scholarly journals Vertical Bargaining and Countervailing Power

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 106-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Iozzi ◽  
Tommaso Valletti
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Countervailing Power ◽  
Buyer Power ◽  
Stark Contrast ◽  
Bargaining Problems ◽  
Input Prices

We study a set of bilateral Nash bargaining problems between an upstream input supplier and several differentiated but competing retailers. If one bilateral bargain fails, the supplier can sell to the other retailers. We show that, in a disagreement, the other retailers' behavior has a dramatic impact on the supplier's outside options and, therefore, on input prices and welfare. We revisit the countervailing buyer power hypothesis and obtain results in stark contrast with previous findings, depending on the type of outside option. Our results apply, more generally, to the literature that incorporates negotiated input prices using bilateral Nash bargaining. (JEL C72, C78, D43, L13, L14, L81)

Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Buyer Power

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Inderst ◽  
Tommaso Valletti
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Uniform Pricing ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Buyer Power ◽  
Pricing Power

Abstract This paper introduces a model of third-degree price discrimination where a seller's pricing power is constrained by buyers' outside options. Price uniformity performs more efficiently than discriminatory pricing, as uniform pricing allows weaker buyers to exploit the more attractive outside option of stronger buyers. This mechanism is markedly different from the mechanisms that are at work in case uniform pricing is imposed on an unconstrained monopolist.

Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 182-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Compte ◽  
Philippe Jehiel
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Exact Form ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Bargaining Problems

We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as long as private information is dispersed. We also illustrate how veto constraints differ from ex post participation constraints. (JEL C78, D82)

Complete and defective agreement in Kutchi

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-288
Author(s):  
Stefan Keine ◽  
Trupti Nisar ◽  
Rajesh Bhatt
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Stark Contrast ◽  
Verbal Agreement ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Split Ergativity ◽  
Do So

We describe and analyze the previously undocumented verbal agreement system of Kutchi (Indo-Aryan). We argue that Kutchi instantiates a novel type of split ergativity. First, it exhibits an aspect split in that agreement in non-perfective clauses behaves on a par with agreement in intransitive perfective clauses, in stark contrast to transitive perfective clauses. A striking property of Kutchi is that these asymmetries manifest themselves in the richness of agreement. In the former configurations, the verb agrees with the subject for person, number and gender. In the latter, on the other hand, agreement is systematically defective and reliable fails to cross-references certain φ-features. In addition to this aspect split, Kutchi displays a person split: While the verb normally agrees with the subject, it surprisingly fails to do so in transitive perfective clauses with a 1st person subject. Instead, it is the object that triggers agreement in these configurations, likewise in a defective manner. We will argue that these agreement asymmetries are syntactic in nature rather than morphological. Our analysis builds on, and extends, previous work by Laka (2006) and Coon (2010).

What Results from Resultant Luck?

2021 ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Strict Liability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Stark Contrast

This chapter distinguishes, in a preliminary way, among different views on the role of luck in ascriptions of blameworthiness. First, there is the ‘Strict Liability Account’, which makes agents blameworthy if and only if their acts cause harm. Second, and in stark contrast, there is the ‘Anti-Luck Account’, which holds that any lucky differences between agents should be neutralized: any lucky differences between them should make no difference to how much agents are blamed. Third, there is the ‘Restricted Luck-Sensitive Account’, which appears to blend elements of these other views. The Restricted Account agrees with the Anti-Luck Account that agents are not eligible for blameworthiness unless they act either maliciously, or negligently, or recklessly. This is the ‘Internal Claim’. But the Restricted Account also contends that agents who have qualified for blameworthiness by satisfying the Internal Claim may then be blameworthy to different degrees, depending on how their acts turn out, even if the differences between them at this stage reflect luck. This is the ‘External Claim’. (The other chapters in Part I of the book will build up a case for the Restricted Account and against the Anti-Luck Account.) This chapter also searches for the fundamental constituents of the Anti-Luck Account, and identifies key roles for the ‘Irrelevance Intuition’ and ‘Fairness Intuition’, and for comparative luck. Finally, it takes issue with anti-luckist ‘accommodation strategies’, which attempt to explain away our habits of assigning different amounts of blameworthiness to agents who seem to be separated only by luck.

