scholarly journals Strategic Option Pricing

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (20) (3) ◽  
pp. 118-129
Author(s):  
Volker Bieta ◽  
Udo Broll ◽  
Wilfried Siebe
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Option Pricing ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Binomial Model ◽  
Expiration Date ◽  
No Arbitrage ◽  
Strategic Option ◽  
Equilibrium Data ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Replicating Portfolio

In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium of which the option price can be derived is formulated. Consequently both the underlying asset’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are endogenously determined. The option price derived this way turns out, however, to be identical to the classical no-arbitrage option price of the binomial model if the expiration-date prices of the underlying asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly adjusted according to the Nash equilibrium data of the game.

Option pricing under the fractional stochastic volatility model

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 123-142
Author(s):  
Yuecai Han ◽  
Zheng Li ◽  
Chunyang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Brownian Motion ◽  
Option Pricing ◽  
Fractional Brownian Motion ◽  
Stochastic Volatility ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Stochastic Volatility Model ◽  
Option Prices ◽  
European Call Option ◽  
Volatility Model ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the European call option pricing problem under the fractional stochastic volatility model. The stochastic volatility model is driven by both fractional Brownian motion and standard Brownian motion. We obtain an analytical solution of the European option price via the Itô’s formula for fractional Brownian motion, Malliavin calculus, derivative replication and the fundamental solution method. Some numerical simulations are given to illustrate the impact of parameters on option prices, and the results of comparison with other models are presented. doi:10.1017/S1446181121000225

scholarly journals On Market Completions Approach to Option Pricing

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-93
Author(s):  
I. Vasilev ◽  
A. Melnikov
Keyword(s):  
Option Pricing ◽  
Incomplete Markets ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Option Prices ◽  
End Points ◽  
Hedging Strategies ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Interesting Approach

Option pricing is one of the most important problems of contemporary quantitative finance. It can be solved in complete markets with non-arbitrage option price being uniquely determined via averaging with respect to a unique risk-neutral measure. In incomplete markets, an adequate option pricing is achieved by determining an interval of non-arbitrage option prices as a region of negotiation between seller and buyer of the option. End points of this interval characterise the minimum and maximum average of discounted pay-off function over the set of equivalent risk-neutral measures. By estimating these end points, one constructs super hedging strategies providing a risk-management in such contracts. The current paper analyses an interesting approach to this pricing problem, which consists of introducing the necessary amount of auxiliary assets such that the market becomes complete with option price uniquely determined. One can estimate the interval of non-arbitrage prices by taking minimal and maximal price values from various numbers calculated with the help of different completions. It is a dual characterisation of option prices in incomplete markets, and it is described here in detail for the multivariate diffusion market model. Besides that, the paper discusses how this method can be exploited in optimal investment and partial hedging problems.

scholarly journals PENENTUAN HARGA OPSI BELI ATAS SAHAM PT. ANTAM (PERSERO) MENGGUNAKAN MODEL BINOMIAL FUZZY

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-24
Author(s):  
Agung Prabowo ◽  
Zulfatul Mukarromah ◽  
Lisnawati Lisnawati ◽  
Pramono Sidi
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Risk Level ◽  
Binomial Model ◽  
Purchase Price ◽  
Option Prices ◽  
Movement Data ◽  
Curve Representation ◽  
Price Option

Option is a financial instrument where price depends on the underlying stock price. The pricing of options, both selling options and purchase options, may use the CRR (Cox-Ross-Rubinstein) binomial model. Only two possible parameters were used that is u if the stock price rises and d when the stock price down. One of the elements that determine option prices is volatility. In the binomial model CRR volatility is constant. In fact, the financial market price of stocks fluctuates so that volatility also fluctuates. This article discusses volatility of fluctuating stock price movements by modeling it using binomial fuzzy with triangular curve representation. The analysis is carried out in relation to the existence of three interpretations of the triangular curve representation resulting in different degrees of membership. In addition to volatility, this study added the size or risk level ρ. As an illustration, this study used stock price movement data from PT. Antam (Persero) from August 2015 until July 2016. The results of one period obtained from the purchase price option for August 2016 with the largest volatility, medium and smallest respectively were Rp.143,43, Rp.95,49, and Rp.79,00. There was calculated at the risk level of  ρ = 90%. The degree of membership for each option price varies depending on the interpretation of the triangle curve representation.   Opsi merupakan instrumen keuangan yang harganya tergantung pada harga saham yang mendasarinya. Penentuan harga opsi, baik opsi jual maupun opsi beli dapat menggunakan model binomial CRR (Cox-Ross-Rubinstein). Dalam model ini hanya dimungkinkan adanya dua parameter yaitu u apabila harga saham naik dan d pada saat harga saham turun. Salah satu unsur yang menentukan harga opsi adalah volatilitas. Dalam model binomial CRR digunakan volatilitas yang bersifat konstan. Padahal, pada pasar keuangan pergerakan harga saham mengalami fluktuasi sehingga volatilitas juga menjadi fluktuatif. Artikel ini membahas volatilitas pergerakan harga saham yang fluktuatif dengan memodelkannya menggunakan binomial fuzzy dengan representasi kurva segitiga. Analisis dilakukan terkait dengan adanya tiga interpretasi terhadap representasi kurva segitiga tersebut yang menghasilkan derajat keanggotaan yang berbeda. Selain volatilitas, dalam penelitian ini ditambahkan ukuran atau tingkat risiko ρ. Sebagai ilustrasi, digunakan data pergerakan harga saham PT. Antam (Persero) dari Agustus 2015 hingga Juli 2016. Hasil penelitian dengan perhitungan satu periode diperoleh hasil harga opsi beli untuk bulan Agustus 2016 dengan volatilitas terbesar, menengah, dan terkecil masing-masing adalah Rp.143,43, Rp.95,49, dan Rp.79,00 yang dihitung pada tingkat risiko ρ = 90%. Derajat keanggotaan untuk masing-masing harga opsi berbeda-beda tergantung pada interpretasi dari representasi kurva segitiga.

