Can the "Perfect Couple" Beat the Odds? The Representativeness Heuristic and Prediction of Divorce

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mangan ◽  
Ulf-Dietrich Reips
Author(s):  
Carmen Fernández Aguilar ◽  
José-Jesús Martín-Martín ◽  
Sergio Minué-Lorenzo ◽  
Alberto Fernández Ajuria

Rationale, aims and objectives: The available evidence on the existence and consequences of the use of heuristics in the clinical decision process is very scarce. The purpose of this study is to measure the use of the Representativeness, Availability and Overconfidence heuristics in real conditions with Primary Care physicians in cases of dyspnea and to study the possible correlation with diagnostic error. Methods: A prospective cohort study was carried out in 4 Primary Care centers in which 371 new cases or dyspnea were registered. The use of the three heuristics in the diagnostic process is measured through an operational definition of the same. Subsequently, the statistical correlation with the identified clinical errors is analyzed. Results: In 9.97% of the registered cases a diagnostic error was identified. In 49.59% of the cases, the physicians used the representativeness heuristic in the diagnostic decision process. The availability heuristic was used by 82.38% of the doctors and finally, in more than 50% of the cases the doctors showed excess confidence. None of the heuristics showed a statistically significant correlation with diagnostic error. Conclusion: The three heuristics have been used as mental shortcuts by Primary Care physicians in the clinical decision process in cases of dyspnea, but their influence on the diagnostic error is not significant. New studies based on the proposed methodology will allow confirming both its importance and its association with diagnostic error.


Author(s):  
Peter Gál ◽  
Miloš Mrva ◽  
Matej Meško

The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the impact of heuristics, biases and psychological traps on the decision making. Heuristics are unconscious routines people use to cope with the complexity inherent in most decision situations. They serve as mental shortcuts that help people to simplify and structure the information encountered in the world. These heuristics could be quite useful in some situations, while in others they can lead to severe and systematic errors, based on significant deviations from the fundamental principles of statistics, probability and sound judgment. This paper focuses on illustrating the existence of the anchoring, availability, and representativeness heuristics, originally described by Tversky & Kahneman in the early 1970’s. The anchoring heuristic is a tendency to focus on the initial information, estimate or perception (even random or irrelevant number) as a starting point. People tend to give disproportionate weight to the initial information they receive. The availability heuristic explains why highly imaginable or vivid information have a disproportionate effect on people’s decisions. The representativeness heuristic causes that people rely on highly specific scenarios, ignore base rates, draw conclusions based on small samples and neglect scope. Mentioned phenomena are illustrated and supported by evidence based on the statistical analysis of the results of a questionnaire.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Austerweil ◽  
Shi Xian Liew ◽  
Nolan Bradley Conaway ◽  
Kenneth J. Kurtz

The ability to generate new concepts and ideas is among the most fascinating aspects of human cognition, but we do not have a strong understanding of the cognitive processes and representations underlying concept generation. In this paper, we study the generation of new categories using the computational and behavioral toolkit of traditional artificial category learning. Previous work in this domain has focused on how the statistical structure of known categories generalizes to generated categories, overlooking whether (and if so, how) contrast between the known and generated categories is a factor. We report three experiments demonstrating that contrast between what is known and what is created is of fundamental importance for categorization. We propose two novel approaches to modeling category contrast: one focused on exemplar dissimilarity and another on the representativeness heuristic. Our experiments and computational analyses demonstrate that both models capture different aspects of contrast’s role in categorization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S80-S80
Author(s):  
Jennifer R Turner ◽  
Jennifer T Stanley

Abstract Young adults (YA) frequently endorse age stereotypes (Levy, 2009). We examined whether older adult (OA) speakers influenced by embodied-cognition (“power posing”; Cuddy et al., 2015) would reduce YAs’ stereotype-related judgments. Following the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002), we hypothesized that OA who held a power pose prior to giving their speech would be rated as higher in Competency, Performance, and Electability, but not Warmth. Sixty-three YA viewed and rated 9 videos of OA performing speeches after modeling a pose (power, submissive, control). Within-subjects ANOVAs revealed embodiment condition differences for Performance (F2,124 = 207.76, ηp2 = .77). For ratings of Performance, speakers in the power condition were judged worse than either submissive or control (ps < .001). For Warmth ratings, power (M = 4.81, SD = .62) was worse than control (M = 5.07, SD = .89, p = .003, d = .34), but submissive (M = 4.97, SD = .87) was not significantly different from either group. These results suggest that YA may judge the Performance and Warmth of OA who adopted a power pose harsher because OA are not supposed to be powerful or adopt expansive postures (consistent with the SCM). In comparison, YA may be drawing upon the Representativeness Heuristic of OA in positions of power (e.g., Senators) when rating Electability and Competence.


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