scholarly journals Autonomy of Folk Psychology Reconsidered

2017 ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Taavi Laanpere

It has been a recurring theme in the philosophy of mind that folk psychology is autonomous. This paper has three goals. First, it aims to clarify what the term 'folk psychology' could mean in different contexts. Four widespread senses of the term are distinguished and the one eligible for autonomy is picked out. Secondly, a classic argument for autonomy is introduced and motivated. This is the argument from the normativity of folk psychology, based on its constitutive rationality. According to this argument, mentalistic concepts are to be understood as components of prescriptions for a rational course of action, rather than descriptions. Thirdly, limits of the argument from normativity are demonstrated. At best, the argument applies to merely a small segment of explanations in terms of mentalistic vocabulary, as the latter is meant to convey much more than simply normative content about the rational profile of an agent.

Author(s):  
Lisa Bortolotti ◽  
Rachel Gunn

In a clinical context, delusions are symptoms of a number of psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia and dementia, manifesting as beliefs that are implausible and resistant to counter-evidence. In the philosophical literature, the nature of delusions (what they are) and their formation (what causes them) have been examined with increasing interest. Different arguments for and against delusions being regarded as beliefs have been put forward, and both the doxastic and the anti-doxastic camp capture some distinctive and puzzling features of delusions. The one-factor theory, the two-factor theory, and the prediction-error theory constitute distinct attempts to describe the causal mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions and have implications for the management and treatment of delusions in clinical practice. The lively debates surrounding the nature and the causal history of delusions have also shed some light on standard issues in the philosophy of mind, such as what conditions a report needs to satisfy to be regarded as a belief report, and how experience and reasoning interact in generating of hypotheses that can then be accepted as beliefs.


SAGE Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824401983744
Author(s):  
Averi Mukhopadhyay

University campuses serve as second homes for students, teachers, administrators, and parents coming from diverse regions, religions, classes, castes, and different genders. Interaction and camaraderie between the major characters in the academe develop. The bonhomie that exists between the stakeholders of the academe has its own rules, rules that are marked by the interference of power. The one wielding more power by virtue of one’s position, class, caste, or gender tries to dictate the terms of a particular relationship. Relations evolve as power relations, whereby a specific code of conduct regarding speech, behavior, thought, writing, love, and life is laid down for all—from administrators and professors to students and parents. This article studies how in a location as specific as Chennai University as described in Srividya Natarajan’s No Onions Nor Garlic, the ideological prejudices and hierarchical divisions highlighted by the play of power affect the daily life of the academe and chart out the course of action for everyone, from professors, students, high caste, low caste to men and women, involved in power relations. On the basis of that, this article suggests power in general serves not only to suppress the powerless but is productive also, as countering power with power creates a proper kind of resistance that blurs the difference between the agent and the target of power in power relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-585
Author(s):  
Domenico Carolei

In April 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Italian legislation is inadequate to criminalise acts of torture (Cestaro v. Italy). Following the ECtHR’s decision, the Italian Parliament approved the bill A.C. 2168 which aimed to introduce the crime of torture (Article 613-bis) in the Italian Criminal Code. The bill does not seem to comply with the definition of torture provided by international law, and also neglects the legislative guidelines outlined by the ECtHR in Cestaro v. Italy. The purpose of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it will assess the ECtHR’s decision focusing on Italy’s structural problem and its duty to enact and enforce efficient criminal provisions under Article 3 of the European Convention. On the other hand, it will analyse the normative content of Article 613-bis in order to highlight its weaknesses and propose, on each of them, suggestions for amendment.


Pneuma ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-216
Author(s):  
Walter J. Hollenweger

AbstractFor many years, Christians in the Pentecostal and Catholic traditions have been involved in a kind of border war, complete with territory disputes and border skirmishes. As we approach the Third Millennium, the time is now right for a declaration of truce, for constructive engagement, and-as the title of this essay suggests-the discovery of a "common witness." But upon what basis can a peace be established? On the basis of a shared sense of ecclesiastical authority, on a shared personal and corporate history, or on shared perspectives about theology and piety? It is the position of this essay that the one viable course of action is the last of these three options. The border fights have been over the first two, and because of them we have come to think of the border between Catholics and Pentecostals as a kind of no man's land. But on the basis of the third another course of action opens up; by the grace of God what has been a no man's land may become common ground. We actually have much more in common than we have allowed ourselves to think.


1994 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-370
Author(s):  
Michael Watkins ◽  

Author(s):  
Meredith Rolfe

This article examines collective action, focusing on the role of social interactions, conflict, and the dynamics of interpersonal influence in shaping collective identities and interests. The discussion is based on the co-occurrence of individuals’ interest and group identity through a consistent course of action and begins with an overview of analytical models used to investigate extraordinary forms of collective action. The article then describes formal models and the problem of cooperation between self-interested actors, along with the notion of free-riding and the origin of shared interests and collective identities, paying attention to the importance of conflict, social networks, and interpersonal influence. It also explores the role of multiple levels of decision-making and actors’ consciousness in collective action before proposing a formal approach to collective action that is simultaneously less and more rational than the one currently employed in analytical sociology.


Author(s):  
Kasia M. Jaszczolt

The introduction presents the cutting-edge linguistic and philosophical problems with self-reference. It justifies the need for an unprecedented interdisciplinary perspective that allows the method of theoretical and contrastive linguistics on the one hand, and philosophy of mind and language on the other, to enrich their respective fields of enquiry. It concludes with a summary of the contributing chapters.


Author(s):  
Sandro Nannini

[After a brief review of the solutions given to the mind-body problem by philosophers I propose a naturalistic-materialistic solution that is based on a collaboration between the philosophy of mind and neurosciences. According to this solution the three fundamental characteristics of every human state of consciousness – that is, having a content and being conscious and self-conscious - are identified with three higher order properties of brain dynamics from an ontological point of view, although each of them can be described and explained in the language of neuroscience, cognitive psychology and folk-psychology.]


Author(s):  
Bence Nanay

Abstract The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind (or some subset thereof) without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about representations is whether we should be realist about the theory of representationalism. This paper is an attempt to shift the emphasis from the debate concerning realism about theories to the one concerning realism about entities. My claim is that regardless of whether we are realist about representational theories of the mind, we have compelling reasons to endorse entity realism about mental representations.


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