Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan's Selection of WTO Disputes

2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis ◽  
Yuki Shirato
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Business Officials ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Government Report ◽  
Selection Of

What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude toward WTO adjudication by Japan's largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan's diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members.

Why Adjudicate?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Process ◽  
Steel Industry ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Chinese Intellectual ◽  
Trade War

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? This book investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. It demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. The book establishes this argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. The book explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

Revisiting African States Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement through Intra-Africa RTA Dispute Settlement

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malebakeng Forere
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
East African ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
East African Community ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Southern Africa Development Community

AbstractWhereas developed countries were the main players in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the era of the WTO saw a sharp increase in the developing countries’ participation in trade disputes. Thus, developing countries are active complainants and defendants in the WTO dispute settlement processes. Nevertheless, African states are still marginalised, and this situation has attracted attention of many scholars. As a result, scholars in the field have come up with many reasons to explain why African states do not appear as either complainants or respondents. The reasons for Africa’s non-participation have been argued to include cost of WTO litigation relative to the gains, low trade volumes, legal knowledge and non-integration of African countries in the WTO system. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement. The goal in this article is to confirm or dispel assumptions that African states have interests that they need to safeguard through dispute settlement but are inhibited from doing so because of the reasons mentioned above. Unlike other studies, the determination on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement will be approached from African states’ participation in intra-Africa RTA dispute settlement mechanisms. While there are six intra-Africa RTAs notified to the WTO, this work focuses on only two – East African Community and Southern Africa Development Community.

Subverting the Organizational Cartel: Explaining Cross-Party Leadership Selection in U.S. State Houses

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-483
Author(s):  
Matthew N. Green
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
State Level ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Leadership Selection ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Ideology ◽  
Level I ◽  
Selection Of

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the majority party constitutes an organizational cartel that monopolizes the selection of chamber leaders. But in state legislatures, that cartel power is sometimes circumvented by a bipartisan bloc that outvotes the leadership preferences of a majority of the majority party. Drawing from an original data set of instances of cross-party organizational coalitions at the state level, I use statistical analysis to test various hypotheses for when these coalitions are more likely to form. The analysis reveals that party ideology does not adequately explain the violation of these cartels; rather, violations depend on the costs associated with keeping the party unified and the benefits that come from selecting the chamber’s top leadership post. This finding underscores the potential vulnerability of organizational cartels and suggests that governing parties are strategic when deciding how fiercely to defend their cartel power.

Does the WTO exacerbate international conflict?

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332096020
Author(s):  
J Tyson Chatagnier ◽  
Haeyong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Member States ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Compliant Behavior ◽  
Economic Tools

As one component of its mission to reduce trade barriers and encourage the liberalization of international commerce, the World Trade Organization provides states with a forum in which they can raise and resolve complaints about partners’ unfair trading practices. This mechanism streamlines the process of identifying non-compliant behavior, and provides real incentives for the removal of such policies. By furnishing a form of dispute resolution, the institution should be both trade-inducing and peace-enhancing for member states. However, this very mechanism also has the potential to aggravate existing dispute for two reasons. First, it removes the opportunity for states to use economic policies as instruments of structural linkage in resolving disputes. Second, it deprives its members of powerful economic tools that could be used in lieu of militarized responses. Using the implementation of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, as well as the subsequent expiration of Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (the so-called ‘peace clause’), we examine whether the opportunity to resolve trade disputes through the organization affects the likelihood that member states engage in militarized conflict with one another. We find that membership in a trade institution facilitates peaceful interaction, but that judicialization erases these benefits. We conclude that institution building requires caution and attention to the possibility of unintended consequences.

Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems

2002 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Rodden ◽  
Erik Wibbels
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Original Data ◽  
The Political ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Federal States ◽  
The World ◽  
Macroeconomic Management ◽  
Economic Experiences

Recent research on federalism is extremely divided. While some tout the benefits of “market-preserving” federalism, others point to the fragmentation and incoherence of policy in federal states. This research bridges the divide by analyzing the political andfiscalstructures that are likely to account for the highly divergent economic experiences of federal systems around die world. To test these propositions, the authors use an original data set to conduct analyses of budget balance and inflation infifteenfederationsaround the world from 1978 through 1996. The empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal decentralization, the nature of intergovernmental finance, and vertical partisan relations all influence macroeconomic outcomes. The find- ings have broad implications for the widespread move toward greater decentralization and for the theoretical literatures on federalism and macroeconomics.

Mutually agreed solutions under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Analytical Framework after the Softwood Lumber Arbitration

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALBERTO ALVAREZ-JIMÉNEZ
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Intimate Relation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

AbstractThe unprecedented enforcement of the mutually agreed solution (MAS) in the WTO Softwood Lumber disputes – but outside the WTO dispute settlement system – and the recent use of MAS to resolve important trade disputes should trigger a hard look at these dispute settlement instruments provided for by the DSU. This article seeks to provide a detailed framework of analysis of MAS under the DSU that allows the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate MAS-related disputes. WTO Members should not go outside the system to enforce MAS. The article illustrates that MAS can create binding obligations and that MAS are WTO law, given the explicit reference to them in the DSU, their intimate relation with the WTO-covered agreements and the requirement for compliance with these agreements. In addition, the article offers an interpretation of the DSU that allows panels and the Appellate Body to regard MAS as applicable law. This interpretation is offered in the view that there is no policy reason to sustain that these controversies – always fully related to WTO rights and obligations and framed under the corners of the covered agreements – have to be resolved by an adjudication system other than that of the WTO.

A correction

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES McCALL SMITH
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Supportive Evidence ◽  
Erroneous Conclusion ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Political Controversy

In my article ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: the Politics of Procedure in Appellate body Rulings’ (March 2003), I linked the resignation of Debra Steger, former Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat, to the political controversy regarding amicus curiae submissions. This erroneous conclusion was based on two interviews in Geneva and implicitly supportive evidence from a WTO Reporter article.

Commercial stakeholders in international economic dispute resolution and the issue of adjudicatory independence

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 582-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Jemielniak
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
State Action ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

The article discusses the problem of influence exerted by commercial actors in international trade disputes and consequences of this phenomenon for positions adopted by adjudicators. It explores the role of commercial stakeholders inasmuch as they comprise a driving force behind state action, and examines procedural options available to those stakeholders. The issue of adjudicatory independence and neutrality is considered in the context of involved industries and their interests as the non-party spiritus movens behind WTO dispute settlement processes. Related procedural aspects, such as confidentiality/transparency of proceedings and the possibilities for participation of non-party actors, are also examined. It is argued that WTO litigation is often only one track among several available to the stakeholders in the pursuit of their interests. As a consequence, the problem of forum shopping is also raised. In this vein, the standards of the WTO Appellate Body in the area under discussion are set against those of investment and commercial arbitration (as the institutions and rules designed for the latter are also being used for trade controversies, as evidenced in the Softwood Lumber LCIA arbitrations). Consequently, the problem of establishing standards of adjudicatory independence is deemed a significant factor in strategic selection of the most advantageous forum for dispute resolution.

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