scholarly journals Surfacing the Submerged State: Operational Transparency Increases Trust in and Engagement with Government

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan W. Buell ◽  
Ethan Porter ◽  
Michael I. Norton
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Initial Exposure ◽  
Mobile Phone Application ◽  
Personal Efficacy ◽  
Causal Pathways ◽  
Behavior Study ◽  
Broad Array ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Government ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms

Problem definition: As trust in government reaches historic lows, frustration with government performance approaches record highs. Academic/practical relevance: We propose that in coproductive settings such as government services, people’s trust and engagement levels can be enhanced by designing service interactions to allow them to see the often-hidden work—via increasing operational transparency—being performed in response to their engagement. Methodology and results: Three studies, conducted in the field and laboratory, show that surfacing the submerged state through operational transparency impacts citizens’ attitudes and behavior. Study 1 leveraged proprietary data from a mobile phone application developed by the City of Boston, Massachusetts, through which residents submit service requests; the city’s goal was to increase engagement with the app. Users who received photographs of government addressing their service requests submitted 60% more requests and in 38% more categories over the ensuing 13 months than users who did not receive photographs. These significant increases in engagement persisted for 11 months following users’ initial exposure to operational transparency and were highest for users who had experienced government to be at least moderately responsive to their requests in the past. In study 2, residents of Boston who interacted with a website that visualized both service requests (e.g., potholes and broken street lamps) and efforts by the city’s government to address those requests became 14% more trusting and 12% more supportive of government. Moreover, residents who received additional transparency into the growing backlog of service requests that government was failing to fulfill, revealing government to be less responsive, were no more nor less trusting and supportive of government than residents who received no transparency. Study 3 replicated findings from the first two studies and documented underlying mechanisms: operational transparency increases trust and engagement by two causal pathways—through consumers’ increased perceptions of effort by the government and through increased perceptions that engaging with it is impactful. Responsiveness increases feelings of personal efficacy, which boosts willingness to engage both directly and indirectly through the other causal paths. Managerial implications: Taken together, our results suggest that showing more work performed by government—via operational transparency—encourages people to do more work themselves. These results have implications for the design of a broad array of coproductive services where operations are hidden and consumer trust and engagement are critical.

Artificial Shortage in Agricultural Supply Chains

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Retsef Levi ◽  
Somya Singhvi ◽  
Yanchong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Government Interventions ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Government ◽  
Preemptive Effect

Problem definition: Price surge of essential commodities despite inventory availability, due to artificial shortage, presents a serious threat to food security in many countries. To protect consumers’ welfare, governments intervene reactively with either (i) cash subsidy, to increase consumers’ purchasing power by directly transferring cash; or (ii) supply allocation, to increase product availability by importing the commodity from foreign markets and selling it at subsidized rates. Academic/practical relevance: This paper develops a new behavioral game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain and market dynamics that engender artificial shortage as well as to analyze the effectiveness of various government interventions in improving consumer welfare. Methodology: We analyze a three-stage dynamic game between the government and the trader. We fully characterize the market equilibrium and the resulting consumer welfare under the base scenario of no government intervention as well as under each of the interventions being studied. Results: The analysis demonstrates the disparate effects of different interventions on artificial shortage; whereas supply allocation schemes often mitigate shortage, cash subsidy can inadvertently aggravate shortage in the market. Furthermore, empirical analysis with actual data on onion prices in India shows that the proposed model explains the data well and provides specific estimates on the implied artificial shortage. A counterfactual analysis quantifies the potential impacts of government interventions on market outcomes. Managerial implications: The analysis shows that reactive government interventions with supply allocation schemes can have a preemptive effect to reduce the trader’s incentive to create artificial shortage. Although cash subsidy schemes have recently gained wide popularity in many countries, we caution governments to carefully consider the strategic responses of different stakeholders in the supply chain when implementing cash subsidy schemes.

scholarly journals Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccines Under Limited Supply

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Chen ◽  
Menglong Li ◽  
David Simchi-Levi ◽  
Tiancheng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Dynamic Allocation ◽  
Effective Interventions ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Myopic Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Age Structured

