Toward a Christian Virtue Account of Moral Luck

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-145
Author(s):  
Kate Ward
Keyword(s):  
Moral Luck

Moral Luck and Judgment in Jane Austen's Persuasion

1987 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-158
Author(s):  
Robert Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Moral Luck

Plato on Education as the Development of Reason

1998 ◽  
pp. 255-260
Author(s):  
Samuel Scolnicov
Keyword(s):  
End Of Life ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Educational Innovation ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Intellectual Activity ◽  
Whole Person ◽  
Real Objects

Socrates' great educational innovation was in ascribing moral worth to the intellectual activity reflectively directed at one's own life. His concept of eudaimonia was so different from the ordinary that talking about it took on sometimes a paradoxical air, as in Apology 30b3. For him, reason is not a tool for attaining goals independently thought worthwhile; rather, rationality itself, expressed in the giving of reasons and the avoidance of contradictions, confers value to goals and opinions. Persons are reasonable, but obviously not the empirical human being. But education is aimed at the empirical man or woman and inevitably employs psychological means. How then is it possible that the result of education should grow out of the depths of each individual and be nevertheless valid for all individuals? In the Symposium, Plato gives Aristophanes the crucial move. Each of us is only half the whole person and we are moved by our desire for what we lack. In this context, to claim that the soul is immortal is to claim-at least-that the soul has a non-empirical dimension, that its real objects are not the objects of desire as such, and that a person's sensible life is not the true basis for the evaluation of his or her eudaimonia. However, in the soul which is not free from contradictions there is no advantage to right but unexamined options. There is in the life of the naïve just an insecurity which is not merely pragmatic. Even if a person never falters to the end of life, this is no more than moral luck. One is still guilty on the level of the logos, and liable to blame and punishment not for what one does, but for what one could have done.

Omissions, Moral Luck, and Minding the (Epistemic) Gap

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-314
Author(s):  
Joseph Metz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Holding Responsible ◽  
Epistemic Gap

AbstractThis paper warns of two threats to moral responsibility that arise when accounting for omissions, given some plausible assumptions about how abilities are related to responsibility. The first problem threatens the legitimacy of our being responsible by expanding the preexisting tension that luck famously raises for moral responsibility. The second threat to moral responsibility challenges the legitimacy of our practices of holding responsible. Holding others responsible for their omissions requires us to bridge an epistemic gap that does not arise when holding others responsible for their actions—one that we might often fail to cross.

GOALS, LUCK, AND MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-316
Author(s):  
R. G. Frey
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Obligations

AbstractIn Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work.

Moral Luck

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-121
Author(s):  
Nicholas Rescher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Luck

scholarly journals Remembering Claudia Card: Two Tributes

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Gottlieb ◽  
Lynne Tirrell
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Feminist Philosophy ◽  
Central Division ◽  
University Of Wisconsin ◽  
The University ◽  
Taking Responsibility

From the editor: On behalf of the editors of FPQ, I thank our colleagues for providing us their public addresses at the Celebration of Life of Professor Claudia Falconer Card of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who died on Saturday, September 12, 2015. Claudia Card was the author of over one hundred articles and books, key works of moral and feminist philosophy including Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (Cambridge 2010), The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford 2002), and The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral Luck (Temple 1996). She was the president of the Central division of the APA 2010-2011, which she often described as her favorite division of the APA. She earned her BA from UW-Madison, and her PhD in 1969 from Harvard University, as the advisee of John Rawls, whom she spoke of with affection as one of the most sensitive and generous of philosophers. I remain grateful to Claudia for being the sort of philosopher who helped her students, colleagues, and readers to confront our responsibilities, and the responsibilities of others, as she lived her own philosophy of taking responsibility for one’s own identity. K.J. Norlock

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