scholarly journals Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Hane Htut Maung
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Conceivability Argument ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Strong Reading ◽  
Special Case

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.

Interlude

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Concepts ◽  
Natural Entities ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

This interlude compares the role that the physical digression plays in the Ethics with the function of physics or neuropsychology in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is argued that, unlike in many contemporary approaches, Spinoza does not pursue a reductionist strategy. Instead, the introduction of the physical digression has two very specific functions. On the one hand, it serves as a model that allows Spinoza to conceptualize differences between specific minds, albeit in a preliminary manner. On the other hand, in support of his introduction of the concept of common notions, the digression also justifies his later claim that, by means of coining scientific concepts, humans are able to form adequate ideas of the properties of natural entities.

Comparing the Meaningfulness of Finite and Infinite Lives: Can We Reap What We Sow if We Are Immortal?

2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Natural World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Meaningful Life ◽  
The Past ◽  
William Lane Craig ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
Moral Choices ◽  
The One

AbstractOn the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, significance since we would then be held accountable for our decisions affecting others’ lives. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world.

Comprehending Sociality: Hegel Beyond his Appropriation in Contemporary Philosophy of Recognition

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-292
Author(s):  
Christian Krijnen
Keyword(s):  
Frankfurt School ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Substantial Modification ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Axel Honneth ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One

AbstractContemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality. In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is, on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.

The Animistic Way: Contemporary Paganism and the Posthuman

Poligrafi ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Victoria Dos Santos
Keyword(s):  
Natural World ◽  
Julia Kristeva ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relational Ontology ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Human World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Contemporary Paganism

This article aims to explore the affinities between contemporary Paganism and the posthuman project in how they approach the non-human natural world. On the one hand, posthumanism explores new ways of considering the notion of humans and how they are linked with the non-human world. On the other hand, Neopaganism expands this reflection to the spiritual domain through its animistic relational sensibility. Both perspectives challenge the modern paradigm where nature and humans are opposed and mutually disconnected. They instead propose a relational ontology that welcomes the “different other.” This integrated relationship between humans and the “other than human” can be understood through the semiotic Chora, a notion belonging to Julia Kristeva that addresses how the subject is not symbolically separated from the world in which it is contained.

Caring for the World

2011 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 164-185
Author(s):  
Vincent Blok ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Ecological Crisis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Will ◽  
The One

In the twentieth century, the concept of the will appears in bad daylight. Martin Heideg-ger for instance criticizes the will as a movement of reducing otherness to sameness, dif-ference to identity. Since his diagnosis of the will, the releasement from a wilful manner of thinking and the exploration of the possibility of non-willing has become a prevalent issue in contemporary philosophy. This article questions whether this quietism is still possible in our times, were we are confronted with climate change and the future of mankind is fundamentally threatened. On the one hand, the human will to 'master‘ and 'exploit‘ the natural world can be seen as the root of the ecological crisis, as Heidegger observed. On the other hand, its current urgency forces us to evaluate the releasement of the will in contemporary philosophy. Because also Heidegger himself attempted to develop a proper concept of the will in the onset of the thirties, we start our inquiry with Heidegger‘s phenomenology of the will in the thirties. Although Heidegger was very critical about the concept of the will later on, we are not inclined to reject the concept of the will as he did eventually. In this article we show that Heidegger's criticism of the will is not phenomenologically motivated, and we will develop a proper post-Heideggerian concept of willing. Finally the question will be answerd whether this proper concept of willing can help us to find a solution for the ecological crisis.

