A Study on the Direction of the ‘Nature’ of school Moral subject Curriculum

2021 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Tak-Joon Jung
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lena Halldenius

This chapter demonstrates how Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–97) uses feminist principles to modify and adapt the republican ideal of freedom as the absence of domination or dependence. It shows that, according to Wollstonecraft, freedom consists in the secure entitlement to act in accordance with the dictates of reason—a freedom that depends upon the possession of a certain social standing and the absence of a dominating master. Crucially, according to this chapter, freedom from domination is relational: it bestows a special status on the moral subject in relation to others. Freedom from subjugation thus gives the individual a certain empowerment, or certain entitlement, with respect to other members of society. The chapter ends by showing how Wollstonecraft takes this idea to its logical feminist conclusion: a call for the equal rights of men and women in civil society.


2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Brook

The ubiquitous experience of wartime collaboration in East Asia has not yet undergone the analysis that its counterpart in Europe has received. The difficulty has to do with the political legacies that the denunciation of collaboration legitimized, as well as the continuing hegemony of the discourse of nationalism. Both inhibitors encourage the condemnation of collaboration rather than its historicization. Reflecting briefly on the 1946 trial of Liang Hongzhi, China's first head of state under the Japanese, this essay argues that the historian's task is not to create moral knowledge, but to probe the presuppositions that bring the moral subject of the collaborator into being for us, and then ask whether real collaborators correspond to this moral subject. In the face of the natural impulse to render judgment, this essay argues for the wisdom of hesitation.


Politologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Aistė Noreikaitė

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant’s influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O’Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 125-129
Author(s):  
OLEG A. NESTEROV ◽  

This article contains a philosophical study of the moral basis of modern legal nihilism. Usually legal nihilism is understood as a negative or indifferent attitude of individuals or social groups to law as a social institution. The universal and necessary nature of this phenomenon cannot be revealed by giving even the broadest list of active causes of its occurrence and spread. This nature of legal nihilism can be understood through systematic knowledge the idea of the moral spirit.Within the limits of this article, only the nearest spiritual and practical basis of the legal nihilism is revealed. Further consideration of the problem proves that this basis is the freedom of moral subject, the moral view in general, which is an effective principle of the form of the modern world. From a moral point of view only the autono- mous will is truly free and, therefore, really moral. For it is subordinate to a universal law, rooted in the «moral self» of the will itself. Thus the autonomy of the will is recognized as the true and only law of morality, which is identified with real moral order. Recognition of the autonomy of the moral will as the highest principle of the practical spirit made the moral view an indisputable criterion for evaluating any existing moral order. Thus the reflection of the practical experience of modern times laid the moral foundation of legal nihilism. For from this moment on, any external authority, every normative order has come under the initial suspicion of the moral subject, Every objective normative order came to be considered by him as something that has only a conditional significance. All this reality now requires legitimation by the subject of moral freedom, justification before person’s deep belief in what is rational and moral.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document