The Decline and Fall of Three Hegemonic Parties in Europe

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (1S) ◽  
pp. S-71-S-87
Author(s):  
Erik Jones
Keyword(s):  
2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ora John Reuter ◽  
Jennifer Gandhi

Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant political party and (2) hold multi-party elections. Elite coalitions organized under the aegis of a hegemonic party are most vulnerable in elections that coincide with poor economic performance. A declining economy provides elites with a platform around which they can mobilize support to challenge incumbents in elections. As a result, the likelihood of defections from hegemonic parties increases as income declines. This study’s original dataset, which includes 227 elections for the chief executive in hegemonic party dictatorships from 1946 to 2004, and its case studies of defections in Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF in 2008 and Turkey under the Democratic Party in 1955 provide evidence for this proposition.


Asian Survey ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 749-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elvin Ong ◽  
Mou Hui Tim

We introduce the concept of a “credibility gap” to explain why the Workers’ Party has been more successful than other opposition political parties in recent elections in Singapore. We argue that opposition parties need to overcome a credible commitment problem with the electorate in order to win against hegemonic parties.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Bader

Hegemonic parties in authoritarian regimes can fulfill important purposes for those regimes and thereby contribute to their survival. Along with the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, hegemonic political parties have emerged in some post-Soviet states, raising questions about the role that these parties play in the survival of the regimes. This article asks which of the purposes that are frequently ascribed to ruling authoritarian parties are fulfilled by United Russia, the Yeni Azerbaijan Party, and Nur Otan of Kazakhstan, the hegemonic parties of the three strongest consolidated authoritarian regimes with a hegemonic party in the former Soviet Union. It is argued that despite the increasing prominence of the hegemonic parties, full-fledged party-based authoritarianism has not yet been established in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.


2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy Langston

We know little about how formerly hegemonic parties react to drastic changes in the external political environment. Under non-competitive electoral conditions, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) was characterized by centralized legislative recruitment and candidate selection that delivered a large percentage of coveted senate candidacies to national-level party politicians and bureaucrats. This centralized and nationalized recruitment gave the leader of the PRI enormous control over his wide-flung political elite. Since elections have become competitive, the PRI has decentralized its recruitment of senate candidates, searching out those most popular with state voters. This work compares the PRI candidates’ backgrounds from the non-competitive and competitive periods, and runs a logistical regression to ascertain if there is a relation between competition and types of party politicians winning nominations. The article demonstrates, using first-of-its-kind data on professional backgrounds of candidates (rather than sitting legislators), that legislative recruitment in a federal context has been decentralized in Mexico.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 767-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie E. Anderson

Parties can be a crucial to democratic function but not all parties or party systems are democratic. Some parties are fully competitive within a pluralist system while others, notably hegemonic parties, are antithetical to democracy. Between competitive, pluralist party systems and hegemonic party systems lie predominant party systems. These are compatible with democracy where democracy is fully consolidated but inhibit democratic consolidation in settings with an authoritarian history or where the rule of law is incomplete. The effect of predominant parties in unconsolidated democracies has not been fully studied in comparative context. I scrutinize this problem in Argentina, which has followed an electoral calendar for two decades, but lacks a fully pluralist system of power-sharing among two nationally-competitive parties. The authoritarian background of Peronism, of Argentina itself and the limited competitive potential of the Radical Party have curtailed democratic development. The article underscores the seriousness of Argentina's dilemma by contrasting its situation with Democratic Party predominance in the United States Deep South in the 1940s. The comparison of democratic development in an older democracy with that of a newer democracy illustrates that some of the processes of consolidation are similar and that the experience of older democracies may indicate possible solutions for newer democracies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 373-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micheline Ishay

This article defends three basic premises. First, the same conditions and forces favorable to revolution may serve to impede efforts at post-revolutionary consolidation. Second, one can assess prospects for consolidation based on the capacity of prospective hegemonic parties to achieve several interrelated objectives: developing a shared worldview among disparate segments of the population, delivering social and economic goods, and establishing order. Third, while democratization is a home-grown process, it may require particular forms of limited intervention to offset anti-democratic forces. The goal of this article is to provide an analytical framework that informs the ongoing debates over democratic transitions while suggesting where and how external engagement may influence the transition process.


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