scholarly journals Subjetividade, gênero e Estado de Direito no contexto das democracias liberais contemporâneas / Subjectivity, gender and the Rule of Law within the context of contemporary liberal democracies

Author(s):  
Leonardo Monteiro Crespo de Almeida

Resumo: Este artigo pretender analisar as demandas de gênero no contexto da teoria feminista contemporânea, com especial ênfase aos trabalhos de Drucilla Cornell e Judith Butler, e a relação que guardam com certos conceitos jurídicos, como o de sujeito de direito e cidadania. Pretende destacar a especificidade dessas demandas e como devemos considerá-las no contexto das democracias liberais que vislumbram na igualdade e na liberdade valores indispensáveis. Repensar a diferença sexual e o sujeito de direito torna-se relevante. Defende-se que uma compreensão cuidadosa da dimensão sexual dos sujeitos de direito se faz importante para uma reflexão teórica em torno das condições em que os indivíduos formulam suas demandas perante o poder soberano.Palavras-chave: Pós-Estruturalismo; Gênero; Cidadania. Abstract: This article intends to analyze demands of gender within contemporary feminist theory, paying careful attention to the works of Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler, and the possible relations that it guards with certain legal concepts such as legal subjects and citizenship. It pretends to highlight not only the particularities of these demands but also how we should considerate them in light of liberal democracies that regards freedom and equality as indispensable values. Rethinking sexual difference and legal subject becomes quite relevant for this project. We defend that a sensible understanding of the importance of the sexual domain regarding the existence of legal subjects is important for a theoretical reflection on the conditions which they formulate its political demands to the sovereign power.Keywords: Post-Structuralism; Gender; Citizenship.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-400
Author(s):  
Joseph D’Agostino

Abstract Highly influential legal scholar and judge Richard Posner, newly retired from the bench, believes that law is irrelevant to most of his judicial decisions as well as to most constitutional decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. His recent high-profile repudiation of the rule of law, made in statements for the general public, was consistent with what he and others have been saying to legal audiences for decades. Legal pragmatism has reached its end in abandoning all the restraints of law. Posner-endorsed “epistemological democracy” obscures a discretion that is much worse than the rule of law promoted by epistemological authoritarianism. I argue that a focus on conceptual essentialism and on the recognition of coercive intent as essential to the concept of law, both currently unpopular among legal theorists and many jurists, can clarify legal understandings and serve as starting points for the restoration of the rule of law. A much more precise, scientific approach to legal concepts is required in order to best ensure the rational and moral legitimacy of law and to combat eroding public confidence in political and legal institutions, especially in an increasingly diverse society. The rational regulation by some (lawmakers) of the real-world actions of others (ordinary citizens) requires that core or central instances of concepts have essential elements rather than be “democratic.” Although legal pragmatism has failed just as liberal theory generally has failed, the pragmatic value of different conceptual approaches is, in fact, the best measure of their worth. Without essentialism in concept formation and an emphasis on coercion, the abilities to understand and communicate effectively about the practical legal world are impaired. Non-essentialism grants too much unwarranted discretion to judges and other legal authorities, and thus undermines the rule of law. Non-essentialist or anti-essentialist conceptual approaches allow legal concepts to take on characteristics appropriate to religious and literary concepts, which leads to vague and self-contradictory legal concepts that incoherently and deceptively absorb disparate elements that are best kept independent in order to maximize law’s rationality and moral legitimacy. When made essentialist, the concept of political positive law shrinks, clarifies, and reveals its true features, including the physically-coercive nature of all laws and the valuable method of tracing the content of law by following its coercive intents and effects.


Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

A vibrant debate has recently emerged among legal theorists regarding the desirability of legal pluralism: the existence of distinct regulatory regimes that make overlapping claims to authority. While Monists maintain that we should strive to forge a unitary legal order, Normative Legal Pluralists favour an approach that seeks to manage legal plurality without eliminating it. This chapter critically evaluates a common argument Monists level against Normative Legal Pluralism, namely that it conflicts with fidelity to the ideal of the rule of law.Advocates of Normative Legal Pluralism employ three strategies to respond to their rule-of-law critics. First, they attempt to show that a plural legal order fares no worse than a unitary one when measured against the standard of providing legal subjects with certainty and predictability. Second, they argue that increases in tolerance, or respect for the exercise of communal and individual autonomy, warrant whatever diminution in the rule of law Normative Legal Pluralism produces. Finally, they invoke an account of law’s distinctive normativity informed by sociolegal jurisprudence and constructivist political theory to disarm rule of law objections to normative legal pluralism, either by contesting the premises on which they rest or by providing reasons to conclude that the critics’ worries are seriously overdrawn. While the first two strategies fail, the critics underestimate or simply fail to notice Normative Legal Pluralists’ ability to leverage their conception of law’s legitimacy to address rule of law concerns.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson Tebbe

