scholarly journals Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity

The Monist ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
Sortal Concepts

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Schematic Objects and Relative Identity

Noûs ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 295 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. M. Zemach
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity

Sortal concepts and causal continuity: Comment on Rips, Blok, and Newman (2006).

2007 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1087-1094 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mijke Rhemtulla ◽  
Fei Xu
Keyword(s):  
Sortal Concepts

Relative Identity

2015 ◽  
Vol 38 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 52-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold W. Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity

Identity

2019 ◽  
pp. 117-142
Author(s):  
Georges Dicker
Keyword(s):  
Space Time ◽  
General View ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Time Path

This chapter expounds, formulates in analytical style, and defends Locke’s general view of identity. It interprets Locke’s puzzling statement that existing at the same time and place isn’t necessary for synchronic identity. It focuses mainly, following Locke, on diachronic identity. Locke never suggests that X is diachronically identical with Y iff they house the same substance-substratum; indeed his account of diachronic identity undermines the argument from change for substance-substratum. For Locke, X is diachronically identical with Y iff X is spatiotemporally continuous with Y, and every segment of the space-time path between X and Y is occupied either by something of the same sort as X or by something of the same sort as Y. This account applies to inanimate objects, plants, and animals. Its appeal to sortals makes it a version of the “relative identity” view. The chapter defends that view against the charge that it is self-contradictory.

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