scholarly journals Strategic Trade: Weighted Payoff Functions And Diverse Trade Patterns

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory G. Green
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Industry Trade ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Strategic Trade ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Foreign Governments

This paper extends the basic intra-industry trade model, Brander and Spencer (1985), in two directions. A weight is included in the foreign governments payoff function, similar to Collie (1997), which alters the traditional policy choice when this weight is different than one. We also require each firms output choice be nonnegative. These constraints and the weighted payoff function lead to several Nash equilibria that have not been analyzed in the intra-industry trade literature. Our analysis helps explain why industries satisfying the necessary conditions for intra-industry trade patterns may not actually display such trade patterns. [F12, F13, C72]

scholarly journals Strategic Trade: Weighted Payoff Functions And Diverse Trade Patterns

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory G. Green
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Industry Trade ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Strategic Trade ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Foreign Governments

This paper extends the basic intra-industry trade model, Brander and Spencer (1985), in two directions. A weight is included in the foreign governments payoff function, similar to Collie (1997), which alters the traditional policy choice when this weight is different than one. We also require each firms output choice be nonnegative. These constraints and the weighted payoff function lead to several Nash equilibria that have not been analyzed in the intra-industry trade literature. Our analysis helps explain why industries satisfying the necessary conditions for intra-industry trade patterns may not actually display such trade patterns. [F12, F13, C72]

ON A CLASS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH MEMORY STRATEGIES FOR NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN MICHEL COULOMB ◽  
VLADIMIR GAITSGORY
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Feedback Control ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Feedback Controls ◽  
Memory Strategies ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
With Memory

A two-player nonzero-sum differential game is considered. Given a pair of threat payoff functions, we characterise a set of pairs of acceptable feedback controls. Any such pair induces a history-dependent Nash δ-equilibrium as follows: the players agree to use the acceptable controls unless one of them deviates. If this happens, a feedback control punishment is implemented. The problem of finding a pair of "acceptable" controls is significantly simpler than the problem of finding a feedback control Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the former may have a solution in case the latter does not. In addition, if there is a feedback control Nash equilibrium, then our technique gives a subgame perfect Nash δ-equilibrium that might improve the payoff function for at least one player.

An intra-industry trade model in a vertical differentiation framework

2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Ayşen Hiç Gencer ◽  
William P. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Differentiation ◽  
Industry Trade ◽  
Trade Model

scholarly journals OCTONIONIZATION OF THREE PLAYER, TWO STRATEGY MAXIMALLY ENTANGLED QUANTUM GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADEN OMAR AHMED ◽  
STEVEN A. BLEILER ◽  
FAISAL SHAH KHAN
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Computational Capability

We develop an octonionic representation of the payoff function for three player, two strategy, maximally entangled quantum games in order to obtain computationally friendly version of this function. This computational capability is then exploited to analyze and potentially classify the Nash equilibria in the quantum games.

U.S. Vertical and Horizontal Intra-Industry Trade Patterns with the Middle East

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-160
Author(s):  
Aysar Philip Sussan ◽  
E. M. Ekanayake ◽  
Sabrina D’Souza ◽  
Leila Halawi
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Industry Trade

scholarly journals Dynamics of Strategy Distributions in a One-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space for Games with a Quadratic Payoff Function

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 14
Author(s):  
Georgiy Karev
Keyword(s):  
Broad Class ◽  
Limit State ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Initial Distribution ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Quadratic Term ◽  
Uniform Distributions ◽  
Entire Line ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Initial Distributions

Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the evolution of continuous strategy distributions given a quadratic payoff function for any initial distribution in order to answer the following question—given the initial distribution of strategies in a game, how will it evolve over time? I look at several specific examples, including normal distribution on the entire line, normal truncated distribution, as well as exponential and uniform distributions. I show that in the case of a negative quadratic term of the payoff function, regardless of the initial distribution, the current distribution of strategies becomes normal, full or truncated, and it tends to a distribution concentrated in a single point so that the limit state of the population is monomorphic. In the case of a positive quadratic term, the limit state of the population may be dimorphic. The developed method can now be applied to a broad class of questions pertaining to evolution of strategies in games with different payoff functions and different initial distributions.

scholarly journals Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria

Algorithmica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (10) ◽  
pp. 2927-2954
Author(s):  
Argyrios Deligkas ◽  
John Fearnley ◽  
Paul Spirakis
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Lipschitz Continuity ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Polynomial Algorithms ◽  
Continuous Action ◽  
Lipschitz Continuous ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Action Spaces ◽  
Best Responses ◽  
Strongly Polynomial

Abstract In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all concave games with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention to penalty games, which encompass biased games and games in which players take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function is Lipschitz continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme. Finally, we study distance biased games, where we present simple strongly polynomial time algorithms for finding best responses in $$L_1$$ L 1 and $$L_2^2$$ L 2 2 biased games, and then use these algorithms to provide strongly polynomial algorithms that find 2/3 and 5/7 approximate equilibria for these norms, respectively.

scholarly journals Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific Unemployment

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Larch ◽  
Wolfgang Lechthaler
Keyword(s):  
Heterogeneous Firms ◽  
Unskilled Worker ◽  
Skilled Workers ◽  
Skilled Worker ◽  
Industry Trade ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Unskilled Workers ◽  
Endogenous Selection ◽  
Two Sectors ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract We introduce unemployment and endogenous selection of workers into different skill-classes in a trade model with two sectors and heterogeneous firms. This allows us to identify three different channels through which trade liberalization can affect unemployment: specialization, changes in productivity, and mobility. These three channels may work in opposite directions and their relative importance depends on the type of trade (intra-industry trade vs. inter-industry trade) and the skill-class of a worker. We show that the gains from trade are distributed very unequally. When a skilled worker abundant country opens up to trade with a country that is unskilled worker abundant, the biggest losers are the skilled workers in the import sector in the skill abundant country. However, average unemployment among skilled workers goes down, while average unemployment among unskilled workers goes up.

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