Friends Don't Let Friends Free Ride

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-557
Author(s):  
Nicholas Eubank ◽  
Dorothy Kronick
Keyword(s):  
Free Ride

A Wrinkle-Free Ride to Dermatologic Happiness

2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
KENNETH R. BEER
Keyword(s):  
Free Ride

scholarly journals Do Allies Really Free Ride?

Survival ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
Free Ride

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

Organizing Groups for Collective Action

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 1171-1185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robyn M. Dawes ◽  
John M. Orbell ◽  
Randy T. Simmons ◽  
Alphons J. C. Van De Kragt
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Motivational Factors ◽  
Fair Share ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Full Explanation ◽  
Base Analysis ◽  
Money Back Guarantee

How can the beneficiaries of collective action be persuaded to contribute the resources (time, energy, money) necessary for the effort to succeed? Rational and selfish players will recognize they can free ride on the successful contributions of others. If the effort is not successful, they will lose a contribution—and be “suckered.” Other than relying on altruism, organizers of the group effort can modify incentives so that players are more prepared to contribute. Laboratory experiments offer one way of assessing the effectiveness of various such modifications; we conducted such tests to see how well contributing is promoted by (1) assuring contributors that they will not lose if the group effort fails (a “money-back guarantee”) and (2) enforcing contributions if it succeeds (“fair share”). We expect the latter to be more successful because it is “stable,” unlike the former, whose success can be undermined by expectations of that success. Three experimental replications demonstrate that the money-back guarantee is no more successful than a standard dilemma, but fair-share requirements increase contributing significantly over that base. Analysis of subjects' expectations about others' behavior offers some support to the hypothesized process undermining the money-back guarantee, but motivational factors must also be taken into account for a full explanation.

scholarly journals Rallying the troops

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy JA Passmore ◽  
Megan Shannon ◽  
Andrew F Hart
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Member States ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions

Is the acquisition of personnel for UN peacekeeping missions susceptible to free-riding by UN member states? If so, what drives this behavior and what impact does this have on obtaining required personnel for the mission? Using data from 21 missions in 13 African countries between 1990 and 2010, this article addresses whether UN peacekeeping missions experience a shortfall in personnel due to incentives to free-ride by contributing states. It argues that as the number of states contributing to a mission increases, contributors have a greater incentive to free-ride and make suboptimal personnel contributions, leading to greater overall shortfall in the mission’s personnel. However, this free-riding behavior can be mitigated by the economic incentives of contributor states. The findings support two central tenets of collective action theory: that free-riding by member states contributing to the mission is more prevalent when the number of contributors is larger, and when selective incentives such as economic gains are lower. These findings have implications for the strategic composition and efficacy of peacekeeping forces. More broadly, the results underscore the struggle of international organizations to obtain compliance from member states in achieving their international objectives.

scholarly journals Wealth, Slave Ownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy: An Empirical Study of the American Civil War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
Connor Huff ◽  
Shiro Kuriwaki
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
American Civil War ◽  
The Other ◽  
Confederate Army ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Personal Wealth ◽  
The One

How did personal wealth and slaveownership affect the likelihood southerners fought for the Confederate Army in the American Civil War? On the one hand, wealthy southerners had incentives to free-ride on poorer southerners and avoid fighting; on the other hand, wealthy southerners were disproportionately slaveowners, and thus had more at stake in the outcome of the war. We assemble a dataset on roughly 3.9 million free citizens in the Confederacy, and show that slaveowners were more likely to fight than non-slaveowners. We then exploit a randomized land lottery held in 1832 in Georgia. Households of lottery winners owned more slaves in 1850 and were more likely to have sons who fought in the Confederate Army. We conclude that slaveownership, in contrast to some other kinds of wealth, compelled southerners to fight despite free-rider incentives because it raised their stakes in the war’s outcome.

Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Issue Linkages

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.

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