scholarly journals Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 324-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Costa Lima ◽  
Humberto Moreira ◽  
Thierry Verdier

We address the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have “aligned preferences.” The opposite effect holds for “polarized preferences.” We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria. (JEL D72, D82, F13, F15, H41)

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrique Schneider

Abstract This paper investigates the trade-off between economics and ethics applying them to “lockdowns” as a policy measure to counter the Covid-19-pandemic. This is an academic research on the nature and mechanism of trade-offs in so far as they apply to decision making. In the course of the line of inquiry pursued here, several different ways of trading off are assessed. In applying them to the pandemics, each yield a different answer to the adequacy of lockdowns as measures against the pandemic. The economic trade-off found “optimalcy” conditions, the utilitarian-ethical trade-off failed to do so revealing that there is a problem using “scientific evidence” as basis for such a trade-off. The value-ethical trade-off found out that lockdowns do not pass the test of proportionality within the usual constitutional framework.


Author(s):  
Bahador Bahrami

Evidence for and against the idea that “two heads are better than one” is abundant. This chapter considers the contextual conditions and social norms that predict madness or wisdom of crowds to identify the adaptive value of collective decision-making beyond increased accuracy. Similarity of competence among members of a collective impacts collective accuracy, but interacting individuals often seem to operate under the assumption that they are equally competent even when direct evidence suggest the opposite and dyadic performance suffers. Cross-cultural data from Iran, China, and Denmark support this assumption of similarity (i.e., equality bias) as a sensible heuristic that works most of the time and simplifies social interaction. Crowds often trade off accuracy for other collective benefits such as diffusion of responsibility and reduction of regret. Consequently, two heads are sometimes better than one, but no-one holds the collective accountable, not even for the most disastrous of outcomes.


Author(s):  
Isabel Cepeda ◽  
Pedro Fraile Balbín

ABSTRACT This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.


2021 ◽  
pp. 144078332110011
Author(s):  
Scott J Fitzpatrick

Suicide prevention occurs within a web of social, moral, and political relations that are acknowledged, yet rarely made explicit. In this work, I analyse these interrelations using concepts of moral and political economy to demonstrate how moral norms and values interconnect with political and economic systems to inform the way suicide prevention is structured, legitimated, and enacted. Suicide prevention is replete with ideologies of individualism, risk, and economic rationalism that translate into a specific set of social practices. These bring a number of ethical, procedural, and distributive considerations to the fore. Closer attention to these issues is needed to reflect the moral and political contexts in which decision-making about suicide prevention occurs, and the implications of these decisions for policy, practice, and for those whose lives they impact.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Dorren ◽  
Wouter Van Dooren

AbstractUsing ex ante analysis to predict policy outcomes is common practice in the world of infrastructure planning. However, accounts of its uses and merits vary widely. Advisory agencies and government think tanks advocate this practice to prevent cost overruns, short-term decision-making and suboptimal choices. Academic studies on knowledge use, on the other hand, are critical of how knowledge can be used in decision making. Research has found that analyses often have no impact at all on decision outcomes or are mainly conducted to provide decision makers with the confidence to decide rather than with objective facts. In this paper, we use an ethnographic research design to understand how it is possible that the use of ex ante analysis can be depicted in such contradictory ways. We suggest that the substantive content of ex ante analysis plays a limited role in understanding its depictions and uses. Instead, it is the process of conducting an ex ante analysis itself that unfolds in such a manner that the analysis can be interpreted and used in many different and seemingly contradictory ways. In policy processes, ex ante analysis is like a chameleon, figuratively changing its appearance based on its environment.


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