Price Stability versus Financial Stability in Romania

Author(s):  
Marinela BĂRBULESCU ◽  
◽  
Magdalena RĂDULESCU ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ali Nasir ◽  
Mushtaq Ahmad ◽  
Ferhan Ahmad ◽  
Junjie Wu

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a different context for considering issues of financial stability and instability, with reference to economic growth and price stability in particular. Design/methodology/approach – This paper pursued an empirical exploration of six pillars of financial stability, based on a data set for the UK extending from 1985 (Q1) to 2008 (Q2), through the construction of a vector error correction model, including an impulse response function analysis. Findings – The findings show a strong association between the financial and economic stability even in a non-crisis regime. This includes, for example, a strong association exists between the stock market and the real economy; exchange rate appreciation may not provide for long-term real economic growth; inflation does not contribute to real economic growth, both the sensitivity of the economy to yields and a significant lag in transitional effects from financial markets to the real sector; a positive role of credit creation within a non-crisis regime; exchange rate appreciation affects purchasing power; and potential points of linkage between sovereign debt activity and general price levels. Research limitations/implications – The findings should be considered in the context of a concept of the economy as fundamentally dynamic and subject to complex cumulative processes. Practical implications – The findings indicate there is a role for state oversight and intervention within a non-crisis regime based on the complexity of possible interactions that may undermine financial and price stability, with consequences for their association with economic growth. Originality/value – The study provides a new perspective for considering issues of financial stability and instability.


Author(s):  
Alex Cukierman

The first CBs were private institutions that were given a monopoly over the issuance of currency by government in return for help in financing the budget and adherence to the rules of the gold standard. Under this standard the price of gold in terms of currency was fixed and the CB could issue or retire domestic currency only in line with gold inflows or outflows. Due to the scarcity of gold this system assured price stability as long as it functioned. Wars and depressions led to the replacement of the gold standard by the more flexible gold exchange standard. Along with restrictions on international capital flows this standard became a major pillar of the post–WWII Bretton Woods system. Under this system the U.S. dollar (USD) was pegged to gold, and other countries’ exchange rates were pegged to the USD. In many developing economies CBs functioned as governmental development banks.Following the world inflation of the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, eradication of inflation gradually became the explicit number one priority of CBs. The hyperinflationary experiences of the first half of the 20th century, which were mainly caused by over-utilization of the printing press to finance budgetary expenditures, convinced policymakers in developed economies, following Germany’s lead, that the conduct of monetary policy should be delegated to instrument independent CBs, that governments should be prohibited from borrowing from them, and that the main goal of the CB should be price stability. During the late 1980s and the 1990s numerous CBs obtained instrument independence and started to operate on inflation targeting systems. Under this system the CB is expected to use interest rate policy to deliver a low inflation rate in the long run and to stabilize fluctuations in economic activity in the short and medium terms. In parallel the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system were replaced by flexible rates or dirty floats. The conjunction of more flexible rates and IT effectively moved the control over exchange rates from governments to CBs.The global financial crisis reminded policymakers that, of all public institutions, the CB has a comparative advantage in swiftly preventing the crisis from becoming a generalized panic that would seriously cripple the financial system. The crisis precipitated the financial stability motive into the forefront of CBs’ policy concerns and revived the explicit recognition of the lender of last resort function of the CB in the face of shocks to the financial system. Although the financial stability objective appeared in CBs’ charters, along with the price stability objective, also prior to the crisis, the crisis highlighted the critical importance of the supervisory and regulatory functions of CBs and other regulators. An important lesson from the crisis was that micro-prudential supervision and regulation should be supplemented with macro-prudential regulation and that the CB is the choice institution to perform this function. The crisis led CBs of major developed economies to reduce their policy rates to zero (and even to negative values in some cases) and to engage in large-scale asset purchases that bloat their balance sheets to this day. It also induced CBs of small open economies to supplement their interest rate policies with occasional foreign exchange interventions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-155
Author(s):  
Željko Jović

