scholarly journals PAREITIS, FIZIKALISTINĖ REDUKCIJA IR PERKEISTOS KOKYBĖS

Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys
Keyword(s):  
Material Properties ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Qualitative Properties ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Physiological Properties ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The One

Funkcinės psichinių savybių analizės atveriama jų materialiojo įkūnijimo įvairovės galimybė verčia materialistinį monizmą sąmonės filosofijoje formuluoti ne psichinių ir fizinių savybių tapatumo, bet pirmųjų pareities nuo antrųjų tezę. Pareities sąvoka sąmonės filosofijoje išreiškia minimalius reikalavimus fizikalistinėms teorijoms – paneigus pareities fizikalizmą būtų paneigtos ir stipresnės fizikalizmo versijos. Straipsnyje tyrinėjama fizikalizmo kritika paremta vadinamuoju kokybių perkeitimo galimybės argumentu. Parodoma, kad, viena vertus, toks argumentas negali būti atremtas nuorodomis į empirinius duomenis, nes svarstoma hipotetinė situacija numano jos empirinį nestebimumą; kita vertus, jei svarstoma situacija iš tikrųjų yra galima, tai kokybinės psichinės charakteristikos niekaip nėra susaistytos funkciškai ar fiziologiškai aprašomais ryšiais, vadinasi, antireduktyvistinę išvadą galima grįsti svarstant ne tik atvejus, kai kokybės perkeistos, bet ir kai jų apskritai nėra. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: sąmonės filosofija, fizikalizmas, funkcionalizmas, pareitis, perkeistos kokybės.Supervenience, Physicalist Reduction and Inverted Qualia Jonas Dagys SummaryFunctional analysis of mental properties reveals that these properties are multiply realizable by material properties. Therefore physicalism in philosophy of mind is formulated in terms of supervenience rather than in terms of identity. The concept of supervenience also expresses the minimal commitments of the physicalist theory – refutation of the supervenience physicalism would imply refutation of any stronger version of physicalism as well. The article analyzes the criticism of physicalism based on the possibility of inverted qualia. It is shown that, on the one hand, such possibility cannot be denied on empirical grounds, since the possibility in question is ex hypothesi unobservable; on the other hand, if this situation is in fact possible, then qualitative properties are independent of functional or physiological properties, and therefore the same antireductivist conclusion could be less controversially argued for on the basis of absent rather than inverted qualia.Keywords: philosophy of mind, physicalism, functionalism, supervenience, inverted qualia.ly: Calibri, sans-serif;"> 

Robert Baron’s Metaphysica generalis on the Nature of Free Judgment

2020 ◽  
pp. 127-139
Author(s):  
Alexander Broadie
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Notable Feature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter expounds the concept of ‘judgment’, a concept deployed by seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers in their philosophy of mind. Close attention is paid to the discussion on judgment in the Metaphysica generalis of Robert Baron, where he addresses the idea of judgment as a free act. A notable feature of Baron’s treatment of judgment is his contrast between, on the one hand, the logician’s concern with judgment as a bearer of truth in inferences in which canons of inference are deployed that ensure that if the judgments serving as premises are true then so also must be the judgment drawn as a conclusion from those premises; and, on the other hand, a judgment that is passed by an arbiter, a person agreed upon by two parties in dispute who undertake to accept the judgment he makes as to which party is in the right.

scholarly journals El problema de la reflexión en Husserl y Heidegger

2021 ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Jesús Adrián Escudero
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fe-nomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una parte, se muestra el núcleo de la temprana crítica heideggeriana en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo (1919-1923) y Marburgo (1924-1928) y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente.The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a common-place in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the present article shows Heidegger’s early criticism developed in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1924-1928). On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind.

scholarly journals Access Internalism and the Extended Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis ◽  
Vehicle Externalism

The main goal of this chapter is to argue that accessibilism in epistemology is incompatible with vehicle externalism in the philosophy of mind (also known as “the extended mind thesis”). As we shall see, however, there are strong arguments for both of these positions. On the one hand, there is a compelling argument for vehicle externalism: the parity argument from Clark and Chalmers (1998). On the other hand, there is a compelling argument for accessibilism: the Moorean argument from Smithies (2012). If accessibilism is incompatible with vehicle externalism, then both arguments cannot be sound. I resolve the tension by arguing that the Moorean argument succeeds, while the parity argument fails, and hence that vehicle externalism should be rejected on broadly epistemological grounds.

