Ordering the World of Goods: Consumer Revolution and the Classification of Objects in Eighteenth-Century France

2003 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kwass

This article explores the cultural transformations that accompanied the rise of consumption in eighteenth-century western Europe by examining how defenders of luxury, notably George Marie Butel-Dumont, created new taxonomies to order an expanding world of goods. Building on the work of earlier luxury apologists such as Bernard Mandeville, Voltaire, and David Hume, Dumont reclassified objects of necessity, luxury, and ostentation to redeem the category of luxury and thereby legitimate increased consumption.

1962 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kraus

In ancient Greece the priests of Apollo asserted that freedom of movement was one of the essentials of human freedom. Many hundreds of years later, toward the end of the eighteenth century, people in the Atlantic world again talked of emigration as one of man's natural rights. It was in northern and western Europe that easier mobility was first achieved within the various states. The next step was to use that mobility to leap local boundaries to reach the lands across the western sea. From the “unsettlement of Europe” (Lewis Mumford's phrase) came the settlement of America.Americans and those who wished to become Americans felt at home in the geographical realm conceived by Oscar Wilde. “A map of the world that does not include Utopia,” he said, “is not even worth glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. Progress is the realization of Utopias.” It was the belief that Utopias were being realized in America that caused millions to leave Europe for homes overseas.IA Scottish observer, Alexander Irvine, inquiring into the causes and effects of emigration from his native land (1802), remarked that there were “few emigrations from despotic countries,” as “their inhabitants bore their chains in tranquility”; “despotism has made them afraid to think.” Nevertheless, though proud of the freedom his countrymen enjoyed, Irvine was critical of their irrational expectations in setting forth to America. There were few individuals or none in the Highlands, he said, “who have not some expectation of being some time great or affluent.


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-61
Author(s):  
Thomas Blom Hansen

Abstract Theories of sovereignty in the twentieth century are generally based on a teleological “out-of-Europe” narrative where the modern, centralized nation-state form gradually spread across the world to be the foundation of the international order. In this article, the author reflects on how the conceptualization of sovereignty may change if one begins a global account of modern sovereignty not from the heart of Western Europe but from the complex arrangements of “distributed sovereignty” that emerged in the Indian Ocean and other colonized territories from the eighteenth century onward. These arrangements were organized as multiple layers of dependency and provisional domination, captured well by Eric Beverley's term minor sovereignty. Thinking through sovereignty in a minor key allows us to see sovereignty less as a foundation of states and societies and more as a performative category, emerging in a dialectic between promises of order, prosperity, and law, and the realities of violent domination and occupation.


Author(s):  
Marc Saperstein

This introductory chapter provides some passing references to some of the great Jewish preaching traditions of the modern period. It focuses on preaching in Britain and the United States by representatives of the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements (but not by the ultra-Orthodox, whose Yiddish and — in Israel — Hebrew preaching is a very different tradition). The chapter reveals that there is such a multitude of diverse material from the middle of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twenty-first. All these are furthermore conducted by preachers from all over the world — from both eastern and western Europe as well as the United States and the Middle East. Though this chapter's focus is on Britain and the United States, references are also made to these other preachers from around the world.


2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Jordan

AbstractThomas Carlyle (1795–1881) is well known as one of the earliest and most vociferous critics of Benthamite utilitarianism. However, Carlyle understood Benthamism as the culmination of a much longer eighteenth-century tradition of Epicurean thought. Having been an enthusiastic reader of David Hume during his youth, Carlyle later turned against him, waging an increasingly violent polemic against all forms of Epicureanism. In these later works, Carlyle not only rejected the pursuit of “pleasure” as an appropriate end for the life of the individual, but also took umbrage with Epicurean accounts of sociability as the philosophical underpinnings of laissez-faire, representative democracy, and “public opinion.” For Carlyle, self-interest, no matter how “enlightened,” balanced, or channeled by institutions, could never provide a stable foundation for a political community. Carlyle's contemporaries were aware that his work was intended as an attack on the Epicurean tradition. When John Stuart Mill attempted to defend Epicureanism against Carlyle, several of the latter's disciples and sympathizers responded by extending Carlyle's earlier censures on Epicureanism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 21-38
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

AbstractA survey of theories on the passions and action in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and western Europe reveals that few, if any, of the major writers held the view that reason in any of its functions executes action without a passion. Even rationalists, like Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and English clergyman Samuel Clarke, recognized the necessity of passion to action. On the other hand, many of these intellectuals also agreed with French philosophers Jean-François Senault, René Descartes, and Nicolas Malebranche that, for passions to be useful or to become virtues, they must be governed by reason. Without the moderation of reason, passions will be unruly, distort our notions of good, and disrupt our rational volitions. In response to these popular early modern perspectives, Enlightenment thinker David Hume offered a now-famous argument that reason without passion cannot motivate, drawing the further conclusion that reason cannot govern the passions, either. Given that no one in Hume's era seemed to defend the claim that reason alone can motivate action, what was Hume's intention?