Problem definition: This paper considers how to allocate COVID-19 vaccines to different age groups when limited vaccines are available over time. Academic/practical relevance: Vaccine is one of the most effective interventions to contain the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. However, the initial supply of the COVID-19 vaccine will be limited. An urgent problem for the government is to determine who to get the first dose of the future COVID-19 vaccine. Methodology: We use epidemic data from New York City to calibrate an age-structured SAPHIRE model that captures the disease dynamics within and across various age groups. The model and data allow us to derive effective static and dynamic vaccine allocation policies minimizing the number of confirmed cases or the numbers of deaths. Results: The optimal static policies achieve a much smaller number of confirmed cases and deaths compared to other static benchmark policies including the pro rata policy. Dynamic allocation policies, including various versions of the myopic policy, significantly improve on static policies. Managerial implications: For static policies, our numerical study shows that prioritizing the older groups is beneficial to reduce deaths while prioritizing younger groups is beneficial to avert infections. For dynamic policies, the older groups should be vaccinated at early days and then switch to younger groups. Our analysis provides insights on how to allocate vaccines to the various age groups, which is tightly connected to the decision-maker's objective.

scholarly journals What Should SMEs Consider to Introduce Environmentally Innovative Products to Market?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daegyu Yang
Keyword(s):  
External Information ◽  
Environmental Innovation ◽  
Technological Support ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Innovative Products ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Potential Factors ◽  
The Government ◽  
Develop Market ◽  
Constrained Conditions

In recent years, companies are challenged not only to develop market competencies but also to deal with environmental issues. Unlike larger companies equipped with abundant resources and sustainable capabilities, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are under relatively constrained conditions to effectively deal with environmental concerns as well as market demands. This study attempts to examine a set of potential factors by which SMEs can overcome such limited conditions and bring novel and environmentally beneficial products to market through their innovative activities. Organization theories, such as organizational learning, social network theory, and new-institutional theory, provide a theoretical framework for this study that SMEs may utilize their resources and capabilities from internal, external, and institutional domains. The hypotheses are tested using the Korea Innovation Survey 2010. The analyses show that the likelihood of the market introduction of new and environmentally innovative products is increased not only when an SME makes more monetary investments on internal innovative activities and experiences more success in general innovation activities, but also when an SME inputs more monetary investments into the search for technological knowledge from the outside and utilizes more diverse external information sources. Interestingly, the findings demonstrate that monetary support from the government do not have significant impacts on an SME’s environmental innovation, while a non-monetary technological support system operated by government raises the likelihood of the market introduction of new and environmentally innovative products. Theoretical contributions and managerial implications are discussed.

Partial Completion as a Nonprofit Strategy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Zhang ◽  
Atalay Atasu ◽  
Karthik Ramachandran
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Service Provision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Product Service ◽  
Service Portfolio ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Partial Completion ◽  
Innovative Solution ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Level 3

Problem definition: Faced with the challenge of serving beneficiaries with heterogeneous needs and under budget constraints, some nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have adopted an innovative solution: providing partially complete products or services to beneficiaries. We seek to understand what drives an NPO’s choice of partial completion as a design strategy and how it interacts with the level of variety offered in the NPO’s product or service portfolio. Academic/practical relevance: Although partial product or service provision has been observed in the nonprofit operations, there is limited understanding of when it is an appropriate strategy—a void that we seek to fill in this paper. Methodology: We synthesize the practices of two NPOs operating in different contexts to develop a stylized analytical model to study an NPO’s product/service completion and variety choices. Results: We identify when and to what extent partial completion is optimal for an NPO. We also characterize a budget allocation structure for an NPO between product/service variety and completion. Our analysis sheds light on how beneficiary characteristics (e.g., heterogeneity of their needs, capability to self-complete) and NPO objectives (e.g., total-benefit maximization versus fairness) affect the optimal levels of variety and completion. Managerial implications: We provide three key observations. (1) Partial completion is not a compromise solution to budget limitations but can be an optimal strategy for NPOs under a wide range of circumstances, even in the presence of ample resources. (2) Partial provision is particularly valuable when beneficiary needs are highly heterogeneous, or beneficiaries have high self-completion capabilities. A higher self-completion capability generally implies a lower optimal completion level; however, it may lead to either a higher or a lower optimal variety level. (3) Although providing incomplete products may appear to burden beneficiaries, a lower completion level can be optimal when fairness is factored into an NPO’s objective or when beneficiary capabilities are more heterogeneous.

