Strategic trade between two regions with partial local consumer protection – General setup and nash equilibria

Strategic Trade: Weighted Payoff Functions And Diverse Trade Patterns

International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER) ◽

10.19030/iber.v2i8.3827 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 2 (8) ◽

Author(s):

Gregory G. Green

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibria ◽

Necessary Conditions ◽

Payoff Function ◽

Policy Choice ◽

Trade Patterns ◽

Industry Trade ◽

Trade Model ◽

Strategic Trade ◽

Payoff Functions ◽

Foreign Governments

This paper extends the basic intra-industry trade model, Brander and Spencer (1985), in two directions. A weight is included in the foreign governments payoff function, similar to Collie (1997), which alters the traditional policy choice when this weight is different than one. We also require each firms output choice be nonnegative. These constraints and the weighted payoff function lead to several Nash equilibria that have not been analyzed in the intra-industry trade literature. Our analysis helps explain why industries satisfying the necessary conditions for intra-industry trade patterns may not actually display such trade patterns. [F12, F13, C72]

Download Full-text

Strategic Trade: Weighted Payoff Functions And Diverse Trade Patterns

International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER) ◽

10.19030/iber.v2i4.3786 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 2 (4) ◽

Author(s):

Gregory G. Green

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibria ◽

Necessary Conditions ◽

Payoff Function ◽

Policy Choice ◽

Trade Patterns ◽

Industry Trade ◽

Trade Model ◽

Strategic Trade ◽

Payoff Functions ◽

Foreign Governments

This paper extends the basic intra-industry trade model, Brander and Spencer (1985), in two directions. A weight is included in the foreign governments payoff function, similar to Collie (1997), which alters the traditional policy choice when this weight is different than one. We also require each firms output choice be nonnegative. These constraints and the weighted payoff function lead to several Nash equilibria that have not been analyzed in the intra-industry trade literature. Our analysis helps explain why industries satisfying the necessary conditions for intra-industry trade patterns may not actually display such trade patterns. [F12, F13, C72]

Download Full-text

Difficulties of the Financial Reform in the USA

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2013-10-147-158 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 147-158

Author(s):

V. Kulakova

Keyword(s):

Economic Policy ◽

Consumer Protection ◽

Financial Regulation ◽

Financial Reform ◽

Wall Street ◽

Political Sciences ◽

Consumer Protection Act ◽

The Usa ◽

Major Factors ◽

International Financial Regulation

We study the reform of financial regulation initiated by the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Major factors impeding Obama’s financial and economic policy are explored, including institutional difficulties, party warfare, lobbyism, and systemic inconsistencies of international financial regulation. We also examine challenges that are being faced by economic and political sciences due to the changes in financial regulation and also assess the level of radicality of the financial reform.

Download Full-text

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2011-3-65-87 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 65-87 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

A. Rubinstein

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Social Policy ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Institutional Environment ◽

Social Motivation ◽

Pareto Optimal ◽

Market Failures ◽

Equilibrium Conditions ◽

Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Download Full-text