Effects of isolation and communication on cooperation in a two-person game.

1970 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Wichman
Keyword(s):  
Person Game

scholarly journals Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN n-PERSON GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 08 (05) ◽  
pp. 503-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
SILVIU GUIASU
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Statistical Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Minimum Deviation ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Person Game

A solution of n-person games is proposed, based on the minimum deviation from statistical equilibrium subject to the constraints imposed by the group rationality and individual rationality. The new solution is compared with the Shapley value and von Neumann-Morgenstern's core of the game in the context of the 15-person game of passing and defeating resolutions in the UN Security Council involving five permanent members and ten nonpermanent members. A coalition classification, based on the minimum ramification cost induced by the characteristic function of the game, is also presented.

A global optimization algorithm for solving a four-person game

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 587-596
Author(s):  
S. Batbileg ◽  
N. Tungalag ◽  
A. Anikin ◽  
A. Gornov ◽  
E. Finkelstein
Keyword(s):  
Global Optimization ◽  
Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Global Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Person Game

scholarly journals Toward a Comprehension Challenge, Using Crowdsourcing as a Tool

AI Magazine ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Praveen Paritosh ◽  
Gary Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Full Range ◽  
Still Images ◽  
Comprehension Test ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Repeated Runs

Human readers comprehend vastly more, and in vastly different ways, than any existing comprehension test would suggest. An ideal comprehension test for a story should cover the full range of questions and answers that humans would expect other humans to reasonably learn or infer from a given story. As a step toward these goals we propose a novel test, the Crowdsourced Comprehension Challenge (C3), which is constructed by repeated runs of a three-person game, the Iterative Crowdsourced Comprehension Game (ICCG). ICCG uses structured crowdsourcing to comprehensively generate relevant questions and supported answers for arbitrary stories, whether fiction or nonfiction, presented across a variety of media such as videos, podcasts, and still images.

scholarly journals A Note on the First Occurrence of Strings

10.37236/454 ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Chao Hung ◽  
Robert W. Chen ◽  
Alan Zame ◽  
May-Ru Chen
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Fair Coin ◽  
String Length ◽  
The Third ◽  
First Occurrence ◽  
Person Game

We consider the context of a three-person game in which each player selects strings over $\{0,1\}$ and observe a series of fair coin tosses. The winner of the game is the player whose selected string appears first. Recently, Chen et al. showed that if the string length is greater and equal to three, two players can collude to attain an advantage by choosing the pair of strings $11\ldots 10$ and $00\ldots 01$. We call these two strings "complement strings", since each bit of one string is the complement bit of the corresponding bit of the other string. In this note, we further study the property of complement strings for three-person games. We prove that if the string length is greater than five and two players choose any pair of complement strings (except for the pair $11\ldots 10$ and $00\ldots 01$), then the third player can always attain an advantage by choosing a particular string.

Pareto Equilibrium of Objections and Counterobjections in a Differential Three-Person Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 82 (10) ◽  
pp. 1812-1834
Author(s):  
V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
J. N. Zhiteneva ◽  
J. A. Belskih
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Equilibrium ◽  
Person Game
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