In what sense is Kantian principle of contradiction non-classical?

2008 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Srećko Kovač
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy Gordon

Economic sanctions are emerging as one of the major tools of international governance in the post-Cold War era. Sanctions have long been seen as a form of political intervention that does not cause serious human damage, and therefore does not raise pressing ethical questions. However, the nature of sanctions is that they effectively target the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society, and for this reason they must be subject to ethical scrutiny.This essay looks at sanctions in the context of three ethical frameworks: just war doctrine, deontological ethics, and utilitarianism. It argues that sanctions are inconsistent with the principle of discrimination from just war doctrine; that sanctions reduce individuals to nothing more than means to an end by using the suffering of innocents as a means of persuasion, thereby violating the Kantian principle that human beings are “ends in themselves”; and that sanctions are unacceptable from a utilitarian perspective because their economic effectiveness necessarily entails considerable human damage, while their likelihood of achieving political objectives is low.


1972 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-215
Author(s):  
Harry S. Silverstein
Keyword(s):  

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milene Consenso Tonetto

It can be argued that the "Formula of the End in Itself " of the Categorical Imperative has been widely accepted and analyzed by commentators of Kant. Allen Wood, for instance, mentions that the idea of human dignity, which underlies the "Formula of the End in Itself ", is the Kantian principle that perhaps has the greatest resonance in the moral conscience of our culture and also the most universal appeal because it seems to support human rights (WOOD, 1998).


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (270) ◽  
pp. 350
Author(s):  
Rogério Jolins Jolins Martins ◽  
Márcio Fabri dos Anjos

Estuda-se aqui a contribuição do princípio misericórdia, formulado por Jon Sobrino em teologia e por nós colocado no contexto da questão dos princípios em Bioética. Em grande parte tributária ao principialismo norte-americano, a bioética carrega marcas do liberalismo reforçado pelo princípio kantiano da autonomia. O princípio misericórdia oferece um contraponto contundente que vem da vulnerabilidade dos pobres e da sua condição social nomeada por Sobrino como um “povo de crucificados”. Superando a formulação de uma misericórdia ingênua, soma-se a sua força espiritual com as exigências de uma responsabilidade capaz de torná-la transformadora. Desta forma, o princípio misericórdia vem reforçar tendências da bioética no Brasil que buscam superar o principialismo circunscrito aos âmbitos das relações de saúde, para se tornar uma bioética social de grande abrangência.Abstract: This study is about the principle of mercy formulated by Jon Sobrino in theology and put in the context of the principles in Bioethics. Mostly attributed to the North American principialism, bioethics hold marks from the liberalism reinforced by the Kantian principle of autonomy. The principle of mercy offers a crucial counterpoint which comes from the vulnerability of the poor and their social condition named by Sobrino as a “people of crucified ones”. Suppressing the formulation of a naïve mercy, its spiritual strength joins the demands of responsibility in order to be capable to change and to transform realities. So, the principle of mercy can reinforce the bioethical tendencies in Brazil in overlapping its circumscription to the principialism in the field of health relations, in order to reach a social bioethics with a broader inclusion of the poor.


Author(s):  
Alec Stone Sweet ◽  
Clare Ryan

This chapter charts the growing capacity of the European Court to protect the rights of those who are not citizens of member states of the Council of Europe. The Court’s sustained commitment to robustly enforcing the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, and the right to a court and judicial remedy facilitated the development of three strains of cosmopolitan jurisprudence. The first operationalizes the Kantian principle of hospitality, covering expulsion, extradition, and the treatment of refugees. The second extends protections to persons whose rights have been violated by states who are not parties to the Convention, or by state parties exercising jurisdiction outside of Convention territory. The third instantiates dialogues with other treaty-based regimes when it comes to overlapping obligations to protect rights. These dialogues suggest that constitutional pluralism is an emergent property of the structure of international law beyond Europe.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
Christian Frigerio

This paper studies how Ishida Sui’s Tokyo Ghoul creates its typical sense of “tragedy,” by stressing the injustice inherent in every act of eating, and by generalizing the model of nutrition to every ethically laden act. Ishida undermines the Kantian principle that “ought implies can,” depicting a twisted world which forces us into wrongdoing: we have to eat, but there is no Other we can eat with moral impunity. Still, his characters provide some ethical models which could be implemented in our everyday food ethics, given that the tragicality spotted by Ishida is not that alien to our food system: food aesthetics, nihilism, amor fati, living with the tragedy, and letting ourselves be eaten are the options Ishida offers to cope with the tragedy, to approach the devastation our need for food brings into the world in a more aware and charitable way. The examination of Ishida’s narrative device, conducted with the mediation of thinkers such as Lévinas, Ricoeur, Derrida, and other contemporary moral philosophers, shall turn the question: “how to become worthy of eating?” into the core problem for food ethics.


Author(s):  
Samuel J. Kerstein

Carl Tollef Solberg and Espen Gamlund suggest that in allocating scarce, life-saving resources we ought to consider how bad death would be for those who would die if left untreated. We have moral reason, they intimate, to prioritize persons for whom death would be worse, according to the Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. In response, I try to show that an allocation principle that specifies minimizing the badness of death among those vying for a life-saving resource would fail to respect the worth of persons. Solberg and Gamlund mention several other allocation principles. But, I argue, even when these others also come into play, allocations can fail to respect persons’ worth. A principle of respect for the worth (or dignity) of persons should, I contend, be employed in the allocation of scarce, life-saving resources. I sketch and apply a Kantian principle in an effort to allay the common worries that such a principle will be too vague to be useful and implausibly disallow length of future life to be a deciding factor in choosing whom to save.


Philosophy ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Baltzly

W. A. Hart argues that Martha Nussbaum does not make a convincing case there are genuine moral dilemmas to be found in Aeschylus' Agamemnon. Hart claims that the impossibility of moral dilemmas flows from the Kantian principle that ‘ought implies can’. A certain understanding of OIC does rule out the possibility of moral dilemmas. However, this particular formulation of the OIC principle does not fit well with the eudaimonist framework common to ancient moral philosophy. It emerges that there are trade offs to be made between the ancients' views on the point of moral evaluation and ours. Thus the possibility of moral dilemmas is an issue that in inextricably enmeshed in larger issues in moral philosophy.


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