Interlude

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Concepts ◽  
Natural Entities ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

This interlude compares the role that the physical digression plays in the Ethics with the function of physics or neuropsychology in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is argued that, unlike in many contemporary approaches, Spinoza does not pursue a reductionist strategy. Instead, the introduction of the physical digression has two very specific functions. On the one hand, it serves as a model that allows Spinoza to conceptualize differences between specific minds, albeit in a preliminary manner. On the other hand, in support of his introduction of the concept of common notions, the digression also justifies his later claim that, by means of coining scientific concepts, humans are able to form adequate ideas of the properties of natural entities.

Anomalism and Supervenience: A Critical Survey

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oron Shagrir
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Physical Characteristics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Critical Survey ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The One ◽  
Mental Events ◽  
Mental Characteristics

The thesis that mental properties are dependent, or supervenient, on physical properties, but this dependence is not lawlike, has been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is put forward explicitly in Donald Davidson's seminal ‘Mental Events.’ On the one hand, Davidson claims that the mental is anomalous, that ‘there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained’ (1970, 208), and, in particular, that there are no strict psychophysical laws. On the other hand, he insists that the mental supervenes on the physical; that ‘mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics’ (1970, 214).

scholarly journals Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Hane Htut Maung
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Conceivability Argument ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Strong Reading ◽  
Special Case

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.

scholarly journals La mente mecánica

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Miguel Suay Belenguer
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Turing Machines ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Gödel’S Theorem

Resumen: La mente humana es capaz de razonar, de manera similar que lo haría un ordenador, sobre cuestiones que son formuladas algorítmicamente, pero tam­bién es capaz de realizar otras funciones que algunos autores consideran que son imposibles de simular por una máquina. Los diferentes respuestas a cómo fun­ciona la mente han sido abordadas por la filosofía de la mente, la lógica, la psico­logía y la neurología, incluso hoy en día por la mecánica cuántica. En este trabajo intentaré realizar un compendio de las algunas teorías que han apoyado por un lado la posibilidad, y por otro la imposibilidad, de una mente mecánica.Palabras clave: filosofía de la mente, intencionalidad, dualismo, maquinas de Tu­ring, Teorema de Gödel. Abstract: Human mind is capable of reasoning, as much as a computer would do, on issues algorithmically formulated, but it is also able to play other roles which are regarded by some authors impossible for a machine to mimic. The different answers to how human mind works have been addressed by philosophy of mind, logics, psychology and neurology, and nowadays even by quantum mechanics. In this paper I will intend to present an overall review of the several theories that have supported on the one hand the feasibility, and on the other hand the impos­sibility, of a mechanical mind.Key words: Philosophy of mind, Intentionality, dualism, Turing machines, Gödel’s theorem. Recibido: 07/09/2011. Aprobado: 10/12/2012. 

Xin (heart-and-mind)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Hall ◽  
Roger T. Ames
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
The West ◽  
Natural Processes ◽  
Chinese Thought ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Heart And Mind

In the West, questions of the distinguishability of mind and matter and of rationality and emotion or sentiment are central issues within the philosophy of mind. Neither of these topics is of much interest, however, to the mainstream of Chinese thought. On the one hand, the notion of qi, the vital energizing field that constitutes all natural processes, renders discussions of the relevance of any psychophysical dualism moot. On the other hand, xin, normally translated as ‘heart-and-mind’, preludes the assumption of distinctions between thinking and feeling, or idea and affect. Xin is often translated simply as ‘heart’, but since it is the seat of thinking and judgment, the notion of mind must be included in its characterization if the term is to be properly understood. Indeed, what we often think of as ‘will’ or ‘intention’ is likewise included in the notion of xin.

scholarly journals Two Orders of Things: Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthieu Queloz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The People ◽  
The One ◽  
Historical Sketch

AbstractThis paper situates Wittgenstein in what is known as the causalism/anti-causalism debate in the philosophy of mind and action and reconstructs his arguments to the effect that reasons are not a species of causes. On the one hand, the paper aims to reinvigorate the question of what these arguments are by offering a historical sketch of the debate showing that Wittgenstein's arguments were overshadowed by those of the people he influenced, and that he came to be seen as an anti-causalist for reasons that are in large part extraneous to his thought. On the other hand, the paper aims to recover the arguments scattered in Wittgenstein's own writings by detailing and defending three lines of argument distinguishing reasons from causes. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein's arguments differ from those of his immediate successors; that he anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends; and that he is perhaps closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

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