“Two Suns in One Firmament”: John Cotton, Thomas Hooker, and the 1655 New Haven Sodomy Statute

2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1003-1028
Author(s):  
Sandra Slater
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
New England ◽  
The Other ◽  
Massachusetts Bay ◽  
New Haven ◽  
Sexual Activities ◽  
Legal Code ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Stark Contrast

This piece explores the origins of the anomalous 1655 New Haven statute against sodomy that broke with legal traditions and codes both in England and New England. A lengthy and extraordinarily specific piece of legislation, the New Haven law stands in stark contrast to the minimalist language favored by the English in the early seventeenth century. When viewed within the larger context of clerical animosities, particularly between Thomas Hooker and John Cotton, there is a strong circumstantial case to make for its implementation as an extension of John Cotton's rejected Massachusetts Bay legal code,Moses His Judicials, applied by his friend and admirer John Davenport in New Haven. A devout disciple of John Cotton, John Davenport's New Haven colony relied on Cotton's influence and stood as a rebuke to Thomas Hooker's Connecticut settlements, often criticized as too spiritually lax by those in Massachusetts Bay and New Haven. While seeking to demonstrate greater piety and rigidity, John Cotton and Thomas Hooker sought to exert dominance over the other, with Cotton employing Davenport's colony as an effective castigation of Hooker's perceived liberality. This piece is reflective of trends in studies of sexuality which suggest that ideas and identities related to sexuality do not operate in isolation, but often mirror anxieties not necessarily connected to the regulation of sexual activities. This article situates the 1655 Sodomy Statue within a broader context in order to understand its origins and animosities that potentially motivated its inclusion into the New Haven legal statutes.

scholarly journals Economic development in Slovak agriculture

2009 ◽  
Vol 55 (No. 2) ◽  
pp. 67-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Z. Chrastinová ◽  
V. Burianová
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Arable Land ◽  
The Other ◽  
Plant Production ◽  
Legal Forms ◽  
Production Output ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Input Prices ◽  
The Eu

The article discusses economic development of Slovak agriculture in the period after the accession of Slovakia to the EU and after adopting the CAP. It evaluates agriculture as a whole and its contribution to the national economy, as well as the economic performance of the individual legal forms of business and production sectors. The results achieved by agriculture in 2004–2007 suggest that the income within the sector (except of 2005) has improved also due to the inflow of the EU subsidies. On the other hand, despite the growing aid the production output is shrinking, wages stagnate and the employment is falling. This suggests that the CAP should be changed after 2013, especially as regards the ways of subsidy payments. Economics of the individual products are largely affected by input prices, realisation prices, as well as by the volume of direct subsidies, namely in the plant production – the subsidies for crops grown on arable land, and in animal production – the subsidies per 1 Big Cattle Unit.

R&D INVESTMENTS AS PREBARGAINING STRATEGIES

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450003 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILFRIED PAUWELS ◽  
PETER M. KORT ◽  
EVE VANHAECHT
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Unit Costs ◽  
Bargaining Outcome ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Output Market ◽  
The Difference