scholarly journals EMPIRICAL TEST OF PUT-CALL PARITY ON SPX OVER THE SHORT BAN 2008

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Huyen Do
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Test ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
No Arbitrage ◽  
Put Option ◽  
Key Word ◽  
Momentum Trading ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Trading Behaviour

Put call parity is a theoretical no-arbitrage condition linking a call option price to a put option price written on the same stock or index. This study finds that Put call parity violations are quite symmetric over the whole sample. However during the ban period 2008 in the U.S., puts are significantly and economically overpriced relative to calls. Some possible explanations are the short selling restriction, momentum trading behaviour and the changes in supply and demand of puts over the short ban. One interesting finding that the relationship between time to expiry, put call parity deviations and returns on the index is highly non-linear. Key word: Put-call parity, SPX, short ban 2008 .

scholarly journals Reverse Bonus Certificate Design and Valuation Using Pricing by Duplication Methods

2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-289
Author(s):  
Martina Bobriková ◽  
Monika Harčariková
Keyword(s):  
Option Pricing ◽  
Exotic Options ◽  
Pricing Models ◽  
Underlying Asset ◽  
Replication Method ◽  
Maturity Date ◽  
Derivative Market ◽  
Replicating Portfolio ◽  
Pricing Formula

Abstract In this paper we perform an analysis of a capped reverse bonus certificate, the value of which is derived from the value of an underlying asset. A pricing formula for the portfolio replication method is applied to price the capped reverse bonus certificate. A replicating portfolio has profit that is identical to profit from a combination of positions in spot and derivative market, i.e. vanilla and exotic options. Based upon the theoretical option pricing models, the replicating portfolio for capped reverse bonus certificate on the Euro Stoxx 50 index is engineered. We design the capped reverse bonus certificate with various parameters and calculate the issue prices in the primary market. The profitability for the potential investor at the maturity date is provided. The relation between the profit change of the investor and parameters’ change is detected. The best capped reverse bonus certificate for every estimated development of the index is identified.

NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES REVISITED IN SOFTWARE RELEASE GAMES

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Yasuhiro Saito ◽  
Tadashi Dohi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Optimization Theory ◽  
Applied Probability ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Release Policy ◽  
Software Release ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Person Game

A software release game was formulated by Zeephongsekul and Chiera [Zeephongsekul, P. & Chiera, C. (1995). Optimal software release policy based on a two-person game of timing. Journal of Applied Probability 32: 470–481] and was reconsidered by Dohi et al. [Dohi, T., Teraoka, Y., & Osaki, S. (2000). Software release games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 105(2): 325–346] in a framework of two-person nonzero-sum games. In this paper, we further point out the faults in the above literature and revisit the Nash equilibrium strategies in the software release games from the viewpoints of both silent and noisy type of games. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium strategies in the silent and noisy of software release games exist under some parametric conditions.

scholarly journals Nonparametric Estimation of Fractional Option Pricing Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Qing Li ◽  
Songlin Liu ◽  
Misi Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Option Pricing ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Integral Function ◽  
The State ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
State Price ◽  
Black Scholes ◽  
Option Pricing Model ◽  
State Price Density

The establishment of the fractional Black–Scholes option pricing model is under a major condition with the normal distribution for the state price density (SPD) function. However, the fractional Brownian motion is deemed to not be martingale with a long memory effect of the underlying asset, so that the estimation of the state price density (SPD) function is far from simple. This paper proposes a convenient approach to get the fractional option pricing model by changing variables. Further, the option price is transformed as the integral function of the cumulative density function (CDF), so it is not necessary to estimate the distribution function individually by complex approaches. Finally, it encourages to estimate the fractional option pricing model by the way of nonparametric regression and makes empirical analysis with the traded 50 ETF option data in Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE).

scholarly journals Nash versus coarse correlation

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1178-1204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Georgalos ◽  
Indrajit Ray ◽  
Sonali SenGupta
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Payoff Dominance ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Nash Point

Abstract We run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201–221, 1978), with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) with higher ex-ante expected payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. We find that the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. However, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the same outcomes and the sure payoff as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as selecting risk-dominance over payoff dominance in equilibrium.

scholarly journals Strategic equilibrium versus global optimum for a pair of competing servers

2006 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 1165-1172
Author(s):  
Benjamin Avi-Itzhak ◽  
Boaz Golany ◽  
Uriel G. Rothblum
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Queueing System ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Global Optimum ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Service Rates ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Person Game ◽  
The Given ◽  
Linear Penalties

Christ and Avi-Itzhak (2002) analyzed a queueing system with two competing servers who determine their service rates so as to optimize their individual utilities. The system is formulated as a two-person game; Christ and Avi-Itzhak proved the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium which is symmetric. In this paper, we explore globally optimal solutions. We prove that the unique Nash equilibrium is generally strictly inferior to a globally optimal solution and that optimal solutions are symmetric and require the servers to adopt service rates that are smaller than those occurring in equilibrium. Furthermore, given a symmetric globally optimal solution, we show how to impose linear penalties on the service rates so that the given optimal solution becomes a unique Nash equilibrium. When service rates are not observable, we show how the same effect is achieved by imposing linear penalties on a corresponding signal.

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