scholarly journals Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Athey ◽  
Dominic Coey ◽  
Jonathan Levin
Keyword(s):  
Small Business ◽  
Empirical Model ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Forest Service ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Alternative Policy ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
Efficiency Cost ◽  
Us Forest Service

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, with little efficiency cost. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design. (JEL D44, H57, L73, Q23)

Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Alaei ◽  
Alexandre Belloni ◽  
Ali Makhdoumi ◽  
Azarakhsh Malekian
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

Small Business and Government Procurement

1964 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 390
Author(s):  
Albert N. Schrieber
Keyword(s):  
Small Business ◽  
Government Procurement

scholarly journals Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Benjamin A. Brooks ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

scholarly journals Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 1288-1319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bajari ◽  
Stephanie Houghton ◽  
Steven Tadelis
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Empirical Model ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
Procurement Contracts ◽  
Adaptation Costs

Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7.5–14 percent of the winning bid. Markups from private information and market power, the focus of much of the auctions literature, are much smaller by comparison. Implications for government procurement are discussed. (JEL D44, D82, D86, H57, L13, L74, R42)

Analyzing the Dual Channels for Online Retailer

2011 ◽  
Vol 48-49 ◽  
pp. 232-235
Author(s):  
Sheng Li Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Model ◽  
Design Principle ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Threshold Policy ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
High Valuation ◽  
Dual Mechanism

By constructing the exponential delay cost function, we formulate the consumer decision model based on the threshold strategies in dual-mechanism, and prove that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the high-valuation consumers use a threshold policy to choose between the two selling channels. On the basis of the consumer’s threshold strategies, taking the auction length, the auctioned quantity in each period, and the posted price as the decision variables, we develop the seller’ optimal decision model in dual-mechanism, and show the optimal auction design principle and strategy by numerical analysis.

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