This paper analyzes a semicollusive, differentiated duopoly. Firms first compete in cost reducing R&D and then cooperate on the output market. The sharing of the joint profit on the output market is modeled as a Nash bargaining game. We study an asymmetric setting in which one firm has a lower unit cost of production than the other firm, before any R&D expenditures. If firms do not agree on how to share their joint profit, they play a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Assuming linear demand functions, we show that the Nash bargaining outcome is independent of whether firms play a Cournot or a Bertrand Nash equilibrium, as long as both firms supply positive outputs in these equilibria. If the two products are sufficiently differentiated, there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms supply a positive output, and in which the low cost firm always invests more in R&D than the high cost firm. If the two products are not very differentiated, and if the difference in unit costs between the two firms is not too large, there exist two equilibria. In each of these equilibria only one firm supplies a positive output. This can be the low cost or the high cost firm. In the latter case, the initially high cost firm invests so much in R&D that its unit cost after R&D is lower than that of the other firm. This firm then leapfrogs the other firm. If the two products are very similar and if firms apply Bertrand strategies when disagreeing, there exist equilibria in which only one firm supplies a positive output, while in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium that same firm can prevent the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the context of the Nash bargaining model, this latter firm still has the power to claim a share of the joint profit.

scholarly journals Maintaining Class Actions in Tax Cases: Why Have Federal Litigants Been so Much Less Successful?

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Crane
Keyword(s):  
Federal Courts ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Civil Case ◽  
Class Actions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
State Tax ◽  
Stark Contrast ◽  
Federal Taxes

Class actions challenging tax collections and seeking refunds are commonplace to state tax administrators in many jurisdictions. In stark contrast, however, class actions remain unusual in the various federal courts in which suits claiming that federal taxes have been illegally collected can be brought. This paper will attempt to offer some tentative explanations for this disparity. The disparity can be easily generalized. The federal courts have viewed their ability to interfere with tax processes as strictly a matter of limited jurisdiction under specific statutory provisions. Taking their cues from statutes that clearly were intended to limit their power in tax cases, the federal courts have been relatively unwilling to interpret these statutes in ways that expand taxpayers’ remedies. State courts, on the other hand, seem far more likely to apply the same approach to tax cases as they would apply to any other civil case involving private parties, and as a result, feel far less hesitation in taking a more generous approach to taxpayers’ remedies. Why?

scholarly journals Implicit Taxation of Pakistan's Agriculture: An Analysis of the Commodity and Input Prices

1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ghaffar Chaudhry ◽  
Nighat Naheed Kayani
Keyword(s):  
Value Added ◽  
The Other ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Agricultural Commodities ◽  
The World ◽  
Domestic Prices ◽  
Implicit Taxation ◽  
Input Prices ◽  
Implicit Tax Rates

The purpose of the present paper has been to quantify and discuss the implications of implicit taxes in Pakistan's agriculture. The methodology of the paper consisted of derming the impon and expon parity prices of major agricultural commodities grown in Pakistan, by comparing them with domestic procurement prices. Although the analysis covered only four commodities, implicit tax rates in some of the years from 1970-71 to 1989-90 were as high as 75 percent for cenain commodities. It was only in the case of IRRI rice and sugarcane that domestic prices were above the world levels in some years of the period under consideration. When shown as a percentage of the value-added by agriculture, the taxes on these four commodities, net of the total budgetary subsidies on agricultural inputs, varied from 1.9 percent to 14.9 percent. These tax rates in agriculture compared favourably with the overall tax rates in Pakistan's economy for most of the years. Judged in the light of the relative taxable capacities of agriculture and Pakistan's economy as a whole, implicit taxes were much higher in agriculture than in the other sectors of the economy.

scholarly journals Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan
Keyword(s):  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
High Share

Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we investigate the effect of loss aversion and initial reference points on subgame perfect equilibrium. Firstly, a subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed. And its uniqueness is shown. Furthermore, we analyze this equilibrium with respect to initial reference points, loss aversion coefficients, and discount factor. It is shown that one benefits from his opponent’s loss aversion coefficient and his own initial reference point and is hurt by loss aversion coefficient of himself and the opponent’s initial reference point. Moreover, it is found that, for a player who has a higher level of loss aversion than the other, although this player has a higher initial reference point than the opponent, this player can(not) obtain a high share of the pie if the level of loss aversion of this player is sufficiently low (high). Finally, a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining is established, where player’s bargaining power is negatively related to his own loss aversion and the initial reference point of the other and positively related to loss aversion of the opponent and his own initial reference point.

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