2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
EZEQUIEL ADAMOVSKY

Before the emergence of the field of development economics in the mid-1940s, the mainstream of Western economists had very little to say about the world outside western Europe. However, perhaps due to Russia’s ambivalent location as a nation considered not fully European (nor completely Asiatic) and to her status as a major player in the international arena despite the fact of her modest economic achievements, from the eighteenth century onwards the “Russian case” called the attention of some of the most prominent Western minds, including the first economists. By discussing Russia’s economy, they came to notions and concepts regarding development and backwardness that, to a great extent. informed the twentieth-century debate. The aim of this article is to explore the way in which Russia as a case study affected the evolution of ideas on economic growth or development. The evidence of things Russian, it will be argued, raised doubts about common economic views, thus enabling new thinking that pointed either to criticism of liberal orthodoxy, or to expansion and refinement of its arguments.


Philosophy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-308

Though written several years earlier, Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order has had quite a vogue since September 11th. Philosophers of history, however, will recognize its themes as a re-hash, albeit a timely re-hash, of the eighteenth century dispute between the universalism and optimism of the enlightenment and the cultural relativism and pessimism of Herder.Instead of Voltaire and Diderot in the eighteenth century, in 2002 we have what Huntington calls Davos people, after the annual World Economic Forum meeting in that place. Those who go to Davos include many of the top businessmen, bankers, government officials and opinion formers in the world. They and their kind control most international institutions, most of the world's finances and many governments. They believe in individualism, market economies and political democracy.There is nothing wrong with these beliefs or with holding them. Problems arise when, in enlightenment fashion, Davos people think of these beliefs not just as universal in content but as universally believed in. For though Davos people control much of the world and form political elites in many countries inside and outside the West, outside the West they and their ideas find favour with probably less than one per cent of the world's population. As Huntington puts it this provokes a typically Herderian reaction: ‘The non-Wests see as Western what the West sees as universal. What Westerners herald as benign global integration, such as the proliferation of worldwide media, non-Westerners denounce as nefarious Western imperialism. To the extent that non-Westerners see the world as one, they see it as a threat.’And not only non-Westerners. Much of the success of so-called far right and nationalist movements in Western Europe is undoubtedly due to a Herderian reaction within the West to globalization and federalism, and much of the anger implicit in that reaction is stoked by the complacency of the Davos people.There is indeed nothing wrong with Davos beliefs in themselves, at least nothing that would convict those who hold them of any nefarious or sinister motives. Nor is there anything wrong with the more general enlightenment belief in a universal human nature and a universal standard of morality. The difficulty is to hold this and cognate beliefs, while recognizing that they may not be universally shared, and understanding and even respecting the sensibilities of those who might not share them. In the minds of those who disagree, failure on this point will transform what is supposed to be a liberating faith in universal human rights into an instrument of oppression. But how can one respect what one believes is wrong and even harmful, while not acceding to the very relativism one's commitment to universal truth would strenuously contest—and for the best of philosophical reasons?We are no nearer to solving this problem on a philosophical level than were our predecessors two hundred years ago. But if Huntington and other observers of the world scene are right, its solution is more urgent now than it has ever been.


Author(s):  
Douglas A. Irwin

This chapter provides a background on why free trade is considered to be a desirable policy. It explains whether the most frequently made criticisms of free trade, such as its adverse impact on workers and the environment, have merit. It discusses what is the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as how world trade rules erode a country's sovereignty and undermine its health and environmental regulation. The chapter also introduces basic economic principles and empirical evidence regarding international trade and trade policy. It mentions the perspective on free trade that was originally developed by David Hume and Adam Smith in eighteenth-century Scotland.


2003 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-251
Author(s):  
Victor F. Petrenko ◽  
Olga V. Mitina ◽  
Kirill A. Bertnikov

The aim of this research was the reconstruction of the system of categories through which Russians perceive the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Europe, and the world as a whole; to study the implicit model of the geopolitical space; to analyze the stereotypes in the perception of different countries and the superposition of mental geopolitical representations onto the geographic map. The techniques of psychosemantics by Petrenko, originating in the semantic differential of Osgood and Kelly's “repertory grids,” were used as working tools. Multidimensional semantic spaces act as operational models of the structures of consciousness, and the positions of countries in multidimensional space reflect the geopolitical stereotypes of respondents about these countries. Because of the transformation of geopolitical reality representations in mass consciousness, the commonly used classification of countries as socialist, capitalist, and developing is being replaced by other structures. Four invariant factors of the countries' descriptions were identified. They are connected with Economic and Political Well-being, Military Might, Friendliness toward Russia, and Spirituality and the Level of Culture. It seems that the structure has not been explained in adequate detail and is not clearly realized by the individuals. There is an interrelationship between the democratic political structure of a country and its prosperity in the political mentality of Russian respondents. Russian public consciousness painfully strives for a new geopolitical identity and place in the commonwealth of states. It also signifies the country's interest and orientation toward the East in the search for geopolitical partners. The construct system of geopolitical perception also depends on the region of perception.


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
A. Speckhard

SummaryAs a terror tactic, suicide terrorism is one of the most lethal as it relies on a human being to deliver and detonate the device. Suicide terrorism is not confined to a single region or religion. On the contrary, it has a global appeal, and in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan it has come to represent an almost daily reality as it has become the weapon of choice for some of the most dreaded terrorist organizations in the world, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Drawing on over two decades of extensive field research in five distinct world regions, specifically the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, Russia, and the Balkans, the author discusses the origins of modern day suicide terrorism, motivational factors behind suicide terrorism, its global migration, and its appeal to modern-day terrorist groups to embrace it as a tactic.


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