96 Georgetown Law Journal 183 (2007)This Article addresses the prospects of liberal democracy in non-Western societies. It focuses on South Africa, one of the newest and most admired liberal democracies, and in particular on its efforts to recognize indigenous African traditions surrounding witchcraft and related occult practices. In 2004, Parliament passed a law that purports to regulate certain occult practitioners called traditional healers. Today, lawmakers are under pressure to go further and criminalize the practice of witchcraft itself. This Article presses two arguments. First, it contends that the 2004 statute is compatible with liberal principles of equal citizenship and the rule of law. Second, it warns against outlawing witchcraft as such. Subjecting suspected sorcerers to criminal punishment based on governmental determinations of guilt that many will perceive to be unprincipled would work too much damage to individual autonomy and national unity, among other values. These arguments are designed to contribute to a wider discussion about the capacity of liberalism to respond to the global resurgence of religious traditionalism, especially in countries where traditionalists may comprise a large majority of the citizenry.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (55) ◽  
pp. 516
Author(s):  
Lauro ISHIKAWA ◽  
Clóvis Smith FROTA JÚNIOR

RESUMO O presente artigo discorre sobre a evolução do controle sobre os atos administrativos discricionários, em especial a sindicabilidade do “mérito” destes, perpassando as diferentes teorias surgidas, desde a consolidação da ideia de Estado de Direito. Logo após, discorre-se sobre a admissão do controle judicial quanto aos elementos vinculados do ato, e, em seguida, sobre esse controle a partir de parâmetros implícitos da lei. Posteriormente, discorre-se sobre a teoria da vinculação direta aos princípios e dos atos “vinculados” por conceitos jurídicos indeterminados. Por último, aborda-se a teoria do enfoque jurídico-funconal, para, então, concluir pela possibilidade de se verificar uma tendência de sistematização, no sentido de apontar alguns parâmetros para o controle jurisdicional da discricionariedade administrativa. É utilizado o método dedutivo, por meio de pesquisa realizada em legislação, doutrina e jurisprudência das Cortes Superiores. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Administrativo; Ato Administrativo; Discricionariedade; Controle Jurisdicional; Mérito do Ato; Conveniência e Oportunidade. ABSTRACTThis article discusses the evolution of the judicial control over discretionary administrative acts, especially the syndicability of the "merit" of these acts, crossing the different theories that have emerged since the consolidation of the idea of the rule of law. After discussing this judicial control in face of the rule of law, the admission of judicial control on the elements of the act is analyzed, and then, this control from implicit parameters of the law. Subsequently, there is a discussion of the theory of direct linkage to principles and "bound" acts by indeterminate legal concepts. Finally, it is discussed the theory of the legal-functional approach, and then, conclude that there is a tendency to systematize, in order to point out some parameters for the jurisdictional control of administrative discretion. The deductive method is used, through research conducted in legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of the Superior Courts. KEYWORDS: Administrative Law; Administrative Act; Discretion; Judicial Control; Merit of the Act; Convenience and Opportunity.


This volume is designed to mark the outstanding legacy of Professor Wojciech Sadurski’s scholarship in the field of comparative constitutional law. It provides a rich palette of chapters that aim to rethink the state of the art in this field, in light of the latest challenges to the foundations of liberal constitutionalism. Edited by former doctoral students of Professor Sadurski, the volume transcends the celebration of his major academic contributions by linking his pioneering writings, inter alia on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), to core dilemmas in the turbulent state of the rule of law in western democracies. It consolidates contributions by numerous current and former students, as well as colleagues and friends around the globe in admiration of his didactic style, tireless work, civil dedication, and priceless commentary influencing the work of generations of constitutional scholars. Besides drawing on Wojciech’s fields of interest, the book aims to provide a full overview of the crucial dilemmas in dealing with the current decline of liberal democracies and populist challenges to the rule of law throughout Europe—events that he predicted early on in his writings about the Jörg Haider affair in Austria and the introduction of Article 7 TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty. The major themes of the chapters are thus as follows: 1. Populism and democratic decline in CEE; 2. The EU role: Article 7 TEU vis-à-vis the rule of law in Hungary and Poland; 3. Constitutional review and militant democracy: between public reason and new forms of populism.


