The tax and transfer system are not very effective

Two timely reviews of Australia's transfer and tax systems were commissioned by the incoming government in 2008, although the GST, tax exemption of superannuation payments to people aged over 60, and pre-announced personal income tax cuts were placed outside the scope of inquiry. Most of the recommendations of the Harmer Pension Review have been implemented, but most of the recommendations of the Henry Tax Review have not. The Henry recommendations provided for enhanced equity and efficiency through a broader and simplified base, concentrating revenue raising on personal and business income, private consumption, and economic rents from natural resources and land. They provide an integrated blueprint for ongoing debate over tax reform.

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Generational and gender-specific aspects of the tax and transfer system in Denmark

Empirical Economics ◽

10.1007/bf01205783 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 22 (4) ◽

pp. 615-635 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Svend E. Hougaard Jensen ◽

Bernd Raffelh�schen

Keyword(s):

Transfer System ◽

Tax And Transfer System ◽

And Gender ◽

Gender Specific

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Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child-Related Cash and In-Kind Benefits

German Economic Review ◽

10.1111/j.1468-0475.2009.00471.x ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 11 (3) ◽

pp. 278-301 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Peter Haan ◽

Katharina Wrohlich

Keyword(s):

Optimal Taxation ◽

Discrete Model ◽

Single Women ◽

Transfer System ◽

Tax And Transfer System

Abstract In this paper, we empirically derive the welfare function that guarantees that the current German tax and transfer system for single women is optimal. In particular, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and assess how recent reforms of in-kind childcare transfers affect the welfare function. Our analysis is based on a discrete model of optimal taxation.We apply this framework using microsimulation and microeconometric techniques. In general, we find that marginal welfare weights are relatively high for non-working single women. Further, we show that the reform of in-kind childcare transfers is only optimal if society increases the marginal welfare weights for the working single women.

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