Financial and Corporate Governance Changes in Public Firms Transitioning from Non-Traded to Exchange-Listed Status: A Clinical Study of REITS

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Kern ◽  
Adam Yore ◽  
Dan French ◽  
Thibaut Morillon
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Clinical Study ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Governance Changes

scholarly journals Three Essays on Corporate Governance in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Zonghao Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Director Characteristics ◽  
Chinese Public

<p>This thesis consists of three empirical papers on corporate governance in Chinese listed firms. The first essay examines the influence of director characteristics and ownership structure on director compensation. Over the period 2005 through 2015, we find that director compensation in Chinese listed firms is influenced by both director characteristics and ownership structure. We measure director compensation by both the propensity to be paid and the level of compensation. For independent directors, we find that director busyness, tenure, and ownership concentration positively influence and state-ownership negatively influences director compensation. For non-independent directors, we find that tenure positively influences and that both state-ownership and related directors negatively influence director compensation. Lastly, our evidence suggests that women directors in China are not underpaid.  The second essay examines the influence of rookie independent directors on board functions and firm performance in Chinese public companies from 2008 to 2014. We find that rookie independent directors attend more board meetings than seasoned independent directors. Independent directors with higher board meeting attendance are more likely to remain in the firm in the following year (lower turnover rate). This influence of board attendance on re-appointment is stronger for rookie independent directors. Further, we find that boards with more rookie independent directors tunnel less to controlling shareholders, suggesting that rookie independent directors are efficient monitors. Lastly, we find that firms with more rookie independent directors are associated with higher accounting returns.  In the third essay, we investigate the influence of board networks on directors’ career outcomes in Chinese public firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that board connections increase compensation for independent directors. We find that board connections are positively associated with director turnover for non-related directors, but negatively associated with director turnover for related directors. Further, we find that board connections lead to additional future directorships. Overall, we find that board connections both directly lead to higher compensation and indirectly through labor mobility and additional board seats.</p>

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Its Political Economy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J. Roe ◽  
Massimiliano Vatiero
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Large Firm ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Postwar Europe ◽  
Political Economy Analysis ◽  
Capital Ownership

In this chapter, we analyze three instances that illustrate the political economy of corporate governance. First, we examine how the politics of organizing financial institutions affects, and often determines, the flow of capital into the large firm, thereby affecting, and often determining, the power and authority of shareholder-owners. Second, we show how continental European nations have been slow in developing diffusely owned public firms in the years after World War II. The third political economy example deals with management in diffusely owned firms. The chapter also looks at the historical organization of capital ownership in the United States, noting how the country’s fragmented financial system limited the institutional blockholders and increased managerial autonomy over the years. Finally, it discusses the power of labor in postwar Europe, political explanations for the continuing power of the American executive and the board in recent decades, other political economy channels for corporate governance, and the limits of a political economy analysis.

How Australia's Dennis Family Corp. Professionalized Its Family Business

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Craig ◽  
Ken Moores
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Member ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Second Generation ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Depth Interview ◽  
Generation Family ◽  
Governance Changes

This paper examines a second-generation family business that recently introduced professional corporate governance structures to its organization. The paper includes an outline of the company and an in-depth interview with the second-generation family member who was responsible for the process. Advice to those who are considering corporate governance changes to their family business appears throughout the interview.

scholarly journals TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN VARIABILITAS LABA

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-246
Author(s):  
Ikka Tiaraintan Hariyanto ◽  
Novrys Suhardianto
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Political Risks ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
Effect Regression ◽  
Equity Ratio

This research aims to examine the influence of firm size, leverage, and corporate governance on earnings variability. We relate the earnings variability with the hypotheses of positive accounting theory and governance mechanism in Indonesia to identify factors that influence earnings variability. Using purposive sampling, we got 628 observations of Indonesian public firms during 2012 until 2014. This research uses common and fixed effect regression model to analyse the data. The results of this analysis show that the big firms have higher profit variability due to higher business and political risks. However, this finding applies only to samples with weak governance. Moreover, the greater the debt the company has, the greater the level of profit variability. This is due to the company's incentives to avoid breaching the debt contract, such as maintaining debt to equity ratio, working capital, or shareholder equity, by adopting aggressive accounting policies. Lastly, the CG mechanism does not affect the variability in earnings, indicating the lack of effective corporate governance in Indonesia. The CG mechanism in Indonesia has not generally been able to influence financial reporting behavior and capital market regulators need to take action to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in Indonesia.

scholarly journals Fundamental valuation of extra-financial information

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 296-320
Author(s):  
Christian Mandl ◽  
Sebastian Lobe ◽  
Klaus Röder ◽  
Martina Dürndorfer
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Stock Performance ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Market Values ◽  
European Public ◽  
Innovation Capital

We augment seminal models based on Ohlson (1995) by integrating the value impact of ratings related to three different extra-financial categories, i. e. corporate governance, human capital, and innovation capital. By integrating extra-financial information in valuation models, we examine whether current market values can be better estimated and future stock performance better predicted when considering this information. For a sample of large European public firms, we find that a model including human capital information and analysts’ earnings forecasts best explains current stock prices. Our model based on human capital information (without analysts’ forecasts) best identifies under- and overvalued companies.

scholarly journals Global institutions and local filtering: Introducing independent directors to Taiwanese corporate boards

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chi-Nien Chung ◽  
Young-Choon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
Family Governance ◽  
Geographic Context ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Corporate Governance Practice

Drawing on the idea of selective interaction between organizations and environments, the authors examine how organizations change their traditional practices when they are exposed to new institutional environments. In the context of corporate governance change in response to financial market globalization, they argue that global institutional influence is moderated by local corporate control contexts that function as filtering mechanisms. The authors empirically analyse the adoption of a new corporate governance practice, i.e., the initial introduction of independent directors, in Taiwanese public firms, where family governance has been a dominant governance model. The findings suggest that while firms exposed to US capital markets are more likely to adopt independent directors, this facilitating effect weakens when the firms are under strong family control and is amplified when they are unbound from local frameworks through the key leader’s education or their geographic context.

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