The Conjunction Error and the Representativeness Heuristic

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Wells
2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albertus A. Wijers ◽  
Maarten A.S. Boksem

Abstract. We recorded event-related potentials in an illusory conjunction task, in which subjects were cued on each trial to search for a particular colored letter in a subsequently presented test array, consisting of three different letters in three different colors. In a proportion of trials the target letter was present and in other trials none of the relevant features were present. In still other trials one of the features (color or letter identity) were present or both features were present but not combined in the same display element. When relevant features were present this resulted in an early posterior selection negativity (SN) and a frontal selection positivity (FSP). When a target was presented, this resulted in a FSP that was enhanced after 250 ms as compared to when both relevant features were present but not combined in the same display element. This suggests that this effect reflects an extra process of attending to both features bound to the same object. There were no differences between the ERPs in feature error and conjunction error trials, contrary to the idea that these two types of errors are due to different (perceptual and attentional) mechanisms. The P300 in conjunction error trials was much reduced relative to the P300 in correct target detection trials. A similar, error-related negativity-like component was visible in the response-locked averages in correct target detection trials, in feature error trials, and in conjunction error trials. Dipole modeling of this component resulted in a source in a deep medial-frontal location. These results suggested that this type of task induces a high level of response conflict, in which decision-related processes may play a major role.


Author(s):  
Carmen Fernández Aguilar ◽  
José-Jesús Martín-Martín ◽  
Sergio Minué-Lorenzo ◽  
Alberto Fernández Ajuria

Rationale, aims and objectives: The available evidence on the existence and consequences of the use of heuristics in the clinical decision process is very scarce. The purpose of this study is to measure the use of the Representativeness, Availability and Overconfidence heuristics in real conditions with Primary Care physicians in cases of dyspnea and to study the possible correlation with diagnostic error. Methods: A prospective cohort study was carried out in 4 Primary Care centers in which 371 new cases or dyspnea were registered. The use of the three heuristics in the diagnostic process is measured through an operational definition of the same. Subsequently, the statistical correlation with the identified clinical errors is analyzed. Results: In 9.97% of the registered cases a diagnostic error was identified. In 49.59% of the cases, the physicians used the representativeness heuristic in the diagnostic decision process. The availability heuristic was used by 82.38% of the doctors and finally, in more than 50% of the cases the doctors showed excess confidence. None of the heuristics showed a statistically significant correlation with diagnostic error. Conclusion: The three heuristics have been used as mental shortcuts by Primary Care physicians in the clinical decision process in cases of dyspnea, but their influence on the diagnostic error is not significant. New studies based on the proposed methodology will allow confirming both its importance and its association with diagnostic error.


Author(s):  
Peter Gál ◽  
Miloš Mrva ◽  
Matej Meško

The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the impact of heuristics, biases and psychological traps on the decision making. Heuristics are unconscious routines people use to cope with the complexity inherent in most decision situations. They serve as mental shortcuts that help people to simplify and structure the information encountered in the world. These heuristics could be quite useful in some situations, while in others they can lead to severe and systematic errors, based on significant deviations from the fundamental principles of statistics, probability and sound judgment. This paper focuses on illustrating the existence of the anchoring, availability, and representativeness heuristics, originally described by Tversky & Kahneman in the early 1970’s. The anchoring heuristic is a tendency to focus on the initial information, estimate or perception (even random or irrelevant number) as a starting point. People tend to give disproportionate weight to the initial information they receive. The availability heuristic explains why highly imaginable or vivid information have a disproportionate effect on people’s decisions. The representativeness heuristic causes that people rely on highly specific scenarios, ignore base rates, draw conclusions based on small samples and neglect scope. Mentioned phenomena are illustrated and supported by evidence based on the statistical analysis of the results of a questionnaire.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Austerweil ◽  
Shi Xian Liew ◽  
Nolan Bradley Conaway ◽  
Kenneth J. Kurtz

The ability to generate new concepts and ideas is among the most fascinating aspects of human cognition, but we do not have a strong understanding of the cognitive processes and representations underlying concept generation. In this paper, we study the generation of new categories using the computational and behavioral toolkit of traditional artificial category learning. Previous work in this domain has focused on how the statistical structure of known categories generalizes to generated categories, overlooking whether (and if so, how) contrast between the known and generated categories is a factor. We report three experiments demonstrating that contrast between what is known and what is created is of fundamental importance for categorization. We propose two novel approaches to modeling category contrast: one focused on exemplar dissimilarity and another on the representativeness heuristic. Our experiments and computational analyses demonstrate that both models capture different aspects of contrast’s role in categorization.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document