Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare
2011 ◽
Vol 3
(2)
◽
pp. 194-220
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Keyword(s):
We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton's (1987) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development (R&D) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant's R&D, and can reduce the incumbent's R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce welfare if the incumbent's R&D ability is sufficiently limited, but can increase welfare if patent protection and the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. (JEL D86, L14, O31)
2017 ◽
1993 ◽
Vol 23
(1)
◽
pp. 147-160
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Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
Vol 4
(1)
◽
pp. 61-70
2020 ◽
Vol 9
(7)
◽
pp. 75-83
1997 ◽
Vol 6
(3)
◽
pp. 171-172
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Keyword(s):