scholarly journals The Communist Revolt in Tallinn on the 1st of December 1924 and its Diplomatic Cover-Up

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 22-43
Author(s):  
Zenonas Butkus

This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR “renders support.” Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia’s only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia’s side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the “abstinence” of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 171
Author(s):  
Wojciech Bal ◽  
Magdalena Czałczyńska-Podolska

The Worker Holiday Fund (WHF) was set up just after the Second World War as a state-dependent organization that arranged recreation for Polish workers under the socialist doctrine. The communist authorities turned organized recreation into a tool of indoctrination and propaganda. This research aims to characterize the seaside tourism architecture in the Polish People’s Republic (1949–1989) against the background of nationalized and organized tourism being used as a political tool, to typify the architecture and to verify the influence of politics on the development of holiday architecture in Poland. The research methodology is based on historical and interpretative studies (iconology, iconography and historiography) and field studies. The research helped distinguish four basic groups of holiday facilities: one form of adapted facilities (former villas and boarding houses) and three forms of new facilities (sanatorium-type, pavilion-type and lightweight temporary facilities, such as bungalows and cabins). The study found that each type of holiday facility was characterized by certain political significance and social impact. Gradual destruction was the fate of a significant part of WHF facilities, which, in the public awareness, are commonly associated with the past era of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) as an “unwanted heritage”.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-169
Author(s):  
Ronen Yitzhak

This article deals with Lord Moyne's policy towards the Zionists. It refutes the claim that Lord Moyne was anti-Zionist in his political orientation and in his activities and shows that his positions did not differ from those of other British senior officials at the time. His attitude toward Jewish immigration to Palestine and toward the establishment of a Jewish Brigade during the Second World War was indeed negative. This was not due to anti-Zionist policy, however, but to British strategy that supported the White Paper of 1939 and moved closer to the Arabs during the War. While serving in the British Cabinet, Lord Moyne displayed apolitically pragmatic approach and remained loyal to Prime Minister Churchill. He therefore supported the establishment of a Jewish Brigade and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in the secret committee that Churchill set up in 1944. Unaware of his new positions, the Zionists assassinated him in November 1944. The murder of Lord Moyne affected Churchill, leading him to reject the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.


2021 ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Boris Martynov

The article deals with the evolution of views of the Brazilian authors on the role, played by the Soviet Union in the WWII and its contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitlerian coalition. It contains a historiographical review of the works, written by the Brazilian authors on the theme, beginning from 2004. One follows the process of their growing interest towards clarifying the real contribution of the Soviet part to the common victory, along with the rise of the international authority of Brazil and strengthening of the Russo – Brazilian ties. One reveals the modern attitude of Brazilian authors towards such dubious or scarcely known themes as the Molotov – Ribbentrop pact, the battles for Smolensk and Rhzev, town–bound fights in Stalingrad, liberation of the Baltic republics, the Soviet war with Japan, etc. The author comes to conclusion, that in spite of the Western efforts to infuse the people`s conscience with the elements of the “post – truth” in this respect, the correct treatment of those events acquires priority even in such a far off from Russia state, as Brazil.


2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-461
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Harvey

During the Second World War, the Nazi regime sent thousands of German women to occupied Poland to work with the ethnic German population, comprising native ethnic Germans and resettlers from the Baltic states, eastern Poland and Romania. They were to be trained to act as model colonisers for the newly conquered territories. Meanwhile the non-German population was subjugated and terrorised. This article examines what German women witnessed in Poland and how far they can be seen as complicit in acts of violence and injustice committed against Poles and Jews. To what extent did a gendered division of labour prevent women actively being involved in or witnessing acts committed against the Polish and Jewish populations? Did a construct of ‘womanly work’ help women to ‘look away’ from the evidence of oppression and persecution?


Quaerendo ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 385-408
Author(s):  
René Kruis ◽  
Gerrold van der Stroom

AbstractSome books printed in occupied Holland during the Second World War carry a so-called K number. This was long supposed to signify approval by the Kultuurkamer, a ‘wrong’ (i.e. a pro-German or, as in this case, puppet) body that was set up in November 1941 by the country’s German governor or Reichskommissar. It has now become clear that this is incorrect: the K number was in fact introduced in July 1941 as a bureaucratic means of monitoring and controlling the supply and rationing of all printing paper by the Dutch Department of Economic Affairs, and was a consequence of pre-war Dutch rationing legislation dating from 1939.


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