EXISTENCE OF GENERALIZED EQUILIBRIUM PAIR FOR A NON-COMPACT FREE n-PERSON GAME

2017 ◽  
Vol 102 (8) ◽  
pp. 1579-1592
Author(s):  
Won Kyu Kim
Keyword(s):  
Generalized Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Pair ◽  
Person Game

scholarly journals Iterative Computation for Solving the Variational Inequality and the Generalized Equilibrium Problem

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Xiujuan Pan ◽  
Shin Min Kang ◽  
Young Chel Kwun
Keyword(s):  
Variational Inequality ◽  
Equilibrium Problem ◽  
Iterative Algorithm ◽  
Convergence Result ◽  
Generalized Equilibrium Problem ◽  
Iterative Computation ◽  
Generalized Equilibrium

An iterative algorithm for solving the variational inequality and the generalized equilibrium problem has been introduced. Convergence result is given.

scholarly journals Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN n-PERSON GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 08 (05) ◽  
pp. 503-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
SILVIU GUIASU
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Statistical Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Minimum Deviation ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Person Game

A solution of n-person games is proposed, based on the minimum deviation from statistical equilibrium subject to the constraints imposed by the group rationality and individual rationality. The new solution is compared with the Shapley value and von Neumann-Morgenstern's core of the game in the context of the 15-person game of passing and defeating resolutions in the UN Security Council involving five permanent members and ten nonpermanent members. A coalition classification, based on the minimum ramification cost induced by the characteristic function of the game, is also presented.

A global optimization algorithm for solving a four-person game

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 587-596
Author(s):  
S. Batbileg ◽  
N. Tungalag ◽  
A. Anikin ◽  
A. Gornov ◽  
E. Finkelstein
Keyword(s):  
Global Optimization ◽  
Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Global Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Person Game
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