scholarly journals Consumers as Tax Auditors

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (9) ◽  
pp. 3031-3072 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joana Naritomi
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Detection Probability ◽  
Sao Paulo ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Fixed Costs ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
Behavioral Biases ◽  
Verification System ◽  
Enforcement Value

To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in São Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent. (JEL D22, H25, H26, L25, O14, O17)

scholarly journals How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Social Success ◽  
Low Level ◽  
The World ◽  
Distortionary Taxes ◽  
High Level

American visitors to Scandinavian countries are often puzzled by what they observe: despite large income redistribution through distortionary taxes and transfers, these are very high-income countries. They rank among the highest in the world in terms of income per capita, as well as most other economic and social outcomes. The economic and social success of Scandinavia poses important questions for economics and for those arguing against large redistribution based on its supposedly detrimental effect on economic growth and welfare. How can Scandinavian countries raise large amounts of tax revenue for redistribution and social insurance while maintaining some of the strongest economic outcomes in the world? Combining micro and macro evidence, this paper identifies three policies that can help explain this apparent anomaly: the coverage of third-party information reporting (ensuring a low level of tax evasion), the broadness of tax bases (ensuring a low level of tax avoidance), and the strong subsidization of goods that are complementary to working (ensuring a high level of labor force participation). The paper also presents descriptive evidence on a variety of social and cultural indicators that may help in explaining the economic and social success of Scandinavia.

scholarly journals Sustainable Consumer Tax Evasion Theory under Information Inattention

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 562
Author(s):  
Bodo Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Detection Probability ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Income Levels ◽  
Theory Of Information ◽  
Financial Penalty ◽  
Public Policy Debate

This article studies the renewed interest surrounding sustainable public finance and the topic of tax evasion as well as the new theory of information inattention. Extending a model of tax evasion with the notion of inattention reveals novel findings about policy instruments that can be used to mitigate tax evasion. We show that the attention parameters regarding tax rates, financial penalty schemes and income levels are as important as the level of the detection probability and the financial penalty incurred. Thus, our theory recommends the enhancement of sustainability in public policy, particularly in tax policy. Consequently, the paper contributes both to the academic and public policy debate.

Macroeconomics of money laundering: effects and measurements

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nella Hendriyetty ◽  
Bhajan S. Grewal
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Macroeconomic Conditions ◽  
Illicit Flows

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review studies focusing on the magnitude of money laundering and their effects on a country’s economy. The relevant concepts are identified on the basis of discussions in the literature by prominent scholars and policy makers. There are three main objectives in this review: first, to discuss the effects of money laundering on a country’s macro-economy; second, to seek measurements from other scholars; and finally, to seek previous findings about the magnitude and the flows of money laundering. Design/methodology/approach In the first part, this paper outlines the effects of money laundering on macroeconomic conditions of a country, and then the second part reviews the literature that measures the magnitude of money laundering from an economic perspective. Findings Money laundering affects a country’s economy by increasing shadow economy and criminal activities, illicit flows and impeding tax collection. To minimise these negative effects, it is necessary to quantify the magnitude of money laundering relative to economic conditions to identify the most vulnerable aspects of money laundering in a country. Two approaches are used in this study: the first is the capital flight approach, as money laundering will cause flows of money between countries; the second is the economic approach for measuring money laundering through economic variables (e.g. tax revenue, underground economy and income generated by criminals) separately from tax evasion. Originality/value The paper offers new insights for the measurement of money laundering, especially for developing countries. Most methods in quantifying money laundering have focused on developed countries, which are less applicable to developing countries.

scholarly journals The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues

2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (4II) ◽  
pp. 405-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahseen Ajaz ◽  
Eatzaz Ahmad
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Tax Administration ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Revenue Generation ◽  
Quality Of Governance

Developing countries are typically unable to generate sufficient amount of revenue from taxation because these countries face a number of institutional problems in the process of revenue generation. One of the main problems is corruption in tax administration. The two important components of revenue generation are tax administration and tax system reforms [Brondolo, et al. (2008)]. The main objective of these is to increase the efficiency of tax administrations, specifically by reducing corruption and tax evasion. The second main problem of low revenue generation is political instabilities in developing countries. One of the important characteristics of political instability is unstable and governments and, hence, incoherent policy framework, which hinder in the process of long-term reforms in the system. The quality of governance as a whole is also relevant in this context. It is widely agreed that the presence of tax evasion and corruption of public officials is a social phenomenon that can significantly reduce tax revenue and seriously hurt economic growth and development.

scholarly journals Analisis Kinerja Keuangan Provinsi Jambi

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 628
Author(s):  
Sudirman Sudirman ◽  
Susilawati Susilawati
Keyword(s):  
Central Government ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Domestic Product ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Dependency Ratio ◽  
Regional Income ◽  
Economic Growth Rate ◽  
Regional Autonomy ◽  
Local Revenue ◽  
Revenue Elasticity

The contribution of local revenue (PAD) to regional income during the 2012-2016 period on average was 37.99% per annum and for 2012 the contribution of local revenue to regional income was 37.02%. This is due to the fact that the receipt of original regional income from third party contributions is very large. On average during the period of 2012-2016 the ability of local tax is relatively low if linked to the Gross Regional Domestic Product. While the power of regional retribution if associated with Gross Regional Domestic Product is also still relatively low, but has increased from year to year. This shows that management management in receiving regional retribution has increased. On average during the 2012-2016 period the realization of local tax revenues reached 103.63% per year (very effective) from the target of local tax revenue. In addition, the realization of regional retribution revenue reaches 103.20% per year (very effective) from the target of receiving regional retribution. Whereas the realization of BUMD profit income only reached 131.01% per year (very effective) from the target of BUMD profit income and the realization of other revenue from legitimate PAD only reached 109.36% per annum (very effective). On average, the economic growth rate of Jambi Province is 5.18% per year, it is expected that the increase in local tax revenue elasticity will increase by 8.90% per year. elasticity of the increase in regional retribution receipts is 12.91% per year. The dependency ratio of Jambi Province in the period of 2012-2016 was an average of 31.69 percent per year. Jambi province's regional autonomy ratio in the 2012-2016 period is an average of 12 percent per year with instructive conditions means it is very dependent on the central government

