Xunzi and Mimamsa on the Source and Ground of Ritual: An Analogical Argument

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-761
Author(s):  
Alexus McLeod
Keyword(s):  
1991 ◽  
Vol 57 (01) ◽  
pp. 149-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. D. Lewis-Williams

In 1902 Emile Cartailhac published hisMea Culpa d'un Sceptique. His acceptance of the high antiquity of prehistoric art in western Europe followed Capitan and Breuil's convincing discoveries in Font de Gaume and Les Combarelles and reflected a widespread change of opinion. Despite previous scepticism, researchers were beginning to allow that the parietal as well as the mobile art did indeed date back to the Upper Palaeolithic. But this swing in scientific opinion opened up an even more baffling problem: why did Upper Palaeolithic people make these pictures? In the year following Cartailhac's turn-about Salomon Reinach tried to answer this question by developing an analogical argument based on ethnographic parallels. He could see no other way of approaching the problem: ‘Our only hope of finding outwhythe troglodytes painted and sculpted lies in asking the same question of present-day primitives with whom the ethnography reveals connections’ (Reinach 1903, 259; my translation, his emphasis).


2019 ◽  
pp. 365-392
Author(s):  
Sam Shpall

For decades Ronald Dworkin defended the view that legal interpretation is constructive. One of his most fascinating arguments for this idea, which turns on an analogy between legal and literary interpretation, has been more or less ignored by philosophers of law—probably because they have not been especially interested in the claims about literary interpretation that it presupposes. This chapter explores Dworkin's analogical argument with the sensitivity it deserves, and with particular attention to its controversial ideas about the interpretation of literature. The chapter evaluates the implications of Dworkin’s analogy for his overall anti-positivist project, and for one’s thinking about legal interpretation more generally.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip A. Ostien

Professor Plantinga's “scandalous” conclusion thatIf my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latterrests in part on the twin claims that the best reason we have for belief in other minds is the analogical argument, and the best reason we have for belief in God is the teleological argument. The conclusion also rests on Plantinga's analyses of these two arguments, which show that both fail for very similar reasons. Thus the beliefs based on these arguments are “in the same epistemological boat,“ and Plantinga draws his conclusion. This is, as James Tomberlin says, “an ingenious argument for the conclusion that belief in God is justified in the absence of any good reason whatever.“In this paper I wish to consider the two claims mentioned above, that the best reasons we have for belief in other minds and belief in God are the analogical and teleological arguments, respectively.


1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Brown

Domain constraint, the requirement that analogues be selected from "the same category," inheres in the popular saying "you can't compare apples and oranges" and the textbook principle "the greater the number of shared properties, the stronger the argument from analogy." I identify roles of domains in biological, linguistic, and legal analogy, supporting the account of law with a computer word search of judicial decisions. I argue that the category treatments within these disciplines cannot be exported to general informal logic, where the relevance of properties, not their number, must be the logically prior criterion for evaluating analogical arguments.


Author(s):  
Tao TAO

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.Based on analogical argument, Professor Hans-Martin Sass argues that collective and individual bodies are not independent but interconnected as natural bodies. He worries about modern scientific technologies that aggravate the diseases of the body. I agree with Prof. Sass in many respects but emphasize that modern technology is not the key to the problem. Whether in ancient times or modern times, we have to restate that the ultimate end of life is happiness rather than benefit and that the instrument to pursue happiness is virtue rather than any kind of technology. DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 5 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
John Mariana

Thomas Young (2001) argues that overconsumption and procreation are morally equivalent, and thus that anyone who disapproves of overconsumption must arrive at the same normative judgment concerning procreation (or procreation beyond a certain threshold). Young presents an analogical argument in support of his claim, and defends it against four varieties of objections intended to show that the analogy is weak or faulty. I argue that Young’s defense of his argument fails, and that though a stronger case can be made for his claim of moral equivalence between procreation and overconsumption, a full defense of the claim would unfortunately require a moral theory that we presently do not have (namely, Derek Parfit’s Theory X, the theory of beneficence that would tell us how many people there should be). This is unfortunate because in the absence of successful rational grounds for such a claim concerning the moral value (or disvalue) of procreation relative to resource consumption, we are likely to overlook or misjudge the moral and other costs of population growth.


2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce N. Waller

Analogies come in several forms that serve distinct functions. Inductive analogy is a common type of analogical argument, but critical thinking texts sometimes treat all analogies as inductive. Such an analysis ignores figurative analogies, which may elucidate but do not argue; and also neglects a priori arguments by analogy, a type of analogical argument prominent in law and ethics. A priori arguments by analogy are distinctive, but--contrary to the claims of Govier and Sunstein-they are best understood as deductive, rather than a special form of non deductive reasoning.


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