Coping with Spatial Mismatch: Subsidy Design for Electric Vehicle and Charging Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Yifan Dou
Keyword(s):  
Electric Vehicle ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Spatial Mismatch ◽  
The Government ◽  
Ev Charging

Problem definition: We study how the government should design the subsidy policy to promote electric vehicle (EV) adoptions effectively and efficiently when there might be a spatial mismatch between the supply and demand of charging piles. Academic/practical relevance: EV charging infrastructures are often built by third-party service providers (SPs). However, profit-maximizing SPs might prefer to locate the charging piles in the suburbs versus downtown because of lower costs although most EV drivers prefer to charge their EVs downtown given their commuting patterns and the convenience of charging in downtown areas. This conflict of spatial preferences between SPs and EV drivers results in high overall costs for EV charging and weak EV adoptions. Methodology: We use a stylized game-theoretic model and compare three types of subsidy policies: (i) subsidizing EV purchases, (ii) subsidizing SPs based on pile usage, and (iii) subsidizing SPs based on pile numbers. Results: Subsidizing EV purchases is effective in promoting EV adoptions but not in alleviating the spatial mismatch. In contrast, subsidizing SPs can be more effective in addressing the spatial mismatch and promoting EV adoptions, but uniformly subsidizing pile installation can exacerbate the spatial mismatch and backfire. In different situations, each policy can emerge as the best, and the rule to determine which side (SPs versus EV buyers) to subsidize largely depends on cost factors in the charging market rather than the EV price or the environmental benefits. Managerial implications: A “jigsaw-piece rule” is recommended to guide policy design: subsidizing SPs is preferred if charging is too costly or time consuming, and subsidizing EV purchases is preferred if charging is sufficiently fast and easy. Given charging costs that are neither too low nor too high, subsidizing SPs is preferred only if pile building downtown is moderately more expensive than pile building in the suburbs.

The Effects of Patent Extension and Take-Back Regulation on Green Pharmacy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianqin Shi ◽  
Nicholas C. Petruzzi ◽  
Dilip Chhajed
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Technical Information ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Innovative Company ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
European Environmental Agency ◽  
Managerial Implications

Problem definition: The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals has regulators advocating the benign design concept of “green pharmacy,” but high research and development expenses can be prohibitive. We therefore examine the impacts of two regulatory mechanisms, patent extension and take-back regulation, on inducing drug manufacturers to go green. Academic/practical relevance: One incentive suggested by the European Environmental Agency is a patent extension for a company that redesigns its already patented pharmaceutical to be more environmentally friendly. This incentive can encourage both the development of degradable drugs and the disclosure of technical information. Yet, it is unclear how effective the extension would be in inducing green pharmacy and in maximizing social welfare. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model in which an innovative company collects monopoly profits for a patented pharmaceutical but faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. A social-welfare-maximizing regulator is the Stackelberg leader. The regulator leads by offering a patent extension to the innovative company while also imposing take-back regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. Then the two-profit maximizing companies respond by setting drug prices and choosing whether to invest in green pharmacy. Results: The regulator’s optimal patent extension offer can induce green pharmacy but only if the offer exceeds a threshold length that depends on the degree of product differentiation present in the pharmaceutical industry. The regulator’s correspondingly optimal take-back regulation generally prescribes a required collection rate that decreases as its optimal patent extension offer increases, and vice versa. Managerial implications: By isolating green pharmacy as a potential target to address pharmaceutical eco-toxicity at its source, the regulatory policy that we consider, which combines the incentive inherent in earning a patent extension on the one hand with the penalty inherent in complying with take-back regulation on the other hand, serves as a useful starting point for policymakers to optimally balance economic welfare considerations with environmental stewardship considerations.

Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Zhang ◽  
Atalay Atasu ◽  
Turgay Ayer ◽  
L. Beril Toktay
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Information Provision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Preference Ranking ◽  
Additional Increase ◽  
Healthcare Facilities ◽  
Selection Decisions ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Recipient Selection

