non-linear model of war underline the capability of perception and fast influence. The idea of avoiding open linear contact with the enemy and trying to seize the initiative to strike is the revival of the art of war. (Der Derian 2003, p. 453) Information warfare is concept of information society conflicts and threats. Information warfare means the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Cyberwar is an assault on electronic communication networks. “The POST-COLD WAR paradigm for U.S. forces in combat and in military operations other than war (MOOTW) is increasingly a nonlinear battlespace where brigades and battalions conduct independent operations in assigned sectors. In postcombat and peace-support operations, nonkinetic/nonlethal means are often the main effort. The new paradigm is changing the way the Army plans, coordinates, executes, and conducts information-operations (IO) and IO-effects assessment at brigade and below.” (Tulak, Broome, & Bennett, 2005) The action of information warfare is defined as information operation (IO). Information operation can be divided into offensive IO (e.g., computer network attack, command and control warfare, special information operations), civil affairs, public affairs (media warfare), and defensive IO (e.g., physical security, computer network defense, and counter propaganda) (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002). Information superiority means the simultaneous joint operation with all aspects of information operation. For example, the lack of defensive IO aspect can put at risk offensive IO. Without civil affairs of public affairs capabilities there are risks at achieve success in offensive and defensive IO. Media is one of the most important parts of modern warfare.


Author(s):  
A. Huhtinen

Information warfare (IW) has recently become of increasing importance to the military, the intelligence community, and the business world. The purpose of many actors, like decision makers, military advisers, non-governmental actors, or business people, is to facilitate an understanding of information warfare with reference to both military and civilian life (e.g., Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002; Kaldor, 2001). According to James Der Derian (2003), information warfare has become the umbrella concept for understanding cyberwar, hackerwar, netwar, virtual war, and other technological network-centric conflicts. Many of these concepts associate technology and digital equipment and refer to a specific kind of computer technology. But these concepts are also connected to the definition of conventional conflicts and warfare. The question of conflict or warfare is not only physical, but also a psychological issue. For example, the terrorist group would hit the automated teller machine systems (ATM) and steal the money of private people. The damage would be very small technically but the influence of psychological behaviour could have a long effect. The ATM systems work perfectly and safely after the damage has been done but people no longer want to use it because of bad rumours. Military operation other than war (MOOTW) has a history that goes back at least as far as Sun Tzu, who considered defeating an enemy without violence to be the “acme of skill” in warfare. Asymmetric, non-linear model of war underline the capability of perception and fast influence. The idea of avoiding open linear contact with the enemy and trying to seize the initiative to strike is the revival of the art of war. (Der Derian 2003, p. 453) Information warfare is concept of information society conflicts and threats. Information warfare means the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Cyberwar is an assault on electronic communication networks. “The POST-COLD WAR paradigm for U.S. forces in combat and in military operations other than war (MOOTW) is increasingly a nonlinear battlespace where brigades and battalions conduct independent operations in assigned sectors. In postcombat and peace-support operations, nonkinetic/nonlethal means are often the main effort. The new paradigm is changing the way the Army plans, coordinates, executes, and conducts information-operations (IO) and IO-effects assessment at brigade and below.” (Tulak, Broome, & Bennett, 2005) The action of information warfare is defined as information operation (IO). Information operation can be divided into offensive IO (e.g., computer network attack, command and control warfare, special information operations), civil affairs, public affairs (media warfare), and defensive IO (e.g., physical security, computer network defense, and counter propaganda) (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002). Information superiority means the simultaneous joint operation with all aspects of information operation. For example, the lack of defensive IO aspect can put at risk offensive IO. Without civil affairs of public affairs capabilities there are risks at achieve success in offensive and defensive IO. Media is one of the most important parts of modern warfare.


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