Buddhist karma as infinite regress: vicious or benign?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Kovan
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

An Argument from Contingency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Plural Logic ◽  
Classic Argument

A classic argument from contingency is presented in the language of contemporary plural logic. Included are several independent supports for the principle of explanation that drives the argument. The argument is tested with the instrument of objections. Thus, historical objections from Hume and Kant are examined, and then a series of more recent objections to arguments from contingency is considered. Objections include various reasons to doubt, or hesitate to accept, the principle of explanation. Whether the argument could be sound even if there were an infinite regress of causes is carefully considered. The chapter closes by citing both strengths and weaknesses of the argument.

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

(Non)Issues of Infinite Regress in Modeling Motor Behavior

1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Kohl ◽  
Haim A. Ben-David
Keyword(s):  
Motor Behavior ◽  
Infinite Regress

Locations

1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Edgar
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Divisibility ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Ontological Analysis

Zeno's challenge to the usual mathematical characterization of extension is still with us. Butchvarov, considering the limits of ontological analysis, writes, “I shall not explore [the decision to accept the infinite regress in which the pursuit of the analytical ideal is involved], beyond noting that the infinite divisibility of space is the reductio ad absurdum of any attempt to understand space in terms of its ultimate, simple parts.” Grünbaum states this problem, commonly known as the Measure Paradox, concisely, “[How can one conceive] of an extended continuum as an aggregate of unextended elements ?”

Lewis Carroll's Infinite Regress

Mind ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol LXXXIII (332) ◽  
pp. 571-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM A. WISDOM
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress

Easy ontology, application conditions and infinite regress

Analysis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Ontology Application

WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Short Piece ◽  
Vicious Regress

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.

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