Buying Promises: How Citizens United’s Campaign Expenditures Convert Our “Impartial” Judges and Their Nonpromissory Campaign Statements into an Indebted, Influenced, and Dependent Judiciary

Political Finance and Participation in Congressional Elections

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science ◽

10.1177/000271627642500105 ◽

1976 ◽

Vol 425 (1) ◽

pp. 59-73 ◽

Cited By ~ 43

Author(s):

Paul A. Dawson ◽

James E. Zinser

Keyword(s):

Income Inequality ◽

Political Parties ◽

Capita Income ◽

Congressional Elections ◽

Campaign Contributions ◽

Factors Affecting ◽

Political Finance ◽

Per Capita ◽

Registered Voters ◽

Campaign Expenditures

Citizens participate in the electoral process both to enjoy intrinsic benefits and in the hope of future bene fits. Factors affecting the strength of these consumption and investment motives therefore will affect registration and turnout rates, levels of campaign contributions, and electoral margins. To some extent, the strength of these motives is fixed by relatively static factors: levels of district per capita income, the degree of income inequality, the partisan division of registered voters. However, both motives also are affected by factors more apt to vary: for example, statutory arrangements, the activities of political parties, levels and types of campaign expenditures. In particular, statutory arrangements and the activities of parties which reduce costs can increase participation. Moreover, substan tial efforts to alter the partisan division of registered voters can increase campaign contributions. Also, campaign expenditures channel motivations in partisan directions, stim ulate partisan turnout, and affect electoral margins. Results reported here suggest the likelihood of bipartisan support for policies facilitating registration and voting, challenge assumptions about the effects of incumbency on campaign contributions, raise doubts about legislated ceilings on cam paign expenditures, and weaken the case for public financing of congressional elections.

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De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 9 oktober 1994 : Analyse van de resultaten

Res Publica ◽

10.21825/rp.v37i3-4.18672 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 37 (3-4) ◽

pp. 352-388

Author(s):

Johan Ackaert

Keyword(s):

Political System ◽

Institutional Setting ◽

Local Elections ◽

Right Wing ◽

Extreme Right ◽

Voting Rules ◽

Female Candidates ◽

Compulsory Voting ◽

General Terms ◽

Campaign Expenditures

The institutional setting of the 1994 local elections was characterized by a by law introduced limitation of campaign expenditures and the increased share (at least 25%) of female candidates. In spite of compulsory voting rules, the turnout decreased with 1,2%. The proportion of blanc or invalid votes increased slightly with 0,3%. The results of the local elections followed the trends drawn by the 1991 general election. This means general losses for the traditional parties and large progress for the extreme right-wing parties. In the Flemish region, the winners were the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok, the ecologist AGALEV and the VLD liberals. The others parties lost votes. This was particularly the case for the Flemish-nationalist VU, followed by the socialists (SP) and the christian-democrats (CVP).In the Walloons region, all the traditional parties were set back or stagnated. The socialists (PS) suffered the largest decline, but the liberals (PRL) and christian-democrats (PSC) lost voters too. The ecologist ECOLO only kept a modest status quo position. On the other hand, the extreme right-wing parties Front National and Agir realised a breakthrough. In Brussels, we notice the same tendencies, set-backs for the traditional parties and progress for the extreme rightwing parties (of both languages). The ecologists belonged there also to the winning side. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the local political system should not be dramatized.In general terms, parties supporting the leaving political majorities in the municipalities were no langer electorally favoured. On the contrary, the liberals realized better results in these municipalities where they belonged to the opposition.

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