scholarly journals Public Debt and Changing Inflation Targets

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Pronounced Effect ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Moderate Increase ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Maturity Structure ◽  
Inflation Targets

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)

scholarly journals DOES INFLATION TARGETING MATTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 362-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Cornand ◽  
Cheick Kader M'baye
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Macroeconomic Performance ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Inflation Stabilization

We use laboratory experiments with human subjects to test the relevance of different inflation-targeting regimes. In particular and within the standard New Keynesian model, we evaluate to what extent communication of the inflation target is relevant to the success of inflation targeting. We find that if the central bank cares only about inflation stabilization, announcing the inflation target does not make a difference in terms of macroeconomic performance compared with a standard active monetary policy. However, if the central bank also cares about the stabilization of economic activity, communicating the target helps to reduce the volatility of inflation, interest rate, and output gap, although their average levels are not affected. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature and provides a rationale for the adoption of a flexible inflation-targeting regime.

scholarly journals RAMSEY OPTIMAL POLICY IN THE NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH PUBLIC DEBT

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Jean-Bernard Chatelain ◽  
Kirsten Ralf
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Debt Dynamics ◽  
Level Versus ◽  
The Interest Rate

In the discrete-time new-Keynesian model with public debt, Ramsey optimal policy eliminates the indeterminacy of simple-rules multiple equilibria between the fiscal theory of the price level versus new-Keynesian versus an unpleasant equilibrium. If public debt volatility is taken into account into the loss function, the interest rate responds to public debt besides inflation and output gap. Else, the Taylor rule is identical to Ramsey optimal policy when there is zero public debt. The optimal fiscal-rule parameter implies the local stability of public-debt dynamics (“passive” fiscal policy).

scholarly journals DESIGNING MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY RULES IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH RULE-OF-THUMB CONSUMERS

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaele Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Ricardian Equivalence ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

This paper studies the determinacy properties of monetary and fiscal policy rules in a small-scale New Keynesian model. We modify the standard model in two ways. First, we allow positive public debt in the steady state as in Leeper [Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129–147 (1991)]. Second, we add rule-of-thumb consumers as in Bilbiie [Journal of Economic Theory 140, 162–196 (2008)]. Leeper studied a model in which Ricardian equivalence holds, and he showed that monetary and fiscal policy can be studied independently. In Bilbiie's analysis, rule-of-thumb consumers break the Ricardian equivalence and generate important consequences for the design of monetary policy. In his model, steady-state public debt was equal to zero. We study a model with both rule-of-thumb consumers and positive steady-state public debt. We find that the mix of fiscal and monetary policies that guarantees equilibrium determinacy is sensitive to the exact values of the parameters of the model.

scholarly journals The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
Enrique Martínez-García
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Us ◽  
Imperfect Credibility ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

UNANCHORED EXPECTATIONS: SELF-REINFORCING LIQUIDITY TRAPS AND MULTIPLE STEADY STATES

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joep Lustenhouwer
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Steady States ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Multiple Steady States ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Expectation Values ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
Keynesian Model

We study a New Keynesian model with bounded rationality, where agents choose their expectations heterogeneously from a discrete choice set. The range of their set of possible expectation values can be interpreted as the anchoring of expectations. In the model, multiple locally stable steady states can arise that reflect coordination on particular expectation values. Moreover, bad shocks to the economy can trigger a self-reinforcing wave of pessimism, where the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding, and agents coordinate on a locally stable liquidity trap steady state. When we let the anchoring of expectations evolve endogenously, it turns out that the anchoring of expectations at the time the bad shocks hit the economy is crucial in determining whether the economy can recover from the liquidity trap. Finally, we find that a higher inflation target makes it less likely that self-reinforcing liquidity traps arise.

Money and Credit in the New Keynesian Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Offick ◽  
Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Credit Channel ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Static Approximation ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Interest Rate

AbstractThis paper integrates a money and credit market into a static approximation of the baseline New Keynesian model based on a money-and-credit-in-the-utility approach, in which real balances and borrowing contribute to the household’s utility. In this framework, the central bank has no direct control over the interest rate on bonds. Instead, the central bank’s instrument variables are the monetary base and the refinancing rate, i. e. the rate at which the central bank provides loans to the banking sector. Our approach gives rise to a credit channel, in which current and expected future interest rates on the bond and loan market directly affect current goods demand. The credit channel amplifies the output effects of isolated monetary disturbances. Taking changes in private (inflation and interest rate) expectations into account, we find that - contrarily to BERNANKE and BLINDER (1988) - the credit channel may also dampen the output effects of monetary disturbances. The expansionary effects of a monetary expansion may be substantially diminished if the monetary disturbance is accompanied by a contractionary credit shock. In a dynamic version of our model, in which expectations are formed endogenously, we find that the credit channel amplifies output responses.

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