Problem definition: We analyze a resource allocation problem faced by medical surplus recovery organizations (MSROs) that recover medical surplus products to fulfill the needs of underserved healthcare facilities in developing countries. The objective of this study is to identify implementable strategies to support recipient selection decisions to improve MSROs’ value provision capability. Academic/practical relevance: MSRO supply chains face several challenges that differ from those in traditional for-profit settings, and there is a lack of both academic and practical understanding of how to better match supply with demand in this setting where recipient needs are typically private information. Methodology: We propose a mechanism design approach to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity based on recipients’ reported preference rankings of different products. Results: We find that when MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients, the only truthful mechanism is random selection among recipients, which defeats the purpose of eliciting information. Subsequently, we show that (1) eliminating inventory information provision enlarges the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing the total value provision; and (2) further withholding information regarding other recipients leads to an additional increase in total value provision. Finally, we show that under a class of implementable mechanisms, eliciting recipient valuations has no value added beyond eliciting preference rankings. Managerial implications: (1) MSROs with large recipient bases and low inventory levels can significantly improve their value provision by appropriately determining the recipients to serve through a simple scoring mechanism; (2) to truthfully elicit recipient needs information to support the recipient selection decisions, MSROs should withhold inventory and recipient-base information; and (3) under a set of easy-to-implement scoring mechanisms, it is sufficient for MSROs to elicit recipients’ preference ranking information. Our findings have already led to a change in the practice of an award-winning MSRO.

The Role of the Institutional Environment in Marketing Channels

2002 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 82-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajdeep Grewal ◽  
Ravi Dharwadkar
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Marketing Channels ◽  
Task Environment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Processes ◽  
Channel Relationships ◽  
Current Task ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms

Set within the political economy framework, marketing channels literature predominantly has used an efficiency-based task environment perspective and largely overlooked a legitimacy-based institutional environment approach in studying channel attitudes, behaviors, processes, and structures. The purpose of this article is to highlight the importance of the institutional environment and develop a comprehensive conceptual framework that incorporates the institutional environment into current marketing channels research. The institutional environment perspective relies on the primacy of (1) regulatory institutions (e.g., laws), (2) normative institutions (e.g., professions), and (3) cognitive institutions (e.g., habitual actions) in influencing the legitimacy of channel members. Using institutional theory, the authors augment the current task environment approach by developing three institutional processes and their underlying mechanisms and elaborating on how these institutions might influence channel relationships. The article ends by laying out a research agenda and highlighting managerial implications.

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Arnosti ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Yash Kanoria
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Contact Potential ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Face Search ◽  
Uniqueness Of Equilibrium ◽  
Never Screened

Problem definition: Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. Practical/academic relevance: The success of matching platforms requires designs that minimize search effort and facilitate efficient market clearing. Methodology: We study a game-theoretic model in which “applicants” and “employers” pay costs to search and screen. An important feature of our model is that both sides may waste effort: Some applications are never screened, and employers screen applicants who may have already matched. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize welfare for participants on both sides of the market. Results: We identify that the market operates in one of two regimes: It is either screening-limited or application-limited. In screening-limited markets, employer welfare is low, and some employers choose not to participate. This occurs when application costs are low and there are enough employers that most applicants match, implying that many screened applicants are unavailable. In application-limited markets, applicants face a “tragedy of the commons” and send many applications that are never read. The resulting inefficiency is worst when there is a shortage of employers. We show that simple interventions—such as limiting the number of applications that an individual can send, making it more costly to apply, or setting an appropriate market-wide wage—can significantly improve the welfare of agents on one or both sides of the market. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that platforms cannot focus exclusively on attracting participants and making it easy to contact potential match partners. A good user experience requires that participants not waste effort considering possibilities that are unlikely to be available. The operational interventions we study alleviate congestion by ensuring that potential match partners are likely to be available.

Incentives for Shared Services: Multiserver Queueing Systems with Priorities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanlin Liu ◽  
Yimin Yu
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Queueing Systems ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Shared Services ◽  
Scheduling Policy ◽  
Shared Service ◽  
Managerial Implications

Problem definition: We study shared service whereby multiple independent service providers collaborate by pooling their resources into a shared service center (SSC). The SSC deploys an optimal priority scheduling policy for their customers collectively by accounting for their individual waiting costs and service-level requirements. We model the SSC as a multiclass [Formula: see text] queueing system subject to service-level constraints. Academic/practical relevance: Shared services are increasingly popular among firms for saving operational costs and improving service quality. One key issue in fostering collaboration is the allocation of costs among different firms. Methodology: To incentivize collaboration, we investigate cost allocation rules for the SSC by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. Results: To empower our analysis, we show that a cooperative game with polymatroid optimization can be analyzed via simple auxiliary games. By exploiting the polymatroidal structures of the multiclass queueing systems, we show when the games possess a core allocation. We explore the extent to which our results remain valid for some general cases. Managerial implications: We provide operational insights and guidelines on how to allocate costs for the SSC under the multiserver queueing context with priorities.

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