scholarly journals Animating Sympathetic Feelings. An Analysis of the Nature of Sympathy in the Accounts of David Hume’s Treatise

Conatus ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Natalia Borza
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Reflective Process ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Operating Process ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Ways Of Thinking

Sympathy is a powerful principle in human nature, which can change our passions, sentiments and ways of thinking. For the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, sympathy is a working mechanism accountable for a wide range of communication: the ways of interacting with the others’ affections, emotions, sentiments, inclinations, ways of thinking and even opinions. The present paper intends to find a systematic reading of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739) from the point of view of what the mechanism of sympathetic communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of understanding, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of others. Hume’s description of the sympathetic mechanism appears to suggest that sympathetic passions come upon us purely by natural means in a passive manner, without the active use of any of our faculties. Consequently, scholarly attention is drawn to the mechanistic character of the sympathetic process; its automatic nature is emphasized to such an extent that some experts even find it to be completely void of any reflective process. The current study investigates to what extent the sympathetic process can actively be modified and in what manner sympathetic feelings can be generated as described in Hume’s system of emotions. The paper identifies at which points the otherwise mechanically and passively operating process of sympathetic feelings is open to be modified by actively altering or strengthening certain skeletal points of the mechanism. I argue that the alterations can be initiated by the person who receives the sympathetic feelings and also by the person whose passions are transmitted, moreover even by a third party. In a seemingly mechanic model, there is room for altering or at least amplifying one’s sympathetic feelings.

David Hume: Aesthetics

Philosophy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy M. Costelloe
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
Original Contribution ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Supplementary Volume

Unlike other writers in the tradition of 18th-century aesthetics, Hume never devoted a major work to the subject despite his promise in the advertisement to the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) to write a supplementary volume on “criticism” that, along with one on morals and politics, would complete his philosophical system. This lacuna notwithstanding, Hume did devote a number of essays to the subject, and his corpus is replete with references to and discussions of various themes that are sufficiently numerous and substantive enough to constitute an original contribution to the field and its history. As such, Hume’s aesthetics has come to stand as a distinctive and identifiable part of his philosophy, even though its form and content must, in large part, be constructed from the various writings that make up his corpus as a whole.

Hume and the Legacy of Academic Scepticism

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-76
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
David Hume ◽  
General Framework ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Early Modernity ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Pierre Bayle ◽  
The Middle Ages

Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.

SELF AGAINST CHILDHOOD: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALICE MEYNELL TO A PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY OF MEMORY

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Linda M. Austin
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Self ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Spinal Chord ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Brain

THE IDEA OF THE SELFin its various constructions–political, economic, psychological–has always been shadowed by an English tradition of skepticism about the persistence of a conscious and stable identity. Voiced most disconcertingly by David Hume in his section, “Of personal identity” fromA Treatise of Human Nature(1739–40; I.iv.vi), this attitude was significantly advanced during the second half of the nineteenth century by a group of physiological psychologists who argued for the corporeal basis of mental functions, including memory. Henry Maudsley and George Henry Lewes, among others, challenged the metaphysical notion of a mind and drew instead from controversial and often suppressed theories of neuroscience to describe the physiological operation of memory. These theories, which located impressions and sensations in the brain or spinal chord, produced a form of identity that could endure alterations of consciousness. They offered, in addition, a new understanding of an adult's physical connection to the personal past.

scholarly journals A imaginação como fundamento das ciências experimentais

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Main Aspect ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Mind

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.

