scholarly journals R. D. Ingthorsson, McTaggart's paradox

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Kristie Miller
Keyword(s):  
Mctaggart's Paradox

scholarly journals McTaggart’s paradox and its consequences

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-242
Author(s):  
Strahinja Djordjevic
Keyword(s):  
Time Series ◽  
21St Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Temporal Relations ◽  
Philosophy Of Time ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Contrary View ◽  
History Of ◽  
Mctaggart's Paradox

McTaggart?s explanation of the human understanding of time, which uses the time series, is a significant moment in the history of philosophy, and his attempt to prove time?s unreality had strong but diverse reactions. The majority of thinkers who wrote after him agree that time is indeed real, but the intellectual division that was created around the question of which part of the paradox in dispute will dominate philosophy of time in the 20th and 21st century. It can be concluded that both major theories within this field have an undeniable influence on the division of time series which McTaggart made. After analyzing the paradox, the focus will be on clarifying the debate between tensed and tenseless theorists. The former dispute the claim that the A-series is contradictory and argue that the tensed time is the proper determination of events in time, while the latter claim that the B-series is independent and that time can be determined only by temporal relations. By recognizing the differences between these two lines of thought, it will become easier to understand the nature of their relationship to the time series, namely by considering the ways in which they defend their own and attack the contrary view.

McTaggart’s Paradox

2000 ◽  
pp. 169-217
Author(s):  
William Lane Craig
Keyword(s):  
Mctaggart's Paradox

Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience

2002 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 73-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Nathan Oaklander
Keyword(s):  
Recent Article ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Temporal Experience ◽  
The Past ◽  
William Lane Craig ◽  
Deep Trouble ◽  
Differential Experience ◽  
Mctaggart's Paradox ◽  
Basic Beliefs

In a recent article, ‘Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future,’ William Lane Craig (1999a) attempts to resuscitate A. N. Prior's (1959) ‘Thank Goodness’ argument against the B-theory by combining it with Plantinga's (1983) views about basic beliefs. In essence Craig's view is that since there is a universal experience and belief in the objectivity of tense and the reality of becoming, (that he identifies with ‘the presentist metaphysic’) ‘this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the objections brought against it.’ (1999a, 519) An intrinsic defeater-defeater is a belief that enjoys such warrant for us that it simply overwhelms the defeaters brought against it without specifically rebutting or undercutting them. Thus, Craig claims that an effete philosophical argument like McTaggart's paradox is nothing more than ‘an engaging and recalcitrant brain teaser whose conclusion nobody really takes seriously.’ (1999a, 532) It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Craig's own writings elsewhere. For Craig has vigorously argued in at least two other articles that 'hybrid A-B theorists like McCall, Schlesinger, and Smith [who give ontological status to both A-properties and B-relations] are in deep trouble’ (1998, 127) since they are all effectively refuted by McTaggart's Paradox (cf. Craig 1997). It is not Craig's inconsistency regarding the significance of McTaggart conundrum that I want to draw attention to, however. Rather I wish to raise a different issue.

scholarly journals McTaggart's paradox and Smith's tensed theory of time

Synthese ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Nathan Oaklander
Keyword(s):  
Mctaggart's Paradox ◽  
Tensed Theory

McTaggart's Paradox: Two Parodies

Philosophy ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 56 (217) ◽  
pp. 333-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Rankin
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Similar Argument ◽  
Logical Principle ◽  
Mctaggart's Paradox

To be truly provocative and outrageous the superior philosophical sophistry will commonly possess four somewhat adventitious features. I shall rate it as classic if it has all four. First, and least adventitiously, the argument will be crisp and initially seductive. Second, by the standard the sophistry sets direct rebuttal will be laborious and diffuse. Third, the recipe for the latter will prescribe that we pick out some hitherto unarticulated logical principle (e.g. ‘Existence is not a real predicate’) such that if the principle be true then the sophistical argument must be invalid, and then, on the strength of that consequence assume the principle to be true. Consequently and fourth, as an antidote parody is supreme. With a persuasive absence of fuss and bias we can turn the tables if we show that, if the sophistical argument were really valid, then some structurally similar argument would prove just as consummately far too much. In short, from the rhetorical point of view at least, Gaunilo is more lethal than Kant. Even if the similarity is defective, the sophist will lose some of his adventitious and insufferable poise, if he ventures to show why.

scholarly journals De la solución fenomenológica a la paradoja de McTaggart, al problema del “pluralismo” en la descripción de la realidad temporal

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Cormick
Keyword(s):  
Mctaggart's Paradox

RESUMEN Intentaremos continuar en este trabajo la propuesta de una solución a la paradoja de McTaggart a partir de la retoma de una línea de análisis que se remonta a Dummett, y su complementación con ciertas tesis de la fenomenología merleaupontyana. Para ello tendremos que profundizar las posiciones del autor de Truth and other enigmas en el sentido de la objeción contra una «descripción completa» de la realidad y que favorecen, por el contrario, de una pluralidad de «descripciones máximas». Nuestro intento no debe, sin embargo, adoptar un «pluralismo» que se exponga a las objeciones de Nicholas Smith, a quien replicaremos a su vez apelando a la noción fenomenológica de «síntesis de transición». Concluiremos que el «pluralismo» de descripciones temporales que nos permite escapar a la paradoja de McTaggart no resulta incompatible con el requisito de «componibilidad» planteado por Smith.PALABRAS CLAVE TIME, MERLEAU-PONTY, MCTAGGART, DUMMETT, SMITHABSTRACTIn this paper we attempt to continue the proposal of a solution to McTaggart’s paradox on the basis of a return to a line of analysis traceable back to Dummett, and its implementation with certain tenets of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology. With this aim, we have to deepen the positions of the author of Truth and other enigmas which point towards an objection against one “complete description” of reality and favour, on the contrary, a plurality of “maximal descriptions”. Our attempt must not, however, adopt a “pluralism” which can be targeted by Nicholas Smith’s objections, to whom, in turn, we reply by turning to the phenomenological notion of “synthesis of transition”. We conclude that the “pluralism” of temporal descriptions that allows us to escape from McTaggart’s paradox is not incompatible with the requisite of “compossibility” laid out by Smith.KEYWORDS TIME, MERLEAU-PONTY, MCTAGGART, DUMMETT, SMITH

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