scholarly journals Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 144-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Gagliarducci ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Paolo Naticchioni
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Using Data

Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994–2001: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin, we find that majoritarian representatives put forward more bills targeted at their constituency and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. (JEL D72)

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

scholarly journals The Career Length and Service of Female Policymakers in the US House of Representatives

2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Praino ◽  
Daniel Stockemer
Keyword(s):  
Gender Gap ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Careers ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Career Length ◽  
The Us ◽  
Using Data

Various studies have outlined the institutional (e.g. the existence of quota laws and the electoral system type of a country) and non-institutional factors (e.g. the political culture of a country) that account for variation in women’s representation, in general, and, in more detail, the low representation of women in the US Congress. However, no study has, so far, compared the Congressional career paths of men and women in order to understand whether this gender gap in representation stems from a difference in terms of the duration and importance of the careers of male and female policymakers. Using data on all US House elections between 1972 and 2012, we provide such an analysis, evaluating whether or not the political careers of women in the US House of Representatives are different from the political careers of their male counterparts. Our findings indicate that the congressional careers of men and women are alike and, if anything, women may even have a small edge over their male colleagues.

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽  
BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽  
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Parallel System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Individual

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 528-552
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Coalition Partner ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Opposition Parties

This chapter explores patterns in legislative speech in the House of Representatives of Japan from 1996 to 2017. In the two main arenas of legislative debate—plenary sessions and committee meetings—the inter-party dimension of speech is characterized by the disproportionate share of speaking activity by opposition parties, as well as the dominant Liberal Democratic Party’s junior coalition partner, Kōmeitō. Within parties, senior members and leaders speak more than others in plenary debates, where debate time is more limited. Backbenchers, including those who lost a single-member district (SMD) race but won a seat through the proportional representation (PR) tier of the mixed-member majoritarian electoral system, are relatively more active in committees. Although women are under-represented in terms of seats, they are not significantly under-represented in terms of relative speaking activity in either arena.

Recruitment and Representation of Ethnic Minorities under Proportional Representation

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleh Protsyk ◽  
Konstantin Sachariew
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Party System ◽  
Structural Characteristics ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Minority Communities ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Beneficial Effects ◽  
Original Dataset

This article explores the effects that electoral rules, party ideologies, and structural characteristics of minority communities have on party system responses to the need of accommodating the country’s ethnic diversity. The article uses an original dataset on parliamentary representation in Bulgaria to analyze candidate selection practices of electorally successful political parties. The article’s findings highlight the need to qualify the academic discussion of beneficial effects of proportional representation (PR) electoral rules for minority representation. The authors report the failures of demographically large ethnic groups to secure close-to-proportional representation under Bulgaria’s choice of PR electoral system. The authors also identify costs in terms of reduced competitiveness and accountability that PR-facilitated electoral success of ethnic minority parties can impose on minority constituencies.

scholarly journals Executive power 60 years on: has anything changed?

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harshan Kumarasingham
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Prime Ministers

When New Zealand changed its electoral system from first-past-the-post (FPP) to mixed member proportional representation (MMP), the move was heralded as the end of old politics. Prime ministers and their Cabinet would no longer be the ‘elected dictatorship’. The executive would now be constrained by greater checks and balances. The two-party system that had held New Zealand politics hostage for at least 60 years would end and instead a greater diversity of interests would be represented in the House of Representatives, a House that could better hold the executive to account. This was the aim, but has it happened? This article examines recent instances of executive actions that are akin to those taken in the FFP era that MMP has been unable to eliminate. It also offers suggestions for how to increase the accountability of the executive by strengthening the constitution and other branches and offices of state. 

scholarly journals Votes for Women: Electoral Systems and Support for Female Candidates

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (01) ◽  
pp. 107-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sona N. Golder ◽  
Laura B. Stephenson ◽  
Karine Van der Straeten ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Damien Bol ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
National Data ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Individual Vote ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Cross National

It is a well-established finding that proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are associated with greater legislative representation for women than single member systems. However, the degree to which different types of PR rules affect voting for female candidates has not been fully explored. The existing literature is also hampered by a reliance on cross-national data in which individual vote preferences and electoral system features are endogenous. In this study, we draw upon an experiment conducted during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections to isolate the effects of different PR electoral systems. Participants in the experiment were given the opportunity to vote for real EP candidates in three different electoral systems: closed list, open list, and open list with panachage and cumulation. Because voter preferences can be held constant across the three different votes, we can evaluate the extent to which female candidates were more or less advantaged by the electoral system itself. We find that voters, regardless of their gender, support female candidates, and that this support is stronger under open electoral rules.

scholarly journals Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederico Finan ◽  
Maurizio Mazzocco
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cost

Abstract Politicians allocate public resources in ways that maximize political gains, and potentially at the cost of lower welfare. In this paper, we quantify these welfare costs in the context of Brazil’s federal legislature, which grants its members a budget to fund public projects within their states. Using data from the state of Roraima, we estimate a model of politicians’ allocation decisions and find that 26.8% of the public funds allocated by legislators are distorted relative to a social planner’s allocation. We then use the model to simulate three potential policy reforms to the electoral system: the adoption of approval voting, imposing a one-term limit, and redistricting. We find that a one-term limit and redistricting are both effective at reducing distortions. The one-term limit policy, however, increases corruption, which makes it a welfare-reducing policy.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document