Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-294
Author(s):  
Anja Sautmann
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Assortative Matching ◽  
Constant Flow ◽  
Age At Marriage ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
Age Dependent ◽  
Finite Period ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Increasing Functions

This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with positive sorting by age include all strictly increasing functions and constant flow payoffs enjoyed for some finite period. (JEL C78, D83, J12)

On the threshold strategies in optimal stopping problems for diffusion processes

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 963-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vadim Arkin ◽  
Alexander Slastnikov
Keyword(s):  
Diffusion Process ◽  
Optimal Stopping ◽  
Diffusion Processes ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Threshold Strategy ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Stopping Set ◽  
Optimal Stopping Problems ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

Abstract We study a problem when the optimal stopping for a one-dimensional diffusion process is generated by a threshold strategy. Namely, we give necessary and sufficient conditions (on the diffusion process and the payoff function) under which a stopping set has a threshold structure.

scholarly journals Dynamics of Strategy Distributions in a One-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space for Games with a Quadratic Payoff Function

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 14
Author(s):  
Georgiy Karev
Keyword(s):  
Broad Class ◽  
Limit State ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Initial Distribution ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Quadratic Term ◽  
Uniform Distributions ◽  
Entire Line ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Initial Distributions

Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the evolution of continuous strategy distributions given a quadratic payoff function for any initial distribution in order to answer the following question—given the initial distribution of strategies in a game, how will it evolve over time? I look at several specific examples, including normal distribution on the entire line, normal truncated distribution, as well as exponential and uniform distributions. I show that in the case of a negative quadratic term of the payoff function, regardless of the initial distribution, the current distribution of strategies becomes normal, full or truncated, and it tends to a distribution concentrated in a single point so that the limit state of the population is monomorphic. In the case of a positive quadratic term, the limit state of the population may be dimorphic. The developed method can now be applied to a broad class of questions pertaining to evolution of strategies in games with different payoff functions and different initial distributions.

scholarly journals Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria

Algorithmica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (10) ◽  
pp. 2927-2954
Author(s):  
Argyrios Deligkas ◽  
John Fearnley ◽  
Paul Spirakis
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Lipschitz Continuity ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Polynomial Algorithms ◽  
Continuous Action ◽  
Lipschitz Continuous ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Action Spaces ◽  
Best Responses ◽  
Strongly Polynomial

Abstract In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all concave games with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention to penalty games, which encompass biased games and games in which players take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function is Lipschitz continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme. Finally, we study distance biased games, where we present simple strongly polynomial time algorithms for finding best responses in $$L_1$$ L 1 and $$L_2^2$$ L 2 2 biased games, and then use these algorithms to provide strongly polynomial algorithms that find 2/3 and 5/7 approximate equilibria for these norms, respectively.

Optimum replacement of a system subject to shocks

1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Abdel-Hameed
Keyword(s):  
Poisson Process ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Sample Path ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Homogeneous Poisson Process ◽  
Jump Size ◽  
Shock Process ◽  
Finite Period ◽  
Periodic Replacement ◽  
Non Homogeneous Poisson Process

A system is subject to shocks. Each shock weakens the system and makes it more expensive to run. It is desirable to determine a replacement time for the system. Boland and Proschan [4] consider periodic replacement of the system and give sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal finite period, assuming that the shock process is a non-homogeneous Poisson process and the cost structure does not depend on time. Block et al. [3] establish similar results assuming that cost structure is time dependent, still requiring that the shock process is a non-homogeneous Poisson process. We show via a sample path argument that the results of [3] and [4] hold for any counting process whose jump size is of one unit magnitude.

scholarly journals On the Usefulness of Cooperation in N Person Games

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Mikhail Sergeevich Nikolskii ◽  
Aboubacar Moussa
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Linear Case ◽  
Global Terrorism ◽  
Constructive Conditions

The N person games in which each player maximizes his payoff function are considered. We have studied an interesting question for the cooperative game theory about the usefulness of uniting the N players in a union. The aim of such cooperation is for each player to get a positive increase to his guaranteed payoff. We have obtained some effective sufficient conditions under which the joining of the players in union is useful for each player. The linear case, specially, is being considered. In the second part of the paper, we have studied the question about the usefulness of cooperation of the N players in the presence of the (N+1)th player, an ill-intentioned destructive player, whose whole aim is not to win but to harm each player individually, and also the union of these players, for example, global terrorism. It should be noted that the considered situation in the second part is related to A. V. Kryazhimskiy’s talk delivered in the summer of 2014. We obtain constructive conditions under which the union of the players is beneficial in this situation as well.