Lex Russica ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 170-178
Author(s):  
E. N. Matyukhina

The paper analyzes the legislative acts on the collection and storage of biometric data of citizens and the changes in the idea of how the legal state can and should be arranged, what the guarantees of the security of providing such data to various structures in the Russian and German legislation are. The idea of a rule-of-law state was, as you know, was developed in Germany by C. T. Welker, R. v. Mohl, R.G. Gneist and J.C. Freiherr von Aretin and was borrowed by Russian statesmen — S. S. Alekseev, V. M. Gessen, N.M. Korkunov, A. F. Kistyakovsky, S.A. Kotlyarevsky, P.I. Novgorodtsev, N.I. Paliyenko. During the existence of our States, this concept has undergone many changes in both its Russian and German versions, which each time was dictated by a number of objective reasons. At the present stage, both powers are concerned with the problem of security, the threat of terrorism, fraud in the Internet space. Therefore, in the European Union, for example, the requirement for identification documents to contain biometric data is now mandatory for all member countries. European thought, as revealed in the analysis of existing concepts and experience of their implementation, was a few steps ahead — while in Russia laws are adopted without discussion with citizens infringing their rights guaranteed by the Constitution, Europe is concerned with the creation of a data storage system representing the cultural heritage of mankind. The rule of law state has become to a large extent a metaphor for which a particular citizen does not feel any content. The use of this term has become a technological tool for the state to achieve political and geopolitical goals, a way to prove that we are also among the civilized liberal democracies and market economies, which distorts the essence of the idea of the rule of law for a particular person. The Russians themselves often do not understand the idea of the rule of law and the mechanism for its achievement.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 400-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jude McCulloch ◽  
Joo-Cheong Tham

This article describes the secrecy provisions embodied in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cwlth). The article explains how these provisions curb freedom of speech and remove ASIO's activities from the domain of public scrutiny. It argues that by effectively criminalising open discussion of ASIO's activities the provisions insulate much of the domestic ‘war on terror’ from the public gaze. It also argues that the provisions implicitly sanction lawlessness by ASIO in open breach of the rule of law. By undermining free speech and the rule of law, this legislation increases the risk of torture of persons detained by ASIO. The legislation also exacerbates the punitiveness of such detention. Moreover, the secrecy offences will distort Australian politics by enabling the government to control and manipulate ‘security’ information. The article concludes that the increase in state secrecy and its impact are part of a continuing shift in the relative distribution of power between state and subject in liberal democracies; a shift that signals a move to more repressive or authoritarian forms of rule.


Author(s):  
Bas Schotel

AbstractScholars have recently shown how in Europe regimes in democratic decay (e.g. Poland, Hungary) take all sorts of measures targeting and marginalizing political opponents. Although they are authoritarian by nature, the measures are cast in a legal form. According to some scholars this kind of authoritarian rule of law can be best understood as a dual state, namely a combination of the normative state (the rule of law) and the prerogative state (the pure—political or arbitrary—will of those in power). Building on these insights, the present paper makes two new observations. First, administrative law is distinctively well suited to cater for the creation of a dual state. By distinctively I mean better than civil and criminal law. In fact, I argue that administrative law constitutes a dual state in and of itself combining normative and prerogative state elements within a single area of law, in ways that cannot be done under civil and criminal law. Second, not only regimes in democratic decay but also liberal democracies make use of the dual state nature of administrative law. The paper illustrates this point with two techniques whereby liberal democracies use administrative law to circumvent or pervert the normal operation of criminal law, namely crimmigration and the alien detention of citizens. My underlying normative point is to draw attention to the inherent authoritarian potential of administrative law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 3-34
Author(s):  
Scott Slorach ◽  
Judith Embley ◽  
Peter Goodchild ◽  
Catherine Shephard

This chapter considers law as a concept and in its context. It examines key legal concepts such as law and morality, jurisprudence, the legitimacy of laws, the rule of law, and the separation of powers, looking at these in both theory and practice. It includes consideration of the virtue, duty, and consequentialist ethical theories, and legal theories including natural law, legal positivism, realism, and critical legal studies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 159-193
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Thomas

This chapter uses extensive archival evidence to demonstrate how the membership norm adopted by the community around 1970—that only liberal democracies respecting human rights and the rule of law are eligible for membership—shaped its decisions on Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine over subsequent decades. The democratic governments that took power in Greece and Spain after the collapse of authoritarian rule in the mid-1970s used the community’s membership norm to pressure member states to fast track them to accession despite the hesitation of the European Commission and powerful domestic lobbies. Notwithstanding the growing controversy over Turkey’s membership prospects in this period, the community’s membership norm played an important role in keeping the relationship on track. Finally, the EU’s membership norm impeded Ukraine’s pursuit of closer ties after interdependence in 1991 because of widespread concern within the Union regarding the country’s actual commitment to liberal democracy and the rule of law.


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