scholarly journals Second-person Perspective in Interdisciplinary Research: A Cognitive Approach for Understanding and Improving the Dynamics of Collaborative Research Teams

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Claudia E. Vanney ◽  
J. Ignacio Aguinalde Sáenz

In this paper, we argue that to reverse the excess of specialization and to create room for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, it seems necessary to move the existing epistemic plurality towards a collaborative process of social cognition. In order to achieve this, we propose to extend the psychological notion of joint attention towards what we call joint intellectual attention. This special kind of joint attention involves a shared awareness of sharing the cognitive process of knowledge. We claim that if an interdisciplinary research team aspires to work collaboratively, it is essential for the researchers to jointly focus their attention towards a common object and establish a second-person relatedness among them. We consider some of the intellectual dispositions or virtues fostered by joint intellectual attention that facilitate interdisciplinary exchange, and explore some of the practical consequences of this cognitive approach to interdisciplinarity for education and research.

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Andrea Hollingsworth

In De visione Dei’s preface, a multidimensional, embodied experience of the second-person perspective becomes the medium by which Nicholas of Cusa’s audience, the benedictine brothers of Tegernsee, receive answers to questions regarding whether and in what sense mystical theology’s divine term is an object of contemplation, and whether union with God is a matter of knowledge or love. The experience of joint attention that is described in this text is enigmatic (paradoxical, resisting objectification), dynamic (enactive, participatory), integrative (cognitive and affective), and transformative (self- creative). As such, it instantiates the coincidentia oppositorum and docta ignorantia which, for Cusa, alone can give rise to a vision of the infinite.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-104
Author(s):  
Andrew Pinsent

The claim has been made that when Aquinas speaks about the virtue of truth and its opposing vices in the Summa theologiae (ST) 2-2.109-113, he regards himself as speaking of the same virtue of truth as found in the Nicomachean Ethics 4.7. In this paper, I dispute this claim, showing how Aquinas’s account cannot be Aristotelian and, in particular, that the possibility of forfeiting the virtue of truth by one serious lie cannot be explained by habituation. I argue instead that Aquinas’s account can be better understood by reference to the kind of embodied experience most commonly encountered in joint attention or second-person relatedness, an approach that may offer new ways to address broader moral questions regarding truth.


Author(s):  
Ana Brígida Paiva

As works of fction, gamebooks offer narrative-bound choices – the reader generally takes on the role of a character inserted in the narrative itself, with gamebooks consequently tending towards being a story told in the second-person perspective. In pursuance of this aim, they can, in some cases, adopt gender-neutral language as regards grammatical gender, which in turn poses a translation challenge when rendering the texts into Portuguese, a language strongly marked by grammatical gender. Stemming from an analysis of a number of gamebooks in R. L. Stine’s popular Give Yourself Goosebumps series, this article seeks to understand how gender indeterminacy (when present) is kept in translation, while examining the strategies used to this effect by Portuguese translators – and particularly how ideas of implied readership come into play in the dialogue between the North-American and Portuguese literary systems.


Author(s):  
Susanne Ravn

AbstractThis paper sets out from the hypothesis that the embodied competences and expertise which characterise dance and sports activities have the potential to constructively challenge and inform phenomenological thinking. While pathological cases present experiences connected to tangible bodily deviations, the specialised movement practices of dancers and athletes present experiences which put our everyday experiences of being a moving body into perspective in a slightly different sense. These specialised experiences present factual variations of how moving, sensing and interacting can be like for us as body-subjects. To use of these sources inevitably demands that qualitative research methodologies – especially short-term ethnographical fieldwork – form part of the research strategy and qualify the way the researcher involves a second-person perspective when interviewing dancers and athletes about their experiences. In the subsequent phases analysing the data generated, I argue that researchers first strive to achieve internal consistency of empirical themes identified in the case of movement practices in question thus keeping to a contextualised and lived perspective, also denoted as an emic perspective. In subsequent phases phenomenological insights are then actively engaged in the exploration and discussion of the possible transcendental structures making the described subjective experiences possible. The specialised and context-defined experiences of ‘what a moving body can be like’ are accordingly involved as factual variations to constructively add to and potentially challenge phenomenological descriptions. Lastly, I exemplify how actual research strategies have been enacted in a variety of projects involving professional dancers’, golfers’ and sports dancers’ practices and experiences, respectively.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Gambi ◽  
Martin J. Pickering

AbstractA second-person perspective in neuroscience is particularly appropriate for the study of communication. We describe how the investigation of joint language tasks can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying interaction.


Daímon ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoni Gomila Benejam ◽  
Diana Pérez

In this paper, we will address the question of the impact of the second person perspective of psychological attribution on the traditional problem of knowing other minds. With that purpose in mind, we will introduce the notion of a second-personal perspective of mental attribution within the context of the classical problem of other minds, and discuss the epistemic and ontological implications that follow once the second person perspective is honored. In particular, we will examine how its recognition transforms the traditional problem of other minds, both in its epistemological, ontological and semantical dimensions, and offers a way to go beyond the objective/subjective dichotomy of Modern Philosophy. A proper notion of intersubjectivity, we will argue, is not a simple addition to this dichotomy, but it offers the way to get over the traditional philosophical problems that follow from this modern philosophical paradigm.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document