Morphology-Dependent Resonance Enhanced Nonlinear Photoacoustic Effect in Nanoparticle Suspension: A Temporal-spatial Model

The article is a brief summary of current research results of the authors in the field of spatial modeling of air pollution based on spatio-temporal data streams from geosensor networks. The urban environment is characterized by the presence of a large number of different sources of emissions and rapidly proceeding processes of contamination spread. So for the development of an adequate spatial model is required to make measurements with a large spatial and temporal resolution. It is shown that geosensor network provide researchers with the opportunity to obtain data with the necessary spatio-temporal detail. The article describes a prototype of a geosensor network to build a detailed spatial model of air pollution in a large city. To create a geosensor in the prototype of the system, calibrated gas sensors for a nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide concentrations measurement were interfaced to the module, which consist of processing unit and communication unit. At present, the authors of the article conduct field tests of the prototype developed.

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A Unified Spatial Model of Congress

10.1093/oso/9780190865580.003.0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Justin Buchler

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Spatial Model ◽

Party Leader ◽

Roll Call ◽

Legislative Elections ◽

Collective Action Problem ◽

Party Leaders ◽

Legislative Session ◽

Disciplinary System ◽

Sincere Voting

This chapter presents a unified model of legislative elections, parties, and roll call voting, built around a party leadership election. First, a legislative caucus selects a party leader who campaigns based on a platform of a disciplinary system. Once elected, that leader runs the legislative session, in which roll call votes occur. Then elections occur, and incumbents face re-election with the positions they incrementally adopted. When the caucus is ideologically homogeneous, electorally diverse, and policy motivated, members will elect a leader who solves the collective action problem of sincere voting with “preference-preserving influence.” That leader will threaten to punish legislators who bow to electoral pressure to vote as centrists. Consequently, legislators vote sincerely as extremists and get slightly lower vote shares, but they offset that lost utility with policy gains that they couldn’t have gotten without party influence. Party leaders will rarely pressure legislators to vote insincerely.

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Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780190865580.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Justin Buchler

Keyword(s):

Spatial Model ◽

Spatial Models ◽

Spatial Theory ◽

Roll Call ◽

Policy Space ◽

Policy Decisions ◽

Roll Call Voting ◽

Legislative Session ◽

History Of ◽

Conventional Models

Spatial theory is divided between models of elections and models of roll call voting, neither of which alone can explain congressional polarization. This chapter discusses the history of spatial theory, why it is important to link the two strands of spatial models, and the value of reversing the order of conventional models. Conventional models place an election before policy decisions are made. This chapter proposes a unified spatial model of Congress in which the conventional order is reversed. First, there is a legislative session, then an election in which voters respond retrospectively, not to the locations candidates claim to hold, but to the bundles of roll call votes that incumbents cast to incrementally adopt their locations in the policy space. Such a model is best suited to explaining three puzzles: why do legislators adopt extreme positions, how do they win, and what role do parties play in the process?

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Relation-Based Governance and Competition

10.1093/oso/9780198812555.003.0015 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Avinash Dixit

Keyword(s):

Spatial Model ◽

Monopolistic Competition ◽

Perfect Competition ◽

Alternative Methods ◽

Fixed Costs ◽

Relational Governance ◽

Dead Weight ◽

Small Communities ◽

Information And Communication ◽

Size Of Firms

If formal institutions of contract governance are absent or ineffective, traders try to substitute relational governance based on norms and sanctions. However, these alternatives need good information and communication concerning members’ actions; that works well only in relatively small communities. If there are fixed costs, the market has too few firms for perfect competition. The optimum must be a second best, balancing the effectiveness of contract governance and dead-weight loss of monopoly. This chapter explores this idea using a spatial model with monopolistic competition. It is found that relational governance constrains the size of firms and can cause inefficiently excessive entry, beyond the excess that already occurs in a spatial model without governance problems. Effects of alternative methods of improving governance to ameliorate this inefficiency are explored.

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Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.47 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 93-113

Author(s):

Nicholas R. Miller

Keyword(s):

Spatial Model ◽

Strategic Behavior ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Strategic Interaction ◽

Veto Power ◽

Constitutional Design ◽

One Dimensional ◽

Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

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