Demarcation Between the Concepts of Tax Evasion, Tax Planning and Aggressive Tax Planning in the Russian and Foreign Practice

Financial law ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 32-36
Author(s):  
Natalya G. Andrianova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Border Trade ◽  
The Russian Federation

One of the main consequences of globalization is development of cross-border trade of goods, work and services, emergence of multinational enterprises operating on the territory of two or more jurisdictions. Taxation of multinational enterprises is always controversial taking into consideration seeking of balance of public and private interests which involves taxpayer’s desire to decrease the amount of payable taxes and reverse governmental interest in obtainment of the full amount of the tax revenue. The article covers and differentiates the main models of taxpayer’s behavior aimed at reducing the amount of payable taxes: tax evasion, tax planning and aggressive tax planning, the harm caused by these activities to governmental budget revenues. The article deals with Russian and foreign legal framework and practice of each of the abovementioned legal phenomenon, highlighted the necessity of statutory recognition in the Russian Federation of the term “tax planning” and its principles to define its limits clearly. The article outlines different approaches to the term “aggressive tax planning” and the limits of this term, importance of cooperation among jurisdictions and information exchange to detect and give appropriate legislative and administrative responses for aggressive tax planning schemes.

scholarly journals Tax evasion and financial instability

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 531-539
Author(s):  
Peterson K. Ozili
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Exploratory Study ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Financial Systems ◽  
Content Type

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the association between tax evasion and financial instability. The discussion also examines the effects of tax evasion for financial instability. Design/methodology/approach This paper is an exploratory study on the effect of tax evasion on financial instability Findings The paper shows that tax evasion can reduce the tax revenue available to governments to manage the economy and can weaken the government’s ability to promote stability in financial systems, whereas on the contrary, taxpayers who evade taxes feel they can use the evaded tax money to rather improve their own financial stability. Originality/value This paper presents the first attempt to carefully examine the association between tax evasion and financial instability.

scholarly journals Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Carrillo ◽  
Dina Pomeranz ◽  
Monica Singhal
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Policy Intervention ◽  
Tax Collection ◽  
Tax Enforcement ◽  
A Priority

Reducing tax evasion is a priority for many governments. A growing literature argues that verifying taxpayer reports against third-party information is critical for tax collection. However, effectiveness can be limited when tax authorities face constraints to credible enforcement and taxpayers make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We exploit a policy intervention in which Ecuadorian firms were notified about detected revenue discrepancies. Most firms simply failed to respond. Firms that responded increased reported revenue, matching the discrepancy amount when provided. However, they also increased reported costs by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in tax collection. (JEL D22, H25, H26, O23)

scholarly journals How can We Measure the VAT Fraud and Evasion? Case of Albania

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Ledjon Shahini ◽  
Arben Malaj
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Budget Deficit ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Threshold Level ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
National Accounts ◽  
Administration System ◽  
Budget Revenue

Taxation is one of the most important fiscal instruments which in many case is used to recover the economy performance of a country. It is the main budget revenue and its role in decreasing budget deficit is undisputed. The intensity of the instrument efficiency is depended although by the level of tax evasion in the country. At this point, knowing the level of tax evasion from one side is one of the most important topics that fiscal policy could work and from the other side improving the tax administration system is a purpose for public financial stability. The focus of the paper will be only on the value added tax (VAT) as the main tax revenue component in Albania with about 37 % of total tax revenue. In the absence of a comprehensive analysis between VAT that should have been paid by all taxpayers and real VAT collected, the divergence between them could be considered as VAT evasion, or known as VAT gap, which will be our objective measurement. Calculations will be based on the data from the national accounts (Supply-Use Tables), more concretely on the use side of the economy. All the variables of final demand are treated at a very detailed level specifying the VAT ratio by product and the threshold level for each component of final use. Estimations are done for year 2011 as the latest year where the Supply Use Tables are available for Albania.

scholarly journals Tax amnesty and secondary tax evasion

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-139
Author(s):  
Yu-Kun Wang ◽  
Li Zhang ◽  
We-Me Ho
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Initial Assessment ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Tax Amnesty ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
Assessment Period ◽  
The Government ◽  
Behavioural Aspects

AbstractThough tax amnesties (TAs) are considered as a policy tool to increase revenue for governments, they have generated some puzzles. To solve the puzzles of TA we should not ignore the behavioural aspects of delinquent taxpayers. In this paper, we focus on a relatively neglected but important area of the TA literature. Considering that people who participate in tax amnesty policy (TAP) may not honestly report the whole amounts of evaded tax, thus they commit a secondary tax evasion. We indicate that even considering the risk of abstaining from TA and incurring possible uncertainty of tax evasion penalties, participating in a TA provides a higher level of utility for the delinquent taxpayers. Also, due to a secondary tax evasion usually accompanying with TA, we show that during the initial assessment period of a TAP the tax revenue drastically increases and when the assessment period is approaching the tax revenue stably declines and ultimately converges to a fixed value. Furthermore, we show that if delinquent taxpayers participate in the TAP and the penalties are larger than the expected tax revenue of the government, it increases the tax revenue without reducing the welfare of other taxpayers, so as to achieving Pareto improvement.

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