scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 555-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noriaki Okamoto
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Ausubel Auction

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. (JEL D44)

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

scholarly journals Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 361-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Baisa
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Multiunit Auctions ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Multidimensional Types ◽  
Normal Goods

I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non‐quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single‐dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multidimensional types.

Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (6) ◽  
pp. 1477-1506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kleiner ◽  
Benny Moldovanu
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Practical Design ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Sincere Voting ◽  
Strategic Skills

We analyze sequential, binary voting schemes in settings where several privately informed agents have single-peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives, and we focus on robust equilibria that do not depend on assumptions about the players' beliefs about each other. Our main results identify two intuitive conditions on binary voting trees, ensuring that sincere voting at each stage forms an ex post perfect equilibrium. In particular, we uncover a strong rationale for content-based agendas: if the outcome should not be sensitive to beliefs about others, nor to the deployment of strategic skills, the agenda needs to be built “from the extremes to the middle” so that more extreme alternatives are both more difficult to adopt, and are put to vote before other, more moderate options. An important corollary is that, under simple majority, the equilibrium outcome of the incomplete information game is always the Condorcet winner. Finally, we aim to guide the practical design of schemes that are widely used by legislatures and committees and we illustrate our findings with several case studies. (JEL D71, D72, I10, J16, J32, K10)

scholarly journals Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (9) ◽  
pp. 2528-2551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Levin ◽  
Andrzej Skrzypacz
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Demand Curves ◽  
Demand Reduction ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Good Setting ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
Homogeneous Good

The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction. (JEL D44, D47, H82, L13)

An Introduction of Evolutionary Computation in Auctions

2007 ◽  
pp. 771-785
Author(s):  
A. Mochon ◽  
Y. Saez
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Computation ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Auction Theory ◽  
Drop Out ◽  
Bidding Strategy ◽  
Demand Curves ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Recent Method ◽  
Ausubel Auction ◽  
The Subject

The increasing use of auctions as a selling mechanism has led to a growing interest in the subject. Thus both auction theory and experimental examinations of these theories are being developed. A recent method used for carrying out research on auctions has been the design of computational simulations. The aim of this chapter is to give a background about auction theory and to present how evolutionary computation techniques can be applied to auctions. Besides, a complete review to the related literature is also made. Finally, an explained example shows how a genetic algorithm can help automatically find bidders’ optimal strategies for a specific dynamic multi-unit auction—the Ausubel auction—with private values, drop-out information, and with several rationing rules implemented. The method provides the bidding strategy (defined as the action to be taken under different auction conditions) that maximizes the bidder’s payoff. The algorithm is tested under several experimental environments that differ in the elasticity of their demand curves, number of bidders, and quantity of lots auctioned. The results suggest that the approach leads to strategies that outperform sincere bidding when rationing is needed.

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