The political economy of corruption in China: the principal-agent dimension

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 263
Author(s):  
Miron Mushkat ◽  
Roda Mushkat
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Debt Bondage

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 44-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Dilip Mookherjee
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Debt Bondage ◽  
Pecuniary Externality ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Bonded Labor ◽  
Financial Obligations

What are the effects of restricting bonded labor clauses in tenancy or debt contracts? While such restrictions reduce agents' ability to credibly commit ex ante to repay principals in states where they default on their financial obligations, they also generate a pecuniary externality on other principal-agent pairs by reducing the equilibrium profit earned by principals. This turns out to imply that on both political and normative grounds, restrictions on bonded labor become more attractive when borrowers become wealthier or the range of collateral instruments widens. (JEL D82, D86, J82, K12)

Sounding the Alarm: The Political Economy of Whistleblowing in the US Security State

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Coyne ◽  
Nathan Goodman ◽  
Abigail R. Hall
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
The Us ◽  
National Security State

AbstractWhat role do whistleblowers play in democratic politics? This paper answers this question by analyzing the political economy of whistleblowing within democratic political institutions. Democratic politics is characterized by numerous principal-agent problems creating significant space for opportunism. Whistleblowers help to resolve these principal-agent problems through the revelation of information regarding abuses of power. These revelations can take place internally, by taking advantage of channels to report abuse, or externally, by publicly revealing information. The latter is especially important where internal mechanisms for reporting opportunism are lacking. Whistleblowing in the US national security state is presented to illustrate this logic.

The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficit Reductions

2020 ◽  
pp. 83-91
Author(s):  
Vito Tanzi
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Fiscal Deficit ◽  
Fiscal Deficits ◽  
The Past

Do policymakers learn from the past mistakes of previous governments or from mistakes made by other countries? Probably not. They mostly learn from their own mistakes. Governments often end up with fiscal deficits and a public debt that are too large. They regularly make pronouncements that they find difficult to satisfy, thus losing credibility. The loss of that credibility makes it difficult for them to introduce the necessary policies. The chapter provides some real life examples. Governments’ control over policymaking is often limited, as is their control over policy instruments. This is an area where principal–agent problems frequently exist.

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