scholarly journals El entendimiento agente según Tomás de Aquino

2002 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Juan F. SELLÉS

The "intellectus agens" is the zenith of the theory of the human knowledge according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. It is personal in each human being: one with the being of the human person. Separated from the body, without mixture with it, impassible and always in act. Innate cognoscitive light. It proceeds from God, and from Him it participates natural and supernaturally. Through the "intellectus agens" we are free and responsible. It permits to know everything, because it activates the different human cognoscitive faculties. It uses the innate habits as instruments. It is perpetual, but after this life it will no know as now.

Author(s):  
Carlos Ramos Rosete

Toda disciplina de tipo humanista o de carácter social asume como uno de sus presupuestos fundamentales una noción de lo que es el ser humano. Llevar a cabo una reflexión de tipo filosófico sobre las nociones de hombre, persona y dignidad se vuelve imprescindible para aclarar elementos antropológicos que son fundamentos teóricos de las ciencias humanas y sociales. La palabra “hombre” admite significados que en parte coinciden y en parte difieren con la noción de persona. La expresión “persona humana” no es siempre una redundancia. Siguiendo el pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, que distingue entre las nociones de hombre y persona, la subsistencia de la persona humana se vuelve fundamento de la dignidad humana y fuente de los derechos humanos.All humanist or social discipline assumes as one of its fundamental principles an idea of what human being is. Accomplishing a philosophical reflection about the man notions, person and dignity become essential to clarify antropological elements which are theorical fundaments of human and social sciences. The Word man accepts meanings that are partly the same and partly different with the concept of human person, in some way, is not totally a redundancy. Following Saint Thomas Aquinas´s thought who distinguishes between the notions of man and person, it is noted that the subsistency of the human person turns into the human dignity basis and source of all human rights.


Philosophy ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 25 (92) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick C. Copleston

I. In the early part of the sixth century a.d. Boethius defined the person as “an individual substance of rational nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia). This definition, which became classical and was adopted by, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously implies that every human being is a person, since every human being is (to employ the philosophical terms of Boethius) an individual substance of rational nature. If one cannot be more or less of a human being, so far as “substance” is concerned, one cannot be more or less of a person. One may act as a human person ought not to act or in a way unbefitting a human person; one may even lose the normal use of one's reason; but one does not in this way become depersonalized, in the sense of ceasing to be a person. According to St. Thomas, a disembodied soul is not, strictly speaking, a person, since a disembodied soul is no longer a complete human substance; but every complete human substance is always and necessarily a person.


2019 ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Frances Young

This chapter demonstrates how arguments about creation and resurrection in the second century ensured that by the fourth century even those Christian thinkers with the most leanings toward Neoplatonism would espouse the view that the union of soul with body was constitutive of human being as a creature among creatures, and so a necessary aspect of the reconstitution of the human person at the resurrection. Soul-body dualism is often treated as the default anthropological position in antiquity, but the fourth-century anthropological treatise of Nemesius of Emesa shows that, despite huge debts to the legacies of philosophy, creation and resurrection, though barely mentioned, in fact shape his conclusion that the body-soul union is fundamental to what a human being is; the same is true, for example, of the Cappadocian Gregories and Augustine.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 161-176
Author(s):  
Marika Räsänen

Thomas Aquinas (1224/25-1274) joined the Order of Preachers around the year 1244 and became one of the most famous friars of this own time. He died in 1274 at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanova where his remains were venerated for almost a hundred years. The Dominicans, who had desired the return of the body of their beloved brother, finally received it by the order of Pope V in 1368. The Pope also ordered that the relics should have been transported (translatio) to Toulouse, where they arrived on 28 January 1369. In this article, I argue that his joining the Order was considered Thomas's first coming, and the transportation of his relics to Toulouse was his second coming to the Order. I will analyse the Office of Translatio (ca.1371) in the historical contexts of the beginning of the Observant reform of the Dominican Order in a period which was extremely unstable regarding both the papacy itself and politics between France and Italy. I will propose that the Office of Translatio inaugurated Thomas as the leader of a new era and the saviour of good Christians in a Christ-like manner. The liturgy of Translatio appears to offer a new interpretation of new apostles, the Dominicans, and the construction of eschatological self-understanding for the Dominican identity. On cover:Monks singing the Office and decorated initial A[sperges me.]. Gradual Olivetan Master (Use of the Olivetan Benedictines), illuminated manuscript on parchment ca. 1430-1439. Italy, Monastero di Santa Maria di Baggio near Milan, Ca 1400-1775.Beinecke Ms1184: The olivetan Gradual. Gradual. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.