Exponential Stability of Stochastic Age-Dependent Population with Diffusion

2011 ◽  
Vol 282-283 ◽  
pp. 231-235
Author(s):  
Hui Li Han ◽  
Qi Min Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Hilbert Space ◽  
Exponential Stability ◽  
Dynamic System ◽  
Population Dynamic ◽  
Lyapunov Functional ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Strong Solutions ◽  
Exponential Martingale ◽  
Age Dependent ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, a class of stochastic age-dependent population dynamic system with diffusion is introduced. Exponential stability of paths of a strong solution for stochastic age-dependent population dynamic system in Hilbert space is established. The analyses use exponential martingale formula, Lyapunov functional and some special inequalities for our stability purposes. Various sufficient conditions are obtained to ensure the stability of the strong solutions. In particular, by means of our results we loosen the condition of stability.

scholarly journals Existence and Regularity for Boundary Cauchy Problems with Infinite Delay

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Jung-Chan Chang
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Delay ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Regularity Of Solutions ◽  
Cauchy Problems ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Age Dependent ◽  
Population Equation

The aim of this work is to investigate a class of boundary Cauchy problems with infinite delay. We give some sufficient conditions ensuring the uniqueness, existence, and regularity of solutions. For illustration, we apply the result to an age dependent population equation, which covers some special cases considered in some recent papers.

scholarly journals Identification of games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria and unobserved heterogeneity

10.3982/qe666 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1659-1701 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Aguirregabiria ◽  
Pedro Mira
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Finite Mixture Model ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Finite Mixture ◽  
Relevant Variables ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

This paper deals with identification of discrete games of incomplete information when we allow for three types of unobservables: payoff‐relevant variables, both players' private information and common knowledge, and nonpayoff‐relevant variables that determine the selection between multiple equilibria. The specification of the payoff function and the distributions of the common knowledge unobservables is nonparametric with finite support (i.e., finite mixture model). We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of all the primitives of the model. Two types of conditions play a key role in our identification results: independence between players' private information, and an exclusion restriction in the payoff function. When using a sequential identification approach, we find that the up‐to‐label‐swapping identification of the finite mixture model in the first step creates a problem in the identification of the payoff function in the second step: unobserved types have to be correctly matched across different values of observable explanatory variables. We show that this matching‐type problem appears in the sequential estimation of other structural models with nonparametric finite mixtures. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for identification, and show that additive separability of unobserved heterogeneity in the payoff function is a sufficient condition to deal with this problem. We also compare sequential and joint identification approaches.

ON A CLASS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH MEMORY STRATEGIES FOR NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN MICHEL COULOMB ◽  
VLADIMIR GAITSGORY
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Feedback Control ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Feedback Controls ◽  
Memory Strategies ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
With Memory

A two-player nonzero-sum differential game is considered. Given a pair of threat payoff functions, we characterise a set of pairs of acceptable feedback controls. Any such pair induces a history-dependent Nash δ-equilibrium as follows: the players agree to use the acceptable controls unless one of them deviates. If this happens, a feedback control punishment is implemented. The problem of finding a pair of "acceptable" controls is significantly simpler than the problem of finding a feedback control Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the former may have a solution in case the latter does not. In addition, if there is a feedback control Nash equilibrium, then our technique gives a subgame perfect Nash δ-equilibrium that might improve the payoff function for at least one player.

scholarly journals Subgame Maxmin Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
János Flesch ◽  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Jasmine Maes ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Keyword(s):  
Stochastic Games ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Countable State ◽  
Finite Action ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Action Spaces ◽  
Special Case

AbstractWe study subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with a countable state space, finite action spaces, and a bounded and universally measurable payoff function. Here, $$\phi $$ ϕ denotes the tolerance function that assigns a nonnegative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategies are strategies of the maximizing player that guarantee the lower value in every subgame within the subgame-dependent tolerance level as given by $$\phi $$ ϕ . First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be a subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategy. As a special case, we obtain a characterization for subgame maxmin strategies, i.e., strategies that exactly guarantee the lower value at every subgame. Secondly, we present sufficient conditions for the existence of a subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategy. Finally, we show the possibly surprising result that each game admits a strictly positive tolerance function $$\phi ^*$$ ϕ ∗ with the following property: if a player has a subgame $$\phi ^*$$ ϕ ∗ -maxmin strategy, then he has a subgame maxmin strategy too. As a consequence, the existence of a subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategy for every positive tolerance function $$\phi $$ ϕ is equivalent to the existence of a subgame maxmin strategy.

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