Robert Baron’s Metaphysica generalis on the Nature of Free Judgment

2020 ◽  
pp. 127-139
Author(s):  
Alexander Broadie
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Notable Feature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter expounds the concept of ‘judgment’, a concept deployed by seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers in their philosophy of mind. Close attention is paid to the discussion on judgment in the Metaphysica generalis of Robert Baron, where he addresses the idea of judgment as a free act. A notable feature of Baron’s treatment of judgment is his contrast between, on the one hand, the logician’s concern with judgment as a bearer of truth in inferences in which canons of inference are deployed that ensure that if the judgments serving as premises are true then so also must be the judgment drawn as a conclusion from those premises; and, on the other hand, a judgment that is passed by an arbiter, a person agreed upon by two parties in dispute who undertake to accept the judgment he makes as to which party is in the right.

scholarly journals El problema de la reflexión en Husserl y Heidegger

2021 ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Jesús Adrián Escudero
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fe-nomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una parte, se muestra el núcleo de la temprana crítica heideggeriana en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo (1919-1923) y Marburgo (1924-1928) y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente.The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a common-place in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the present article shows Heidegger’s early criticism developed in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1924-1928). On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind.

scholarly journals Apes and Elephants: In Search of Sensation in the Tropical Imaginary

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Creed
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
World View ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Major Purpose ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
The Public ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
And Control

This paper will explore the tropical exotic in relation to the widespread European fascination with tropical animals exhibited in zoos throughout the long nineteenth century. Zoos became places where human animals could experience the chill of a backbone shiver as they came face to face with the animal/other. It will examine the establishment of the first zoos in relation to Harriet Ritvo’s argument that their major imperative was one of classification and control. On the one hand, the zoo fulfilled the public’s desire for wild, exotic creatures while, on the other hand, the zoo reassured the public that its major purpose was control of the natural world encapsulated by the stereotype of tropical excess. I will argue that these various places of exhibition created an uncanny zone in which the European subject was able to encounter its animal self while reaffirming an anthropocentric world view.

The structure of knowledge

2021 ◽  
Vol 153 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-290
Author(s):  
Nadja Germann
Keyword(s):  
Formative Period ◽  
The Other ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Intellectual Traditions ◽  
The One ◽  
Structure Of Knowledge ◽  
New Religion ◽  
Special Case

Medieval architectures of knowledge designed in the Islamic world constitute a special case: They neatly reflect the competition between different intellectual traditions and approaches. On the one hand, there are those classifications that are centered on what was perceived as the indigenous sciences during the formative period, i.e. those sciences that arose in connection with the new religion, Islam, and the language of its revelation, Arabic. On the other hand, scholars eagerly took over and adapted disciplines deriving from non-Arab and non-Muslim cultures, primarily Greek science and philosophy. These traditions, however, transmitted their own conceptions of knowledge that partly stood in conflict with Arabic-Islamic ideas. In this article, I first give an overview of the various approaches and then concentrate on Fārābī and Avicenna, in order to trace a remarkable development: the gradual dissolution of boundaries both within and between the different scientific spheres and paradigms on epistemological grounds.

Luminous Stuff: The Resurrection of the Flesh in Vaughan’s Religious Verse

2021 ◽  
pp. 101-123
Author(s):  
Daniel Juan Gil
Keyword(s):  
Natural World ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Time ◽  
Avant Garde ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Religious Verse ◽  
Henry Vaughan ◽  
The One

Henry Vaughan asserts an understanding of resurrection as essentially and fundamentally about the body, and he understands resurrection to be “immanent” in the sense that signs of resurrection can already now be seen breaking into the here and now. Vaughan’s goal in his poetry is to uncover “Traces, and sounds of a strange kind,” as he puts it in “Vanity of Spirit.” Vaughan’s searching analysis of himself splits his bodily life into two: on the one hand, a socialized and historicized life and, on the other hand, a life that, in its material strangeness, is alien to his time and place and therefore the substrate of resurrection. At the same time, Vaughan is also interested in investigating the material stuff of the natural world separate from the uses and meanings that human languages impose upon it. By mystical attention to material stuff, including feathers, rocks, rainbows, and trees, Vaughan believes he can discover a perspective that transcends historical time. In that sense, Vaughan anticipates the Romantic poets. His formal experimentation is designed to make his poetry a tool to investigate the material strangeness of the person. As such, he develops a distinctively avant-garde poetics as theorized by Peter Bürger.

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