Abstract The financial system of Serbia is highly bank-centric and euroised, which is a common specific feature of financial systems in developing countries. High level of euroisation represents an adequate environment for the development of emphasized interaction of foreign exchange and credit risks; therefore, creation of the spillover mechanism of foreign exchange risk to credit risk is immanent for euroised systems. Although maintaining the stability of the dinar exchange rate is a secondary goal of the National Bank of Serbia in relation to price and financial stability as the primary goals, in terms of existence of the aforesaid spillover mechanism, maintaining stability of the dinar exchange rate represents the area where there is an interaction between the goals of monetary policy (price stability) and those of financial stability policy (maintaining and strengthening the financial system’s stability). In order to explore whether the spillover mechanism of foreign exchange risk to credit risk exists in Serbia’s financial system, the vector autoregressive (VAR) model is applied on data from the Serbian banking sector to quantify the impact of changes in the dinar exchange rates on the rate of non-performing loans (NPLs); the sample was formed in the period of increased instability of the dinar exchange rate, from 31 January 2008 to 31 December 2010. As we have quantitatively confirmed the impact of increase in the dinar exchange rate on the increase of 90-120 days past due NPLs, we can conclude that the existence of expressed interaction between foreign exchange risk and credit risk in the Serbian financial system represents a paradigm of the regulator’s need to achieve contemporary goals of monetary and financial stability policy by maintaining relative stability of the dinar exchange rates. Depreciation of the local currency has inflationary pressure on price stability and simultaneously influences the achievement of financial stability goals through the spillover mechanism of foreign exchange risk to credit risk. In addition to taking systematic measures to reduce the level of euroisation and introduce the specific regulatory requirements, in order to protect banks and clients from the dinar exchange rate volatility, the regulator faces extremely important task of maintaining relative stability of the dinar exchange rate as the instrument to simultaneous achievement of goals of monetary and financial stability policies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (101) ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Isabel Cairó ◽  
◽  
Jae Sim ◽  

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis called into question the narrow focus on price stability of inflation targeting regimes. This paper studies the relationship between price stability and financial stability by analyzing alternative monetary policy regimes for an economy that experiences endogenous financial crises due to excessive household sector leverage. We reach four conclusions. First, a central bank can improve both price stability and financial stability by adopting an aggressive inflation targeting regime, in the absence of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on nominal interest rates. Second, in the presence of the ZLB constraint, an aggressive inflation targeting regime may undermine both price stability and financial stability. Third, an aggressive price-level targeting regime can improve both price stability and financial stability, regardless of the presence of the ZLB constraint. Finally, a leaning against the wind policy can be detrimental to both price stability and financial stability when the credit cycle is driven by countercyclical household sector leverage. In this environment, leaning with credit spreads can be more effective.


Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki

The chapter describes the historical process as well as the analytical and empirical factors that, at the end of the twentieth century, led to the dominance, in advanced economies, of a central bank model based on an independent institution devoted to price stability as its overriding objective. The central bank pre-crisis model was elegant, performing, and efficient. However, it could not easily accommodate the pursuit of a traditionally important central bank objective: financial stability. Indeed, since central banks have, in essence, just one tool, that is, the interest rate, the pursuit of a financial stability objective in addition to a price stability objective could create dilemma situations. In the two decades between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, the economies of advanced economies were very stable, and this period was thus identified as Great Moderation. However, subsequent experience showed that, in this period, the crisis was incubating.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 334-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Fahr ◽  
John Fell

Purpose The global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy alone cannot ensure both price and financial stability. According to the Tinbergen (1952) rule, there was a gap in the policymakers’ toolkit for safeguarding financial stability, as the number of available policy instruments was insufficient relative to the number of policy objectives. That gap is now being closed through the creation of new macroprudential policy instruments. Both monetary policy and macroprudential policy have the capacity to influence both price and financial stability objectives. This paper develops a framework for determining how best to assign instruments to objectives. Design/methodology/approach Using a simplified New-Keynesian model, the authors examine two sets of policy trade-offs, the first concerning the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policy instruments in achieving price and financial stability objectives and the second concerning trade-offs between macroprudential policy instruments themselves. Findings This model shows that regardless of whether the objective is to enhance financial system resilience or to moderate the financial cycle, macroprudential policies are more effective than monetary policy. Likewise, monetary policy is more effective than macroprudential policy in achieving price stability. According to the Mundell (1962) principle of effective market classification, this implies that macroprudential policy instruments should be paired with financial stability objectives, and monetary policy instruments should be paired with the price stability objective. The authors also find a trade-off between the two sets of macroprudential policy instruments, which indicates that failure to moderate the financial cycle would require greater financial system resilience. Originality/value The main contribution of the paper is to establish – with the help of a model framework – the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies in achieving price and financial stability objectives. By so doing, it provides a rationale for macroprudential policy and it shows how macroprudential policy can unburden monetary policy in leaning against the wind of financial imbalances.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Abdullah ◽  
Rizal Mohd Nor

This paper seeks to provide a conceptual framework as to whether a central bank or a monetary authority should issue a crypto-currency given available technology and what are the consequences of doing so. Under the fiat standard the value and purchasing power of money has experienced an exponential decay, whilst prices have increased exponentially. Typically, a central bank is responsible for monetary and financial stability, including settlement and payment mechanisms. A proposed methodology is provided that involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis to measure the comparative monetary performance, stress testing and impact assessment of a new crypto-currency that includes backing by gold, silver and a basket of commodities. The scope of the proposed framework involves a monetary economic analysis, supported by a technological investigation, under the framework of Shari’ah compliance, to explore an impact assessment of the adoption of a national crypto-currency. The significance of this study is that, it provides a framework for the development of a new national crypto-currency, which retains its’ store of value in terms of monetary performance and price stability, that would also investigate whether it’s implementation is viable.


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