WAR OR PEACE?: A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ANARCHY

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER VANDERSCHRAAF
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Analysis ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Dynamical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Different Types

I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic analysis of anarchy, I maintain that typically in anarchy some moderate individuals will most desire mutual cooperation while other dominators will most desire to exploit others' cooperation. I argue that once one allows for different types of individuals in anarchy, any a priori analysis of anarchy requires unrealistic assumptions regarding the agents' common knowledge of their situation. However, this move also suggests a dynamical analysis of anarchy, one that assumes no common knowledge. In the Variable Anticipation threshold model developed here, individuals modify their behavior as they learn from repeated interactions. I present specific instances of this model where the individuals in anarchy converge to different equilibria corresponding to either peace or war, depending on the initial conditions. I show that individuals are liable to converge to Hobbes' war of all against all even if only a small percentage of are dominators. The presence of only a few “nasty” individuals gradually drives all, including those inclined to be “nicer”, to imitate the “nasty” conduct of these few. This dynamic analysis suggests that the Hobbesian war in anarchy is indeed inevitable in most realistic circumstances.You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)

SHAFTESBURY ON SELFISHNESS AND PARTISANSHIP

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Michael B. Gill
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Psychological Egoism ◽  
Political Commitments

AbstractIn the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text.

scholarly journals Kritik Nalar Kausalitas dan Pengetahuan David Hume

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (02) ◽  
pp. 201-214
Author(s):  
M Suyudi ◽  
Wahyu Hanafi Putra
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Data Sources ◽  
Sequential Process ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Five Senses ◽  
The Law

This research aims at explaining David Hume’s logical critique of causality and knowledge. As library research, the method used is descriptive-qualitative. Data and data sources were obtained from his important works Why Cause is Always A Need and A Treatise of Human Nature and several secondary literatures on causality. The data was carried out through documentation, started by the researcher documenting Hume's thoughts, especially criticism of the law of causality (cause-effect) and knowledge of both of Hume's primary works. The study results explained that Hume criticized the performance of the law of causality, which explained that the existence of a second essence and after it was an impact or certainty of the first essence. The second essential is the consequence and legitimacy of the first one. According to Hume, it cannot serve empirically as the law of causality occurs because the sequential process is stagnant. Hume's skepticism and doubts over dogmatic and metaphysical matters then affect that all knowledge can only be explored with the five senses and is empirical. All irrational and non-empirical characteristics cannot be attributed to a belief and truth. In conclusion, real truths in knowledge are those that can be investigated empirically. Keywords: Causality, Hume, Knowledge, The five senses.   Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan kritik nalar kausalitas dan pengetahuan David Hume. Sebagai penelitian pustaka, metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif-kualitatif. Data dan sumber data didapat dari karya-karya Why Cause is Always Necessary dan A Treatise of Human Nature serta literatur-literatur sekunder yang berkaitan dengan tema kausalitas. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan dokumentasi, yaitu peneliti mendokumentasikan pemikiran-pemikiran Hume terutama kritik atas hukum kausalitas (sebab-akibat) dan pengetahuan dari kedua karya primer Hume tersebut. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa Hume melakukan kritik atas kinerja hukum kausalitas yang menjelaskan bahwa adanya esensi kedua dan setelahnya merupakan dampak atau keniscayaan atas esensi pertama. Esensi kedua merupakan akibat dan legitimasi dari esensi pertama. Hal demikian yang menurut Hume tidak dapat dijelaskan secara empiris. Menurutnya, hukum kausalitas itu terjadi karena proses keterurutan secara stagnan. Sikap skeptis dan ragu-ragu Hume atas perihal yang sifatnya dogmatis dan metafisik membawa dampak bahwa segala pengetahuan hanya bisa digali dengan panca inderawi dan bersifat empiris. Semua perihal yang sifatnya irasional dan tidak empiris tidak dapat dinisbatkan pada suatu keyakinan dan kebenaran. Pada akhirnya, kebenaran sejati dalam pengetahuan adalah yang dapat diselidiki secara empiris. Kata kunci: Hume, Kausalitas, Pengetahuan, Panca Indera

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Abigail Zitin
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Aesthetic Theory ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature

When David Hume writes, in Book 2 of his Treatise of Human Nature, that “beauty is nothing but a form, which produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts, which conveys pain,” it may seem as though form is already fixed in place as a concept around which aesthetic theory revolves....

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