Author(s):  
Carlos Llano

Hay dos modos de abstracción diferenciados por Tomás de Aquino: abstractio per modum totius y abstractio per modum formae, modos —y no grados— irreductibles del conocimiento humano. El primer conocimiento conserva el sujeto de aquello conocido, mientras que el segundo lo rechaza. Las consecuencias de estas diferencias originarias del conocer, se pueden abordar desde tres diversos ámbitos: antropológico (la composición hilemórfica humana), epistemológico (la vuelta al singular por parte del intelecto) y metafísico (la realidad primigenia del singular por encima del universal).Saint Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two modes of abstraction: abstractio per modum totius and abstractio per modum formae. These are essential modes, not degrees, of the human knowledge. Whereas in the first mode knowledge retains the subject of what is known, in the second mode it rejects the subject. The consequences of these fundamental differences of knowledge may be addressed through three different perspectives: anthropological (the human hylemorphic structure), epistemological (the intellect going back to the singular), and metaphysical (the reality of the singular prevailing over the universal).


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51
Author(s):  
Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere ◽  

In the quest to understand the meaning of existence, the human being is torn between many choices, exposed to individualism of all forms, especially atheistic perspectives. John Paul II’s personalism in the light of Thomas Aquinas’ personalistic notion of mercy suggests an alternative of meaningful living, co-existence, and holistic transcendence. John Paul’s search for the basis on which individual and social rights may grow and enhance human dignity demonstrate the ontological human worth. Following Aquinas’ model, John Paul shows that human dignity takes precedence over all options and needs preservation. Similarly, Aquinas’ classification of the human person as “rational subsistent” portrays this dignity in “effective mercy” that allows one to thrive in all kinds of existential vicissitudes. This essay explores John Paul’s personalist notion of mercy reflecting Aquinas’ model in the contemporary milieu in view of holistic existence.


Etyka ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Szawarski

Human life is a process. It is the process of becoming and ceasing to be a human being and it is a process of becoming and ceasing to be a human person. I accept the distinction between being a human being and being a human person and distinguish further – future, present, and past human persons. The main problem of the paper is when do we become past persons? Having distinguished and presented four distinctive modi of human dying (hospital death, hospice death, nursing home death, and death at home) I concentrate on the problem of good death and ask what are the goods of the dying person. The goods are: life, the good of the mind, the good of the body, the good of the communal life, and (paradoxically) the good of death. The decision who is a terminal patient is a moral one and implies two different strategies with regard to life: the affirmation of life, and the affirmation of death strategy. The first one, based on the concept of respect for human life, ignores the value of human dignity. The second one assumes that we should respect not only human biological life, but the whole human person, and we cannot respect the whole person if we do not respect her freedom of choice and her right to self-respect. Care for the artificially sustained but absolutely personless human life, is not a proper terminal care but rather is post-terminal care, and as such requires other, special justification.


1941 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-427
Author(s):  
Jacques Maritain

Let us think of the human being, not in an abstract and general way, but in the most concrete possible, the most personal fashion. Let us think of this certain old man we have known for years in the country, —this old farmer with his wrinkled face, his keen eyes which have beheld so many harvests and so many earthly horizons, his long habits of patience and suffering, courage, poverty and noble labor, a man perhaps like those parents of a great living American statesman whose photographs appeared some months ago in a particularly moving copy of a weekly magazine. Or let us think of this certain boy or this girl who are our relatives or our friends, whose everyday life we well know, and whose loved appearance, whose soft or husky voice is enough to rejoice our hearts. Let us remember—remember in our heart—a single gesture of the hand, or the smile in the eyes of one we love. What treasures on earth, what masterpieces of art or of science, could pay for the treasures of life, feeling, freedom and memory, of which this gesture, this smile is the fugitive expression? We perceive intuitively, in an indescribable not inescapable flash, that nothing in the world is more precious than one single human being. I am well aware how many difficult questions come to mind at the same time and I shall come back to these difficulties, but for the present I wish only to keep in mind this simple and decisive intuition, by means of which the incomparable value of the human person is revealed to us. Moreover, St. Thomas Aquinas warns us that the Person is what is noblest and most perfect in the whole of nature.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-428
Author(s):  
Jason Reimer Greig

The contemporary rise in the West of cosmetic surgery as a cultural practice expresses the story of the late modern self as autonomous renovator, and the body as disenchanted raw material and individual possession. Technological biomedicine offers itself as the institution ready to assist this reflexive self in aligning the body to an individual’s inner identity. A Christian body politics, however, challenges this narrative of the human person, by claiming that gift and dependence more aptly represent human being than possession and autonomy. The rite of footwashing, particularly as articulated by Jean Vanier and practised in the communities of L’Arche, represents a sacramental practice which forms Christians in a different narrative of the body and being human. Footwashing reminds and trains members of the Body in a non-violent gentleness towards all bodies, and a recognition of humans as creatures of a good God rather than mere possessors of inert flesh.


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