Measuring the value of central bank commitment in the benchmark New Keynesian model

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 249-265
Author(s):  
Luc Marest ◽  
Thom Thurston
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Keynesian Model

scholarly journals Public Debt and Changing Inflation Targets

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Pronounced Effect ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Moderate Increase ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Maturity Structure ◽  
Inflation Targets

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)

scholarly journals The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
Enrique Martínez-García
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Us ◽  
Imperfect Credibility ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

Money and Credit in the New Keynesian Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Offick ◽  
Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Credit Channel ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Static Approximation ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Interest Rate

AbstractThis paper integrates a money and credit market into a static approximation of the baseline New Keynesian model based on a money-and-credit-in-the-utility approach, in which real balances and borrowing contribute to the household’s utility. In this framework, the central bank has no direct control over the interest rate on bonds. Instead, the central bank’s instrument variables are the monetary base and the refinancing rate, i. e. the rate at which the central bank provides loans to the banking sector. Our approach gives rise to a credit channel, in which current and expected future interest rates on the bond and loan market directly affect current goods demand. The credit channel amplifies the output effects of isolated monetary disturbances. Taking changes in private (inflation and interest rate) expectations into account, we find that - contrarily to BERNANKE and BLINDER (1988) - the credit channel may also dampen the output effects of monetary disturbances. The expansionary effects of a monetary expansion may be substantially diminished if the monetary disturbance is accompanied by a contractionary credit shock. In a dynamic version of our model, in which expectations are formed endogenously, we find that the credit channel amplifies output responses.

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