Strategic Hedging: A "Third Way" for Australian Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific

Asia Policy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lai-Ha Chan
Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-170
Author(s):  
Mustafa Izzuddin

In common with other countries around the world, Brunei Darussalam has had to deal with the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid19) pandemic and its consequences. By the end of 2020, Brunei had navigated the pandemic storm successfully by keeping its social compact intact, achieving a relatively buoyant economy, exhibiting a balanced foreign policy through strategic hedging, and keeping the country secure through defense diplomacy. Ending 2020 in great shape places Brunei in good stead for assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN and future royal succession.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetozar Rajak

This article reevaluates the origins of Yugoslavia's instrumental role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and elucidates the roots and conceptualization of Tito's strategic reorientation toward nonalignment. Yugoslav foreign policy became truly independent only after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet fold. The article shows that Belgrade began searching for a “third way” earlier than is acknowledged in the relevant historiography. The search began when, faced with the distinct threat of a Soviet invasion in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia became all but formally incorporated into the Western alliance. Based on previously unknown or inadequately researched documents from the Yugoslav archives, the article demonstrates that Josip Broz Tito's trip to India and Burma in December 1954, particularly his first encounter with India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, played a key role in shaping Tito's principles of active peaceful coexistence and noncommitment and in transforming them into a global initiative. The article highlights the well-defined political and philosophical rationale behind the principles that became embedded in the concept of non-engagement and, later, nonalignment.


Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin

The Atlantic Gets Ever Wider. Not just in a physical sense, as oceans rise and coastlines recede, but also in ideological terms. Europe and America appear to be pitted against each other as never before. On one shore, capitalist markets, untempered by proper social policies, allow unbridled competition, poverty, pollution, violence, class divides, and social anomie. On the other side, Europe nurtures a social approach, a regulated labor market, and elaborate welfare networks. Possibly it has a less dynamic economy, but it is a more solidaristic and harmonious society. “Our social model,” as the voice of British left liberalism, the Guardian, describes the European way, “feral capitalism,” in the United States. With the collapse of communism, the European approach has been promoted from being the Third Way to the Second Way. The UK fl oats ambiguously between these two shores: “Janus Britain” in the phrase of the dean of transatlanticist observers, Timothy Garton Ash. It is part of Europe, says the British Left ; an Anglo-Saxon coconspirator, answer its continental counterparts. That major differences separate the United States from Europe is scarcely a new idea. But it has become more menacingly Manichaean over the last decade. Foreign policy disagreements fuel it: Iraq, Iran, Israel, North Korea. So does the more general question of what role the one remaining superpower should play while it still remains unchallenged. Robert Kagan has famously suggested that, when it comes to foreign policy, Americans and Europeans call different planets home. Americans wield hard power and face the nasty choices that follow in its wake. Europeans, sheltered from most geopolitical strife, enjoy the luxury of approaching conflict in a more conciliatory way: Martian unilateralism confronts Venusian multilateralism. But the dispute goes beyond diplomatic and military strategy. It touches on the nature of these two societies. Does having the strongest battalions change the country that possesses them? After all, America is not just militarily strong. It is also—compared to Europe—harsh, dominated by the market, crime-ridden, violent, unsolidaristic, and sharp-elbowed. Competition is an official part of the national ideology and violence the way it spills over into everyday life. Or so goes the argument: a major battle of worldviews and social practices separates America from Europe.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-24
Author(s):  
Gaurav Raja Dahal

Caught between the rising rival powers- India and China, Nepali foreign policy can be perceived as following the practice of strategic hedging where it is attempting to position itself in a way to maximize benefits while simultaneously defending against undesirable threats and dangers from both the rising powers. In the context of a small state like Nepal, strategic hedging implies consciously choosing to adopt mixed policies, which features both balancing and bandwagoning. This paper aims to understand how a ministate like Nepal formulates its foreign policy to address the power politics and applies economic pragmatism followed by smart power and nimble diplomacy to its advantage. This paper also aims to explain that strategic hedging can be followed by Nepal when there is an absence of immediate threat that might compel the state to ally with the power for protection. Through the lens of various realist theories, this paper analyzes that a mini state like Nepal can achieve its national interest and would either bandwagon with the rising power i.e., “China, or” it could try to balance against it supporting the current status quo i.e., India.


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