God, Emperor and Relative Identity

1979 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. Martinich
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Schematic Objects and Relative Identity

Noûs ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 295 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. M. Zemach
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity

Relative Identity

2015 ◽  
Vol 38 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 52-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold W. Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity

Identity

2019 ◽  
pp. 117-142
Author(s):  
Georges Dicker
Keyword(s):  
Space Time ◽  
General View ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Time Path

This chapter expounds, formulates in analytical style, and defends Locke’s general view of identity. It interprets Locke’s puzzling statement that existing at the same time and place isn’t necessary for synchronic identity. It focuses mainly, following Locke, on diachronic identity. Locke never suggests that X is diachronically identical with Y iff they house the same substance-substratum; indeed his account of diachronic identity undermines the argument from change for substance-substratum. For Locke, X is diachronically identical with Y iff X is spatiotemporally continuous with Y, and every segment of the space-time path between X and Y is occupied either by something of the same sort as X or by something of the same sort as Y. This account applies to inanimate objects, plants, and animals. Its appeal to sortals makes it a version of the “relative identity” view. The chapter defends that view against the charge that it is self-contradictory.

Relative Identity and Cardinality

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Blanchette
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
William Alston ◽  
Persuasive Argument ◽  
Absolute Identity ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Peter Geach

Peter Geach famously holds that there is no such thing as absolute identity. There are rather, as Geach sees it, a variety of relative identity relations, each essentially connected with a particular monadic predicate. Though we can strictly and meaningfully say that an individual a is the same man as the individual b, or that a is the same statue as b, we cannot, on this view, strictly and meaningfully say that the individual a simply is b.It is difficult to find anything like a persuasive argument for this doctrine in Geach’s work. But one claim made by Geach is that his account of identity is the account most naturally aligned with Frege's widely admired treatment of cardinality. And though this claim of an affinity between Frege's and Geach's doctrines has been challenged, the challenge has been resisted. William Alston and Jonathan Bennett, indeed, go further than Geach to argue that Frege's doctrine implies Geach's.

scholarly journals Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity

The Monist ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
Sortal Concepts

scholarly journals Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 128-146
Author(s):  
James Goetz
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Identity ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Social Trinitarianism ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Legal Entities

Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is an account of impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.

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